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Abstract 
The identification of possible hazards in chemical plants is a very important part of the 
design process. This is because of the potential danger that large chemical installations 
pose to the public. One possible route for speeding up the identification of hazards in 
chemical plants is to use computers to identify hazards automatically. This will facilitate 
safe plant design and will avoid late design changes which can be very costly to 
implement. 
Previous research at Loughborough has concentrated on developing a model-based 
approach and an analysis algorithm for automating hazard identification. The results 
generated have demonstrated the technical feasibility of the approach. This approach 
requires a knowledge-base of unit models. This library of models describes how different 
plant equipment behaves in qualitative terms. 
The research described in this thesis develops a method for creating and testing the 
equipment models. The model library was previously achieved by an expert writing the 
models in a format that could be directly used by the system described above. An 
engineer unfamililar with the system would find this difficult. An alternative method 
would have been to use an intermediary (a knowledge engineer) to gather information 
from the engineer and convert it into the system format. This would be expensive. Both 
methods would take up a lot of the engineer's time. An engineer should be able to enter 
information personally in order to maintain efficiency and avoid information loss through 
the intermediary. A front end interface has been built to the system which enables an 
expert to enter information directly without needing to understand details of the 
application system. This interface incorporates ideas from the knowledge acquisition field 
in order to produce a tool that is simple to use. 
Unit-based qualitative modelling can lead to incorrect or ambiguous inference. The 
method developed here identifies situations where ambiguities may arise. A new modular 
approach is presented to overcome this type of problem. This method also presents a 
technique to verify that the models created are both complete and correct. 
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1. Introduction 
The research described in this thesis develops a method for creating and testing equipment 
models for process plants. The models are necessary for the modelling of fault 
propagation. Many applications utilise fault propagation modelling to identify and assess 
hazards or to diagnose faults. A computer-aided modelling tool, Equipment Model 
Builder, has been constructed to demonstrate this method. This introduction begins by 
considering why a method is needed. Further sections provide an overview of the project 
and describe the structure of this thesis. 
1.1. Motivations 
Modelling fault propagation requires the representation of process variable deviations and 
the causes and effects of these deviations in qualitative terms. This section will begin by 
briefly describing the concept of qualitative models, why they are useful and explaining 
why they are difficult to construct. The need for a method to aid an engineer in 
constructing these models is considered. 
Qualitative modelling does not require detailed quantitative infon-nation (which 
may be difficult or expensive to acquire or simply unnecessary) in order to describe a 
physical system. Numerical methods give precise answers but if a broader outlook is 
required then qualitative reasoning can provide the solution to a whole class of problems. 
As well as providing a description of the physical system, qualitative modelling can be 
used to explain how the system functions. As qualitative models do not refer to numeric 
values, precise values are abstracted into symbolic ones. For example, a change in a value 
for a process variable such as flow might be depicted qualitatively as increasing. 
Qualitative model construction is recognised as a difficult task (Schut and 
Bredeweg, 1994). However, no guidelines exist as to how to build the models. 
Consequently there are no tools to aid in signed directed graph model construction. Many 
applications such as those described in section 2.3. require a good library of component 
models. To create a model library for one of these applications requires an engineer to 
write the models in a format that can be directly used by the application program. An 
engineer who is unfamiliar with the system would find this difficult. An alternative 
method would be to use an intermediary (a knowledge engineer) to gather information 
from the expert and convert it into the application system format. This would be 
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expensive and time consuming. Both methods would take up a lot of the engineer's time. 
The engineer should be able to enter information directly in order to maintain efficiency 
and avoid information loss through the intermediary. 
Models constructed using these methods are normally for a particular purpose only 
and are difficult to reuse and verify. Much of the experience gained about how to 
construct the models (i. e. methodologies) will be lost once a project is completed. In all 
forms of modelling errors will occur due to omissions, mistakes and lack of knowledge. 
These errors will need to be identified and corrected. Model building also requires 
knowledge of what is important to model and what approximations and abstractions to 
make. Currently this is subjective and will result in non-uniform models, making them 
difficult to update, compare and detect errors in. If the assumptions for a model are not 
explicitly stated then there is a likelihood that the model may be inappropriately applied. 
A method is needed which enables an eng ineer to enter information directly 
without needing to understand details of the model format or the application. The engineer 
should be informed which is the most important part of the model to build first or if any 
parts of the model are missing. 
The equipment models considered by this thesis use the signed directed graph 
representation. This representation is described in section 2.1.2. Signed directed graphs 
are a form of qualitative model. 
1.2. Project Overview 
This thesis develops a method to construct signed directed graph models simply and 
correctly. A computer-aided modelling tool, Equipment Model Builder, has been built to 
demonstrate this method. Three main contributions have been made by this thesis. These 
are: 
1. Creating a front end interface enabling an engineer to enter modelling information 
directly; 
2. Developing a novel modular approach which provides a methodology to remove a 
specific type of ambiguity which arises when unit models are combined; 
3. Developing verification techniques for the models created. 
A front end interface has been developed. By following the method provided by 
the interface an engineer is able to create models directly without being required to know 
exact details of model structure. In order to fulfil the requirement that the method should 
be simple to use and aid the engineer in building correct models ideas from the knowledge 
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acquisition field have been incorporated into the interface. This results in a tool for 
constructing signed directed graph models which is simple to use. 
Knowledge acquisition tools are a type of modelling tool although they are not 
described as such. This is because they have been developed in a different field. 
Knowledge acquisition tools provide aids to allow the expert to achieve a structured input 
of information without knowledge of the internal format of the expert systems that these 
types of tools are acquiring information for. Knowledge acquisition tools are surveyed in 
chapter 3. 
In order for a model to be correct it must be free from ambiguities. This thesis 
considers ambiguities due to multiple causal paths which occur when unit models are 
combined to form a system. Problems can occur when one path has a contradictory effect 
compared to another. The result of the addition of the effects of these paths cannot be 
determined unambiguously. A novel modular approach is developed which provides a 
methodology to remove the ambiguities caused by multiple causal paths. 
Verification is necessary to detect modelling errors which may give rise to wrong 
results when the models are utilised. A series of verification techniques for signed 
directed graph models is described. 
The three parts of the method overlap. The user interface also forms part of the 
module and verification tools. Verification is a feature of many knowledge acquisition 
tools. 
The models created by Equipment Model Builder are utilised by the QUEEN 
system (Chung, 1993) described in section 2.4. This is to show that the models created are 
sufficient to be of use. Equipment Model Builder should not be regarded as application 
specific. The tool takes as input a description of a plant and a library of plant models. A 
modified plant description and a file of unit models occurring within the plant are created. 
This information forms the output for QUEEN. 
1.3. Layout of Thesis 
Chapter 2 considers the modelling of fault propagation in process plants using signed 
directed graph and functional equation representations. These two representations are 
equivalent. How ambiguities may arise within the qualitative models created is described. 
Applications of the representations are discussed. The expert system QUEEN, which 
provides a common set of procedures for these applications, is described. Related work 
which considers how qualitative models are created is detailed. 
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Chapter 3 surveys knowledge acquisition tools in order to determine their desirable 
features in relation to qualitative modelling. 
Chapter 4 gives an overview of Equipment Model Builder. How the tool creates 
output for QUEEN is detailed. The tool's user interface is described. 
Chapter 5 explains the modular approach developed and how it is implemented. 
Chapter 6 describes the verification techniques used by Equipment Model Builder. 
Chapter 7 presents two case studies to assess the method implemented by the tool. 
The final chapter describes the contributions made by this thesis. Limitations of 
the work are considered and possibilities for future work discussed. 
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2. Fault Propagation 
This chapter will discuss the modelling of fault propagation in process plants. Fault 
propagation determines the effects of a causal fault upon the process variables of a given 
plant. Modelling fault propagation requires representing the propagation of input process 
variable deviations into output process variable deviations and the causes and effects of 
these deviations in qualitative terms. Computer-aided qualitative modelling allows well- 
defined models to be produced, facilitating model re-use and validation. It by-passes the 
process of manual modelling thus leading to some saving of time. This thesis will only 
examine computer-aided qualitative modelling. 
Qualitative modelling comes from the field of qualitative physics and is concerned 
with developing a variety of models for physical phenomena and engineered systems 
(Falkenhainer and Forbus, 1990). A model is an abstract representation of a physical 
system, providing knowledge about a system, its parts and their relationships. A model 
should provide an adequate description of the system but only take into account those 
aspects that are relevant to the required perspective. The most appropriate model for a 
given application should be generated and used. 
Quantitative numeric methods have traditionally been used for detailed design. 
However, for many engineering tasks numerical methods are not always required or 
suitable. Qualitative reasoning is able to provide statements about the possible behaviour 
of dynamic systems, emphasising a causal explanation of the behaviour derived from a 
structural description. Numerical methods give precise answers but if a broader outlook is 
required then qualitative reasoning can provide the solution to a whole class of problems. 
Qualitative reasoning does not require detailed quantitative information (which may be 
difficult or expensive to acquire or simply unnecessary) in order to describe a physical 
system. As well as providing a description of the physical system, qualitative reasoning 
can be used to explain how the system functions. As qualitative models do not refer to 
numeric values, precise values are abstracted into symbolic ones. For example, a change 
in a value for a process variable such as flow might be depicted qualitatively as increasing. 
Within the process engineering field qualitative reasoning has been applied to alarm 
analysis (Andow and Lees, 1975), fault diagnosis (Wilcox and Himmelblau, 1994), fault 
tree synthesis (Lapp and Powers, 1977) and hazard identification (Catino and Lyle, 1995; 
Larkin et al., 1997). 
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This chapter will discuss representations used for fault propagation. How 
ambiguities may arise within the qualitative models created is described. Applications of 
the representations are discussed. A general purpose tool which provides a common set of 
procedures for these applications is described. The penultimate section discusses related 
work which considers how the qualitative models are created. The chapter concludes by 
stating the type of ambiguities which this thesis will consider. A new methodology is 
proposed which overcomes this type of ambiguity. 
2.1. Representations 
Fault propagation may be represented in a number of ways. Some forms of representation 
are functional equations, program rules, reliability block diagrams, influence graphs, 
signed directed graphs, logical expressions, truth tables, fault trees, event trees and bond 
graphs. It is possible to map between some of these representations (Aldersey et al., 
1991). The representations considered here are functional equations and signed directed 
graphs because they are most widely used in the modelling of fault propagation within 
process plants. It will be shown later that these two representations are equivalent. 
Process plant are built by connecting a set of smaller units together to perform the required 
functions. How the unit descriptions are combined so the fault propagation behaviour of 
the whole plants can be analysed will be described. 
2.1.1. Functional Equations 
Functional equations have been developed by Lees and co-workers (Andow and Lees, 
1975; Parmar and Lees, 1987; Hunt 1992) and used to create plant unit models. The 
types of functional equation considered here are: 
(i) propagation equations; 
(ii) event statements. 
Propagation equations describe the relationship between the output variable of a 
unit and the input and other output variables of the unit. An example of a propagation 
equation is: 
L =f(Q in, -Q out) 
This signifies that the level L increases if the inlet flow 'Q in' increases or the outlet flow 
out' decreases, and vice versa. In fault propagation modelling it is necessary to 
consider two way propagation of flow. For example, a leak will cause an increase in flow 
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upstream and a decrease in flow downstream. Two way propagation of flow is modelled 
using, by convention, the flow variable Q and the pressure gradient variable G. The 
resulting propagation equations are: 
1. G in =f(Q in, Q out) 
2. Q out =f(G in, G out) 
Equation I indicates that the inlet pressure gradient 'G in' increases if the inlet flow 'Q in' 
increases or if the outlet flow 'Q out' increases, and vice versa. Equation 2 indicates that 
the outlet flow 'Q out' increases if the inlet pressure gradient 'G in' increases or if the 
outlet pressure gradient 'G out' increases, and the reverse. Both equations are used in the 
unit model to propagate flow in both directions. 
Propagation equations describe how a fault propagates. Event statements describe 
how a deviation is initiated or terminated. Initial event statements model the way basic 
faults in units affect the variables propagating out of the unit. They take the form: 
Initial fault: variable deviation 
For example, the following states that the outlet flow 'Q out' will be low if there is a 
partial blockage: 
partial blockage: Q out low 
A terminal event represents the termination of a variable deviation. Terminal 
events are usually undesired events or hazards. A terminal event statement takes the form: 
Variable deviation: terminal event 
For example, the following states that if the pressure T out' is high there is overpressure 
of the unit: 
P out high: overpressure 
2.1.2. Signed Directed Graphs 
Wide use has been made of signed directed graphs in modelling fault propagation (for 
example, Lapp and Powers, 1977; Iri et al., 1981; Shiozaki et al., 1985; Kramer and 
Palowitch, 1987; Chung, 1993; Larkin et al., 1997). A signed directed graph (SDG) 
consists of an influence graph with labelled arcs. An influence graph contains the 
variables in a physical system which are depicted as nodes. These are connected by arcs to 
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reflect the influence the variables have on one another. An arc from a node X, to another 
node Y, indicates that a change in the variable X will cause a change in the variable Y: 
x 
An influence is defined as a causal relation between two variables or simply how one 
variable affects the other. Several variations of signed directed graph exist in which the 
arcs may be labelled differently. A convention commonly. used is to label each arc of the 
graph with a sign'+' or'-'. The sign'+' indicates a positive influence, i. e. Y will increase 
if X is increased and Y will decrease if X is decreased. The sign '-' indicates a negative 
influence, i. e. Y will decrease if X is increased and Y will increase if X is decreased. '+' 
and'-' can be shown as '+I' and '-V as in the work of Kohda and Henley (1987) who also 
use '0' to indicate what they call nullification or no influence between the variables. 
Some workers also use '+ 10' to denote a very large positive influence and '- 10' to 
denote a very large negative influence (Lapp and Powers, 1977; Andrews and Brennan, 
1990; Chang and Hwang, 1992). These large deviations are defined as being beyond the 
capacity of the system to rectify. Larkin et al. (1997) found the use of the two signs '+' 
and '-' not rich enough to represent all of the possible relationships between process 
variables. They have developed a representation allowing the relationship between 
variables to be more explicitly specified using a code of extended signs. An arc with code 
'N' is represented in the SDG as: 
N 
0 
Table 2.1 gives the interpretations for 'N'. 
Extended sign value (N) Interpretation 
+ high X high Y 
low X low Y 
high X low Y 
low X high Y 
++ high X high Y 
high X low Y 
low X low Y 
low X high Y 
Table 2.1 Interpretation of Coded Arcs 
To model fault propagation the basic SDG representation is extended by the 
addition of causes (of deviations) and adverse consequences. The cause and consequence 
nodes are linked into the deviation network. Cause nodes represent the faults (failure 
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modes) of units. Consequence nodes represent potentially hazardous events arising from 
causes or deviations. Using this extended representation the node 'X' of the SDG shown 
could be a process variable deviation or a fault. The node 'Y' could be a process variable 
deviation or a consequence. 
SDG's are an equivalent representation to functional equations. The nodes in an 
SDG which represent process variable deviations are equivalent to propagation equations. 
For example, assume that 'Q in' represents flow at an inlet port of a unit and 'Q out' flow 
at an outlet port. The propagation equation 'Q out pump = J(Q in purnp)' could 
interchange with the partial signed directed graph: 
pump, out, flow .+0 pump, 
in, flow 
Those nodes in the SDG which represent faults can be modelled by initial event 
statements. For example, 'pump, partial blockage: Q out pump low' is equivalent to: 
pump, partial blockage PUMP, flow, out 
Nodes representing consequences can be modelled by terminal event statements. For 
example, assume that 'P out' represents pressure at the outlet port of a unit. The statement 
'P out pump high: pump, overpressure' may be modelled by: 
pump, pressure, out pump, overpressure 
2.1.3. Plant Models from Unit Models 
To construct a model for a whole plant can be very time consuming. However process 
plants are built by connecting together a set of smaller units to carry out the required 
functions. The behaviour of each of these types of units can be modelled generically so 
that it will apply to any plant in which the unit is used. The assumption is made that the 
causal relationships within an item of equipment are independent of the context in which 
the equipment is used in the plant. By combining the unit models the behaviour of the 
whole plant can be analysed. This unit-based approach is widely used (Chung, 1993; 
Vaidhyanathan and Venkatasubramanian, 1995; Catino et al., 1991). The SDG and 
functional equation representations can be used to create unit models. 
For the SDG representation each unit model consists of a mini-SDG. The mini- 
SDG shows how a change in one process variable affects another variable in the same unit. 
Deviations occurring in the unit can be propagated to other units via inport and outport 
connections. An SDG for a complete plant is created by joining together the appropriate 
mini-SDGs based on the plant topology. Consider the simple fluid flow system displayed 
in figure 2.1. A partial SDG model of the system may be created from its constituent 
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mini-SDG's as shown in figure 2.2. The mini-SDG's for the pipe, pump and heater are 
separated by dashed lines. Only arcs for the process variable 'flow' and one initiating fault 
arc are given. 
heater 
pump 
pipe 
Figure 2.1 A Simple Fluid Flow System 
consequence, contaminate environment o+ leak Pipe 
in, flow ou flow 
...................................................................................................... ++*, -*-* ...... 
ou ow in, flow 
........................................................................... .......................................................... ++ Heater 
in, flow out, flow 
figure 2.2 A Partial Signed Directed Graph of a Simple Fluid Flow System 
The mini-SDG's are joined together to create the model of the simple fluid flow system by 
linking: 
spipe, out, flow' to 'pump, in, flow', 'pump, out, flow' to 'heater, in, flow'; 
'heater, in, flow' to 'pump, out, flow', 'pump, in, flow' to 'pipe, out, flow'. 
By similar reasoning functional equation unit models may be linked together with 
propagation equations to create a process plant model. The linking propagation equations 
model inport and outport connections between the constituent units of the plant. The 
equivalent linkages for the simple fluid flow system would be: 
Q out pump =AQ out pipe), Q in heater =AQ out pump), 
Q out pump =AQ in heater), Q out pipe =AQ in pump). 
How any one variable affects another can be found by identifying an acyclic path 
within the plant model between the two variables. An acyclic path is a path where all the 
nodes within the SDG (or statements in the case of functional equations) appear only once. 
10 
For example, how the leak in the pipe in the simple fluid flow system shown in figure 2.1 
affects the out flow of the heater is given by the following acyclic path: 
pipejeak -" pipe, out, flow 
+o 
pump, in, flow 
+0 
PUMPIOUt'now 
+P heater, in, flow 
I+ 
heater, out, flow 
The product of all the signs in the path is '-'. This means that the fault 'leak' will cause a 
decrease in 'out flow' of the heater. If no path exists between any two variables then the 
variables are independent. 
To generate a plant model in this way requires a library of unit models of all the 
different types of units that are used in the plant. Individual plant units may be recognised 
by creating instances of the unit models and assigning a unique identifier to each instance. 
2.2. Model Ambiguities 
Although the use of qualitative models has many advantages, reasoning based on 
qualitative models can lead to ambiguous results. For example, arithmetic operations such 
as addition and subtraction cannot be represented unambiguously. The overall effect of 
combining a variable that is increasing with one that is decreasing can be an increase, 
decrease or no effect. This sub-section describes current approaches to resolve the 
ambiguities which can arise in qualitative models. The approaches fall into three 
categories: 
1. those due to the initial and final effects within feedback; 
2. those due to unrealistic scenarios; 
3. those due to multiple causal paths. 
A path is a directed series of nodes and arcs in the SDG. All the approaches in category I 
construct an SDG for the whole process plant. The unit-based approach is not used. 
2.2.1. Ambiguities due to Initial and Final Effects 
Feedback occurs when the effects of change in a system return in time to influence the 
source of the change. Feedback causes ambiguities by introducing opposing effects on 
variables which cannot be resolved qualitatively. The initial response of a variable to a 
fault (failure mode) is caused by the direct effects of the fault. These direct effects are 
transmitted on acyclic paths within the SDG between the fault and the variable under 
consideration. The final response will take account of all paths through the SDG between 
the fault and the variable. Feedback may cancel the initial response, outweigh it or be 
insufficient to outweigh or cancel the initial response. 
An example of feedback is given by Oyeleye and Kramer (1988). The effect ot'a 
slow partial blockage in the outlet pipe of an open tank (shown in figure 2.3) is described. 
A partial SDG model for the tank is given in figure 2.4. Only arcs for the process 
variables 'flow' and 'level', and the fault 'partly blocked' are shown. 
Figure 2.3 An Open Tank 
in, flow o liquid, level out, flow 4 partly blocked 
Figure 2.4 A Partial Signed Directed Graph for an Open Tank 
The reasoning of Oyeleye and Kramer is shown below, although in pi.,, iii, ý :,, 
depicted is unlikely. 
The initial responsc Ps descrihed hý the m-cs: 
liquid, level 4 out'llmN 4 partly blocked 
The slow partial blockage in the outlet pipe of the tank causes 'out 
floNA" to 
decrease. This leads to 'level' increasing. The final response corresponds to the 
path: 
liquid, level 0 out, flow 4 partly blocked 
The increased 'level' causes 'out flow' to increase and return to its original value. 
In reality for 'out flow' to return to its original value would require 'level' to increase to a 
great extent. The tank is unlikely to be big enough to allow 'level' to increase to this 
extent. The tank would overflow before 'level' reached this value. Whether 'out flow' 
can return to equilibrium will depend upon the relative sizes of the tank and the partial 
blockage. These sizes will determine if the arc 
liquid, level 0 Out, flow 
is of the sarne order of magnitude as the arc 
liquid, level -o out, flow 
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and hence if the two competing influences will cancel out, allowing 'out flow' to return to 
its original value. In practise the negative influence will be almost always be larger than 
the positive and equilibrium will not be reached. Oyeleye and Kramer assume the partial 
blockage is sufficiently small to allow equilibrium to be reached. However it is debatable 
if this will ever occur. 
Approaches to deal with ambiguities due to initial and final effects are those of 
Oyeleye and Kramer (1988), Rose and Kramer (1991), Chang and Yu (1990) and Fanti et 
al. (1993). Rose and Kramer build on the work of Oyeleye and Kramer. Fanti et al. refine 
the work of Rose and Kramer. These approaches rely on analysis algorithms or filtering 
rules to remove the ambiguities or incorrect values. 
Each approach will be described in turn. How it may applied to the example given 
in figure 2.3 to determine the final response is detailed. In this example qualitative 
reasoning is unable to predict the final response with certainty as the relative magnitudes 
of the influences acting upon the arcs within the causal paths of the system cannot be 
depicted. These relative magnitudes are needed to determine whether or not the system 
will reach equilibrium. The correct final response is assumed to be that described by 
Oyeleye and Kramer. 
ZZ1.1. The Approach of Oyeleye and Kramer 
Oyeleye and Kramer (1988) derive the signed directed graph for a system from a dynamic 
process model. The initial response to a fault is traced via the direct effects within the 
SDG. To model final system responses an extension to the SDG, the ESDG (extended 
signed directed graph) is developed. The EDSG includes the final system response and 
minimises ambiguities. Extended signed directed graphs are similar to signed directed 
graphs but include in addition non-physical paths that represent inverse and compensatory 
responses due to feedback. An inverse response occurs when the final sign of a process 
variable in its steady state is opposite to its initial deviation. Compensatory response is 
when the variable returns to its nominal steady state value after an initial deviation. 
Inverse variables and compensatory variables are variables that respectively exhibit 
inverse and compensatory response to a fault due to feedback. 
To create the ESDG inverse variables and compensatory variables are located from 
the system topology using the rules given below. A simplified rule-set is given. To view 
the full set see Oyeleye and Kramer (1988). The necessary conditions for a variable to 
display inverse response are: 
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1. The variable is located in a feedback loop. 
2. The path due to feedback between the fault and the variable should contain a positive 
cycle or self cycle. A positive cycle is a path with the same initial and terminal nodes. 
The product of the signs on the arcs of this path sum to '+'. Variable self cycles are 
derived from the process equations. 
The conditions for a variable to show compensatory response are: 
1. The variable is located in a feedback loop. 
2. The path due to feedback between the fault and the variable should: 
(a) contain an integrating variable; 
(b) not have a cycle containing all the variables in the path due to feedback. 
An integrating variable is one with no (zero) self cycle. 
ESDG arcs are created to explain the behaviour not accounted for in the SDG. 
After identification of the inverse variables and compensatory variables, ESDG arcs are 
constructed that 'jump' over each string of adjacent inverse variables or compensatory 
variables. The sign of the arc is the product of the signs of the arcs on the path between 
the origin and termination of the ESDG arc. 
Using these rules the following ESDG may be created to model the tank shown in 
figure 2.3. 
in, flow liquid, level out, flow 4 partly blocked 
Figure 2.5 ESDG for an Open Tank 
There is a feedback path between the fault 'partly blocked' and the variable 'out, flow' 
consisting of 'liquid, level'. 'liquid, level' is an integrating variable as it has a zero self 
cycle. This means that 'out, floýv' 'is a compensatory variable with respect to the fault 
'partly blocked' and will return to its equilibrium value. The 8 function shown in figure 
2.5 reflects the net sign of the paths between the fault 'partly blocked' and 'liquid, level' in 
the SDG. It represents the effect of adding the two acyclic paths: 
liquid, level +0 out, flow +-I-- partlyblocked 
liquid, level +0 out'now 
The ESDG created enables the final response of the system to be predicted. 
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ZZLZ The Approach ofRose and Kramer 
To improve the analysis speed and reduce the memory requirements of the Oyeleye and 
Kramer method led Rose and Kramer (1991) to develop a method implemented as a 
qualitative simulator called QUAF. QUAF inspects the system topology to predict the 
initial and final responses of the process variables to a deviation initiated by a fault. The 
following is a simplified outline of QUAF: 
Consider the effect of a deviation initiated by a fault on a direct path between two nodes. 
1. The initial response for each variable on the path is the sign of the deviation multiplied 
by the net sign of the shortest non-cyclic path from the fault to the variable. 
2. If the variable examined in step I is not found in a feedback loop the final response to 
the fault is the qualitative sum of the direct effects. If the variable is in a feedback loop 
then: 
(a) If there is no integrating variable within the path due to feedback between the 
fault and the variable examined in step I and 
(i) the path does not contain a positive cycle or self cycle then the final 
response does not cancel the initial response. 
or 
(ii) the path contains a positive cycle or self cycle then the final response 
is ambiguous. 
or 
(b) If there is an integrating variable within the path due to feedback between the 
fault and the variable examined in step I the feedback cancels the initial response 
and the system returns to its original state. 
Applying QUAF to the tank shown in figure 2.3 there is one acyclic path from the 
fault 'partly blocked' to the variable 'out, flow'. 
out, flow +L- partly blocked 
The initial response given by the effect of this path is a decrease in 'out, flow'. There is a 
feedback path which consists of 'liquid, level'. As previously shown 'liquid, level' is an 
integrating variable as it has a zero self cycle. Utilising section 2(b) above QUAF predicts 
that the initial response is cancelled and 'out, flow' returns to its original value. 
15 
ZZ1.3. The Approach of Chang and Yu 
Chang and Yu (1990) criticise the Oyeleye and Kramer approach for its lack of 
modularity. When a fault initiates a deviation in a system it will move towards a new 
steady state by going through several states. Chang and Yu claim that by using states to 
depict the transition of a system response the diagnostic system becomes modular. They 
identify the states of a system depending on whether the compensatory variables have 
returned to their original state. States are obtained from the process model. When a 
variable returns to its original state its corresponding node is deleted and a new SDG is 
constructed. A number of SDG's representing the states of the system are constructed to 
describe the response to a fault. 
Ambiguities are further reduced by using steady-state analysis to check the 
consistency of the fault propagation. This requires an expert's judgement or a quantitative 
process model. Chang and Yu proceed to consider ambiguities pertaining to control loops. 
In control loops the true fault origin may be eliminated within a diagnostic system during 
transient. To overcome this problem the controlled variable is expressed in its velocity 
form. 
Applying Chang and Yu's method to the tank shown in figure 2.3 one 
compensatory variable, 'liquid, level' is identified. As only one compensatory variable is 
found this indicates that for this simple system there are no intermediate states between the 
initial response and the final steady state response. To model the final response the node 
'liquid, level' is deleted from the system, leaving 'in, flow' = 'out, flow'. The fault 'partly 
blocked' does not affect 'in, flow'. The response of 'in, flow' to the fault is none. It 
follows that the final response of 'out, flow' to the fault 'partly blocked' is none. 
ZZI. 4. The Approach of Fanti et aL 
All of the previous methods reduce the number of ambiguities but do not eliminate them. 
Fanti et al. (1993) follow on from Rose and Kramer's work by applying constraints to the 
method developed by Rose and Kramer to resolve the ambiguities. A mass conservation 
constraint is applied to the process as a whole to remove false paths. A program needs to 
be written to identify situations where the constraint can be applicable to resolve 
ambiguities. 
Considering the example given in figure 2.3 the overall mass balance at the steady 
state requires that 'in, flow' = 'out, flow'. The fault 'partly blocked' does not affect 
'in, flow', therefore the final response of 'out, flow' to this fault is none. 
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2.2.2. Ambiguities due to Unrealistic Scenarios 
On the basis of qualitative modelling alone in some cases it is impossible to decide 
whether or not a particular hazard scenario is realistic. An example of this is given by 
McCoy and Rushton (1997). A cooler (shown in figure 2.6) is described. A partial SDG 
model for the cooler is given in figure 2.7. 
Q. T j,, Key. 
(hot methanol) Hot methanol stream: 
Q. Q. flowrate T j,, inlet temperature 
(cooling water) 
T outlet temperature 
Cooling water stream: 
T. j, inlet temperature 
T,,.. outlet temperature 
Figure 2.6 A Methanol Cooler 
Twin 
+ 
T. "Out Q., 
T, 
nin 
r. 
out Q. 
Figure 2.7 A Partial SDG of a Cooler 
The SDG model predicts that high flow or low temperature of the coolant will cause a 
lower process fluid temperature. In the complete model this is linked to the possibility of 
the process fluid freezing. However, consider an application where the process fluid is 
methanol which has a freezing point of -94 
0 C, and the coolant is water which freezes at 
00C. This means that the cooling water would never be able to cause the methanol to 
freeze as it would have ceased to flow before reaching the freezing point of methanol. 
McCoy and Rushton (1997), Vaidhyanathan and Ventkatasubramanian (1996) and 
Srinivasan et al. (1997; 1998) suggest approaches to deal with this type of ambiguity by 
using additional quantitative knowledge to filter out the ambiguities. These methods are 
unit-based. McCoy and Rushton encode the additional quantitative knowledge in a set of 
conditions attached to the relevant arcs in the SDG. These conditions are tested for 
whenever the qualitative reasoning system considers the validity of a path through the 
graph. A similar method is employed by Vaidhyanathan and Ventkatasubramanian. 
Srinivasan et al. perform an analysis using quantitative models on those parts of the plant 
which cannot be qualitatively modelled without ambiguities. The quantitative models use 
a state-transition representation of the system. Each state has a set of differential and 
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algebraic equations associated with it describing the systern in that state. When certain 
logical conditions are satisfied transitions between states are triggered. For safetý 
verification the process is considered unsafe when the process variables take values in 
undesirable ranges. How those areas of the plant requiring quantitative analysis are 
identified is not specified. 
These types of ambiguities are not considered further by this thesis as they are the 
subject of another research project at Loughborough University. 
2.2.3. Ambiguities due to Multiple Causal Paths 
For many plant structures the combination of generic process units provides an efficient 
method of creating a plant model. However for some plant structures combining unit 
models together may not result in a correct plant model. Combining units can lead to 
ambiguities or incorrect model behaviour. The type of ambiguities being discussed here 
are due to Multiple paths between pairs of nodes and hence multiple paths of influence 
between the nodes. Problems can occur when one path has a contradictory eff , ect 
compared to another. The result of the addition of the effects of these paths cannot be 
determined unambiguously. The simple plant loop shown in figure 2.8 is used to illustrate 
the problem with multiple paths. A partial SDG built Lip from unit SDGs is shown for the 
plant loop in figure 2.9. Only arcs for the process variables Alow" and 'level', and on1v 
two initiating faults are shown. 
PI 
V2 
TI ml in2 Via DI 
Out2 Out2l'. 
out 
Figure 2.9 A Simple Plant Loop 
TI VI DI 
in I, Q + liquid, L o out, Q in, Q 10 0 Out, Q i 11, 
partly blocked out J, Q out2, Q 
in2, Q + ... .. .... 
//+ 
Process + + out, Q in, Q out, Q in. Q 
ariables 
Q- flow 
q + 
PI f 
/ 
V2 
L, - level leak 
1, igure 2.9 Partial Signed Directed Graph for a Simple Plant Loop 
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The loop consists of units VI, DI, V2, PI and TI. Consider a partial blockage occurring 
in VI and its effect on the level of T 1. Two possible paths may be traced through the plant 
SDG. The first path is: 
VI partly blocked 0VI out, Q 
+0DI in, Q +PDI out2, Q -+ V2 in, Q 0 V2 out, Q m PI in, Q 
+I+ 
TI liquid, L 4 TI in2, Q 4 PI out, Q 
The effect of a partial blockage in VI according to this path is a decrease in level of I'l. 
The second path is: 
VI partly blocked P VI in, Q P TI out, Q o TI liquid, L 
For this path the effect is an increase in level of TI. 
The qualitative analysis results in two contradictory paths with the second path having the 
correct influence. 
In order to deal with ambiguities caused by multiple paths a heuristic that is 
commonly used is that when there is more than one acyclic path through the SDG tile 
shortest path is used. This heuristic has been used as it is applicable to manly cases 
including the example above. However cases may arise: 
1. where the shortest path does not have a correct influence, 
2. where all the paths have a correct influence; 
I where none of the paths have a correct influence. 
Examples of these cases will be detailed below. 
For the first case, consider the plant shown in figure 2.10 below. 
I Pi TI In I in2 VI 
T2 
Ln 
Out 2 
V2 
l3el-out I 
Figure 2.10 A Two Tank System with a Recycle 
A SDG similar to that given in figure 2.8 may be drawn by combining the unit models (not 
shown here). Consider the effect of a partial blockage of PI on the level of T2. Two 
possible paths may be traced through the SDG. The shortest path is: 
PI partly blocked -0DI out2, Q 
+0 DI in, Q 
+* 
V2 out, Q V2 in, Q 
+P 
T2 out, Q T2 liquid, L 
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This would result in an increase in level of T2. The alternative path is: 
PI partly blocked-4 PI out, Q TI in2, Q----+Tl liquid, L --+Tl out, Q--*V I in, Q----* Vlout, Q 
+I+ T2 liquid, L 4-- T2 in, Q 
The effect of this path would correctly lead to a decrease in level of T2. In this case the 
shortest path heuristic leads to an incorrect inference. 
A case where all the paths have the correct influence (case 2) will now be looked 
at. Returning to the simple plant shown in figure 2.8 for case 2, consider a leak occurring 
in P 1. The shortest path is: 
PI leak -o- PI out, Q -oTI in2, Q o TI liquid, L 
The altemative path gives: 
Plleak---i-Plin, Q oV2out, Q i V2 in, Q--* DI out2, Q--i- DI in, Q VI out, Q--+ VI in, Q 
I+ 
TII iquid, L +: - TI outQ 
Both paths are correct and result in a decrease in the level of TI. 
An example of case 3 where none of the paths have the correct influence will be 
discussed. 
Figure 2.11 A Simple Bypass Line 
Consider the effect of a partial blockage of in2 of HI. Two paths will be found in the 
SDG. The shortest path is: 
HI in2, partly blocked--4 HI out, Q 
This indicates that 'out flow' of HI would decrease if 'H I in2' were blocked. The second 
path is: 
HI in2, partly blocked HI in I, Q--+ HI out, Q 
This would result in an increase of 'out flow' of H 1. 
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As V2 is closed a blockage of 'H I in2' can exert no influence on the out flow and 
both paths above are incorrect. This example also illustrates that problems with 
ambiguities and incorrect model behaviour are not constrained to recycle loops. 
It can be seen that this problem will only occur in the unit-based approach as if the 
plant were being modelled as a whole any effects of the fault 'HI in2, partly blocked' 
would not be included as the overall plant is viewed. With the unit-based approach, 
although the individual unit models are correct, the combination of these unit models to 
form a plant model do not necessarily result in a correct model. The unit models are 
generic and may not be able to encompass behaviour which occurs in some configurations 
such as those given above. 
The method of Fanti et al. (described in section 2.2.1.4. ) may be used to eliminate 
some of the ambiguities resulting from multiple causal paths. Considering the example 
given for case 3, mass conservation requires that 'DI in, Q' = 'HI out, Q'. The fault 'HI 
in2, partly blocked' does not affect 'D1 in, Q'. It follows that the final response of 'HI 
out, Q' to the fault 'HI in2, partly blocked' is none. However this approach is currently 
limited to looking at the effects of deviations in pressure, flow and level. 
The algorithm of Rose and Kramer (see section 2.2.1.2. ) may be used to remove 
ambiguities resulting from multiple causal paths under limited circumstances. When the 
limited circumstances do not exist Rose and Kramer use the shortest path heuristic to 
resolve ambiguities. These circumstances occur when feedback takes place within one or 
more of the multiple causal paths. This does not appertain to any of the cases described in 
this sub-section. It might be expected that feedback would occur within the causal paths 
of the examples shown in figures 2.8 and 2.10 in a similar way to which Oyeleye and 
Kramer (1988) describe feedback occurring within the system shown in figure 2.3 (section 
2.2.1. ). However, neither of the tanks in figures 2.8 and 2.10 is assumed to be of 
sufficient size to allow tank 'level' to increase to the extent that it is able to increase 'out 
flow' of the tank, therefore no feedback takes place. None of the other approaches which 
examine ambiguities due to initial and final responses may be utilised to consider 
ambiguities due to multiple causal paths. Oyeleye and Kramer and Chang and Yu use 
additional quantitative knowledge to resolve the ambiguities when multiple causal paths 
are encountered. 
In the literature no one has tried to solve the problem caused by ambiguities due to 
multiple causal paths in a systematic way. Applications using qualitative models of 
process plants either use ad hoc rules to deal with these problems when they are 
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discovered (Larkin et al., 1997) or resort to additional quantitative knowledge to resolve 
the problem (Vaidhyanathan and Venkatasubramanian, 1996). All applications that claim 
correct results must use one of these methods. 
2.3. Applications 
Many of the methods used to identify and assess hazards or to diagnose faults involve 
tracing the paths by which faults propagate through the plant. It follows that fault 
propagation is a common feature of these methods. The representations described in this 
chapter have been used by computer aids for: 
" fault tree synthesis; 
" HAZOP emulation; 
" diagnosis. 
The following sub-sections will consider these methods. Examples of tools which apply 
them will be discussed. The majority of these tools are constructed to analyse continuous 
process systems. Exceptions which consider batch systems are noted. 
2.3.1. Fault Tree Synthesis 
A fault tree is a graphical representation of the logical relationship between a specific 
undesirable event and its initiating or causal events. The faults are propagated backwards 
from the specific undesirable event. The specific event is termed the 'top event'. Fault 
trees have been used for the identification and assessment of hazards and fault diagnosis. 
A fault tree may be used as a design tool to identify failure paths at an early stage. The 
intention is that by using the fault tree method the design will evolve to eliminate or 
reduce the probability of the significant failure mechanisms. A number of codes have 
been developed to synthesise fault trees automatically. This sub-section will discuss fault 
trees constructed from functional equations (Kelly and Lees, 1985; Hunt, 1992; Shafaghi 
et al., 1984a, 1984b) and SDG's (Lapp and Powers, 1977; Shaeiwitz et al., 1977, Allen 
and Rao, 1980; Allen, 1984; Kumamoto and Henley, 1986; Andrews and Morgan, 1986; 
Andrews and Brennan, 1990; Chang and Hwang, 1992). 
Z3.1.1. Constructing Fault Treesfrom Functional Equations 
The FAULTFINDER code of Kelly and Lees (1985) and Hunt (1992) is unit-based. A 
plant unit is modelled using either of the functional equation types described in sub- 
section 2.1.1. From the unit model mini-fault trees are constructed for the unit. For each 
output from the unit there are at least two mini-fault trees, one for the deviation 'high' and 
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one for the deviation 'low'. The top event of a mini-fault tree is a deviation of a unit 
output. 
The following example illustrates the creation of mini-fault trees for a simple pipe 
model. Consider the propagation equation 
T out =f(T in) 
and the initial event statements 
external heat: Tout high 
external cold: Tin low 
The propagation equation signifies that the outlet temperature 'T out' increases if the inlet 
temperature 'T in' increases. The reverse is also true, i. e. the outlet temperature 'T out' 
decreases if the inlet temperature 'T in' decreases. The initial event statements state that 
the outlet temperature 'T out' will be high if there is an external heat source and low if 
there is an external cold source. The resultant mini-trees are shown below. 
T out high 
I 
OR 
Tin high external heat 
T out low 
I 
OR 
Tin low external cold 
Figure 2.12 Outlet Temperature Mini-trees for a Pipe 
Separate mini-fault trees are used for top events. These are constructed from terminal 
event equations. 
The mini-fault trees form the building blocks for fault tree synthesis. Construction 
of a fault tree begins by nominating a top event. The appropriate top event model is 
retrieved first. Then the unit mini-trees which have as their top event the causes of the 
variable deviations which are the causes of the top event are retrieved. The causes of the 
top events in the set of mini-trees retrieved are found by using further mini-trees. 
Construction continues until the base events in the mini-trees are basic failures or the plant 
boundaries are reached. 
An example of fault tree synthesis will be described. Assume a pipe model 
contains the terminal event statement: 
T out high: expansion 
6expansion' is nominated as the top event of the fault tree. This event has the variable 
deviation cause 'T out high'. The initial causes of 'T out high' are found in the pipe unit 
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where the top event occurs and are given by the mini-fault tree shown on the left hand side 
of figure 2.12. The causal events of 'T out high' are 'T in high' or 'external heat'. The 
'external heat' event is a basic failure and is developed no further. The event 'T in high' 
does not have any causes in the pipe model. However, as 'T in high' occurs in the inlet of 
the pipe it must have propagated there from the next unit upstream. The appropriate mini- 
fault tree is retrieved from this unit. 
Two types of consistency check are performed: series consistency and parallel 
consistency. Series consistency means that an event cannot be caused by itself or its 
obverse. For example, assume the two propagation equations: 
Gl=f(Q in, Q out) 
Q2ýf(G in, G out) 
are being used to model flow in a pipe model. G is the pressure gradient variable and 
the flow variable. Section 2.1.1. explains what these equations signify. The fault tree 
developed from these equations is given below. 
Q out high I 
OR 
G in high G out high I 
OR 
Q in high 0 gh 
Figure 2.13 Fault Tree for High Flow 
The second occurrence of 'Q out high' is deleted as it violates series consistency. 
An event may also be inconsistent with certain faults. Assume the following two 
initial event statements are added to the fault tree given in figure 2.13. 
leak from a high pressure environment: Q out high 
leak to a low pressure environment: G in high 
The resulting fault tree is shown below. 
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Q out high I 
OR 
F- 
leak from a high pressure G in high G out high 
environment I 
OR 
I 
ak a ressure Q in high 
nvironment 
I 
Figure 2.14 Fault tree for High Flow with Additional Events 
The basic fault 'leak from a high pressure environment' forms part of the mini-fault tree 
for 'Q out high'. The fault 'leak to a low pressure environment' forms part of the mini- 
fault tree for 'G in high'. However, the fault 'leak from a high pressure environment' is 
inconsistent with the fault 'leak to a low pressure environment'. The consistency checks 
note that 'leak to a low pressure environment' is added to the fault tree after 'leak from a 
high pressure environment' and consequently the fault that 'leak to a low pressure 
environment' is deleted. 
Series consistency is checked as the tree is developed. Parallel consistency is the 
consistency of events in one branch of the tree with events in other branches of the tree 
under an AND gate. This process can only be carried out once the entire tree has been 
synthesised. 
Control loops, trip loops and divider/header combinations are treated as special 
cases. Information about what loops the plant contains is provided as the part of the input. 
The program is provided with an algorithm to effect identification of divider/header 
combinations. For control loops and trip loops use is made of templates (Shafaghi et al., 
1984a; 1984b) which impose a structure on the tree at the point in tree development where 
the loop is encountered. Special models are used for divider/header combinations. 
Z3. LZ Constructing Fauft TreesfrOm Signed Directed Graphs 
The first fault tree synthesis code using signed directed graphs was developed by Lapp and 
Powers (1977). The fault tree is constructed by selecting the node for the top event of 
interest. The tree is developed for the causes of this node. For a given node, the causes 
are the inputs to this node. Causes which violate consistency are deleted. The tree is 
developed down to the basic events. Special operators are used to handle control loops. 
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Lapp and Powers approach and the following approaches which build on their work are 
not unit-based. 
Lapp and Powers algorithm has been extended by Shaeiwitz et al. (1977) so that it 
may be applied to batch processes. The arcs of the SDG's are made conditional on system 
events so that successive behaviour within the batch system can be modelled. 
Further work on Lapp and Powers algorithm has considered control loops (Allen, 
1984; Andrews and Brennan, 1990; Chang and Hwang, 1992). Allen looks at cascaded 
control loops. Andrews and Brennan put forward more operators to deal with complex 
nested control loops. Chang and Hwang advance further operators to deal with differing 
types of control loop structure and also consider process loops. They develop an algorithm 
to automatically identify control and process loops within the system SDG. 
Lapp and Powers use '+10' to denote a very large positive influence and '-10' to 
denote a very large negative influence within the SDG. These large influences are 
assigned to arcs which propagate deviations that exceed the ability of control loops to 
cancel. This feature is criticised by Allen and Rao (1980) for complicating the task of 
SDG preparation in the presence of multiple control loops. In such instances all the 
control loops that can act upon a given deviation must be identified before assigning 
influences to the SDG arcs. Allen and Rao restrict the influences which may act upon an 
arc to '+', '0' and '-'. Faults initiating deviations which exceed the ability of control loops 
to handle are listed as circumstances under which the control actions can fail. 
Lapp and Powers algorithm is further refined by Kumamoto and Henley (1986) 
who carry out disturbance analysis prior to fault tree synthesis to reduce the amount of 
manual interaction needed to create a correct fault tree. 
None of these approaches can cope with all of the types of ambiguities which may 
occur in process plants. Some manual input is needed to build a correct fault tree. 
2.3.2. Hazard Emulation 
This sub-section will discuss automated hazard identification by emulation of hazard and 
operability studies (HAZOP). The HAZOP technique is considered as this is a widely 
recognised analysis technique (CIA, 1977). HAZOP is very time consuming. To 
overcome this there have been attempts to automate HAZOP using computer technology. 
(Parmar and Lees, 1987; Vaidhyanathan and Venkatasubramanian, 1995; 1996; Larkin et 
al., 1997; Leone, 1996; Kuo et al., 1997). 
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This sub-section will begin by considering how a HAZOP study is carried out. 
The basic methodology which is used by all applications undertaking automated HAZOP 
is described. Further details of some of these applications are given. The applications 
discussed use the functional equation or SDG representations considered in this thesis. 
Z3. Zl. HAZOP 
The HAZOP technique applies guide words (which relate to process deviations) to plant 
diagrams on a line by line basis to identify causes and consequences of the process 
deviations. The list of guide words includes NONE, LESS, MORE, PART OF etc. 
Deviations are derived from a combination of guide words and process variables, e. g. if 
the guide word is MORE and the variable is 'level', then the combination of the two gives 
MORE LEVEL. The approach taken is outlined in figure 2.15 (taken from Jefferson et al., 
1995). A conventional HAZOP can be applied to both batch and continuous plants. 
Select a line/vessel 
Select a process variable 
Apply guide word 
Develop meaningful deviation 
Examine possible Examine 
causes consequences 
Determine Hazards 
Record discussion as appropriate 
Repeat for all meaningful deviations 
Repeat for all guide words 
Mark line/vessel as having been 
examined 
Repeat for all lines/vessels 
Figure 2.15 Basic Methodology for Conventional HAZOP 
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An example of a HAZOP study report is given in table 2.2. The plant analysed is 
the simple fluid flow system shown in figure 2.1. For the purposes of this example the 
whole system is assumed to comprise a line. For simplicity only results for the pipe and 
pump units of the system are given. The lack of a specific guide word for a unit in the 
table implies . that no causes or consequences have been identified for the deviation 
described by this guide word for the unit. 
Unit Guide Word Deviation Cause Consequence 
pipe more more flow out pump leak contaminate 
environment, 
loss of material 
less less flow out pipe leak, contaminate 
environment 
pump partly 
blocked 
none no flow out pump 
completely 
blocked 
reverse reverse flow out pump fails 
more more temperature pipe external 
out heat 
less less temperature out pipe external 
cold 
pump none no flow in heater blocked overheating 
less Tess flow ýout ' heater partly 
blocked 
more more pressure out heater blockage possible rupture 
Table 2.2 HAZOP Report for a Simple Fluid Flow System 
Z3. ZZ The Basic Methodology 
All the applications considered in this section apply automated HAZOP to continuous 
plants. The applications are unit-based. The HAZID system (Parmar and Lees, 1987) uses 
the functional equation representation. The other applications described (Vaidhyanathan 
and Venkatasubramanian, 1995; 1996; Larkin et al., 1997; Leone, 1996; Kuo et al., 1997) 
use the SDG representation. 
The knowledge required by the applications to perform a HAZOP study can be 
separated into two types: 
1. generic knowledge; 
2. plant specific knowledge. 
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The generic knowledge consists of a library of models of standard continuous plant units, 
e. g. pumps, valves, tanks etc. Each unit model describes the behaviour of process 
variables within the unit, failure modes (faults) and the consequences associated with the 
faults and deviations. The plant specific knowledge consists of the plant piping and 
instrumentation diagram and the process material properties. The process material 
properties needed vary depending on the application. Examples of material properties 
which may be required are: toxicity, flammability, and freezing and boiling points at 
various temperatures and pressures; the normal physical state of the material; the intended 
role of the material in the plant (e. g. reactant, product, impurity). 
The generic knowledge and process specific knowledge bases are combined to 
perform the reasoning behind the HAZOP analysis. The piping and instrumentation 
diagram provides information as to what units comprise a plant and their connectivities. 
From this information a plant model describing the plant under analysis can be created by 
reference to the unit models in the unit library. 
To emulate HAZOP all the faults that will lead to a particular deviation and all the 
consequences associated with the deviation must be explored. The inference engines of all 
the applications described here follow the method used in conventional HAZOP studies. 
The plant is examined systematically line by line. For each of the principal process 
variables potential deviations, their causes and consequences are considered. Figure 2.16 
illustrates the basic methodology used by all the applications to emulate conventional 
HAZOP. 
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Figure 2.16 Basic Methodology Used by Applications to Emulate HAZOP 
In a conventional HAZOP, the HAZOP team leader will decide the order in which 
the lines will be studied. The applications consider the units in the order in which they 
appear in the model of the plant being analysed. Each unit has number of inlets and 
outlets which are referred to as ports., These ports form the connections between unit 
models. The inlet port of one unit model is connected directly to the outlet port of another 
unit model. The effects of deviations are considered at all the inlet and outlet ports of the 
relevant unit. The propagation paths of the deviations are traced through the plant model 
to determine the faults and consequences. 
Z3. Z3. Hazard Emulation Applications 
All the applications described use the same basic methodology to emulate HAZOP. This 
sub-section will begin by discussing the HAZID system (Parmar and Lees, 1987). HAZID 
uses the functional equation representation. Other applications which use the SDG 
representation will then be described. 
HAZID takes a block diagram of the plant to be analysed as plant specific 
knowledge input. The block diagram is constructed by a conversion of the piping and 
instrumentation diagram. For each unit in the block diagram, a unit model is specified, 
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drawing on the systems unit model library. Within the unit library the models have a 
hierarchical structure. Thus a pump is a sub-class of the class of pressure raisers and 
inherits certain characteristics. A model generation program exists to allow additional 
models to be configured by the user and added to the library. 
The fault propagation through the units is modelled in terms of statements similar 
to Prolog clauses (Bratko, 1990). The initial and terminal events modelled by the 
functional equations are, respectively, the causes and consequences which the hazard 
identification procedure seeks to discover. In addition to the unit models there are models 
for the process fluids and the materials of construction. These are used to allow 
consequences to be made conditional on the existence of a particular process fluid or 
material susceptibility. 
The hazard identifier program receives as input tables describing the topology of 
the block diagram and listing the library models to be used for each unit. The program 
works through the system line by line. For each line, every parameter deviation is 
considered in turn and causes and consequences are generated from the initial and terminal 
event statements in the unit models. Heuristics are used to reduce the large number of 
potential faults generated. 
The HAZOPExpert system approach described by Vaidhyanathan and 
Venkatasubramanian (1995; 1996) and co-workers (Srinivasan et al., 1997; 1998) appears 
to be broadly similar to that used by HAZID. In this approach and in-the following 
applications described in this sub-section the SDG representation is used. HAZOPExpert 
is implemented in G2 which is marketed by Gensym. G2 is supported by a strong 
graphical user interface. This is used in HAZOPExpert to specify the piping and 
instrumentation diagram and to define new unit models for the system's model library. A 
fluid model is used to enhance the elimination of potential hazards. 
Larkin et al. (1997) build on the work of Chung (1993). Chung developed the 
QUEEN system. QUEEN can be used as an engine to emulate various forms of hazard 
identification (described further in section 2.4. ). The system of Larkin et al. consists of a 
HAZOP engine, AutoHAZID, and a number of supporting modules. The most important 
modules are a graphical tool, a unit model library, a model creation tool, a fluid property 
package, an applications programming interface and a database. 
The graphical tool is a graphical user interface which allows a user to specify a 
process plant. In the unit model library, as in the two applications described above, each 
model exists within a hierarchy. The model creation tool enables a user to build a new 
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unit model by defining the number of chambers, inlets, outlets, phases present, failure 
modes, the consequences of failure modes and the consequences of deviations. Chambers 
are distinct internal spaces. The model creation tool is a simple text tool. The information 
needed to build up the elements of a unit model is elicited from the user through a question 
and answer session. This is the only application in the literature which provides a user 
with guidance on creating unit models which use the SDG representation. However the 
model creation tool is not fully developed. It only allows vessel models to be created. 
The tool also lacks flexibility. The highly structured question and answer approach does 
not allow the user to change the model during creation if a piece of information has been 
overlooked, or to edit an existing model. In addition, the user is unable to see what 
information the model under construction contains. The lack of these features reduces ease 
of use of the tool. 
The fluid property package uses quantitative data to determine whether a particular 
scenario is feasible (see McCoy and Rushton, 1997, section 2.2.2. ). The applications 
programming interface provides a set of functions through which the modules can 
communicate with each other. The database stores information for the graphical tool, e. g. 
icon shapes and process descriptions created using the graphical tool. 
Leone (1996) defines a high level language to define unit models. This language 
translates into an object-oriented representation. An instance of a processing unit consists 
of instances of the classes VarRelationship, Consequence, Port and Compound. Instances 
of VarRelationship comprise SDG's representing the unit behaviour in normal and faulted 
modes. The Compound object contains hazard knowledge concerning the chemicals used 
or produced in the process, e. g. flammability, corrosivity, toxicity etc. A graphical user 
interface is provided to allow new unit models to be specified. 
The approach of Kuo et al. (1997) differs to those described above in that fault and 
event trees are created as intermediate representations. Fault trees are described in section 
2.3.1. An event tree is a graphical structure in which faults are propagated forward from 
an event. A system SDG is obtained by connecting component SDG's corresponding to 
all the units in the system. Loops are searched for using the method of Chang and Hwang 
(1992), see section 2.3.1.2. A deviation is selected and a guide word is determined. A 
fault tree is constructed using the selected deviation as the top event. The contents of the 
fault tree are generated as 'causes'. Next, an event tree is constructed corresponding to a 
minimum cut set. The contents of the event tree are generated as 'consequences'. 
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Larkin et al. (1997), using the method of McCoy and Rushton (1997), and 
Vaidhyanathan and Venkatasubramanian (1995; 1996) consider ambiguities due to 
unrealistic scenarios. Kuo et al. (1997) use special operators to overcome some of the 
ambiguities caused by multiple causal paths within loops. None of the other applications 
mention ambiguities. 
2.3.3. Diagnosis 
When a failure occurs in a complex system the operator may be overwhelmed by the large 
amount of complex information obtained from the plant. However an efficient and 
accurate diagnosis of the problem must be made to avoid any loss of product, potential 
hazard or unnecessary plant shut-down. Due to this difficulty several methods of 
automated diagnosis have been proposed. Diagnosis determines the root causes of a 
process disturbance from observable deviations from the normal range of behaviour in real 
time. The, first two applications discussed use the functional equation representation 
(Andow and Lees, 1975; Martin-Soils et al., 1977). The other applications described here 
use the SDG representation. Only the first two applications are unit-based. 
Early work on diagnosis for process plants was carried out by Andow and Lees 
(1975). They create an alarm data structure of a plant from unit models using the 
functional equation representation. The plant flow diagram is converted into a block 
diagram of linked unit models. This representation is converted into a network of 
interacting process variables, basically an SDG of the plant. The network is then reduced 
to the network of process variables on which there are alarms. This network is used to 
provide the operator with information about the relations between process alarms. The 
network is created on an off-line computer and stored in the process computer. The 
network is used to analyse the alarms as they occur in real time. 
An alternative method to analyse alarms has been developed by Martin-Solis et al. 
(1977). The input data for the system is composed of the plant topology and mini-fault 
tree models of the plant units. The mini-fault trees are derived from unit models 
represented by functional equations via the method already described in section 2.3.1.1. 
The data is stored in the process computer without prior processing. This data is used to 
construct the fault tree used to provide the information for alarm analysis in real time. 
Iri et al. (1979) were the first workers to propose the use of SDG for diagnosis. 
SDG's are used to model the alarm structure of a plant. Special symbols are used to 
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represent controlled deviations. The origin of failure is found by searching through the 
SDG. Umeda et al. (1980) extend the work of Iri et al. to model a batch process. 
More efficient search algorithms for diagnosing faults using the SDG 
representation which require less computer time are presented by Shiozaki et al. (1985), 
Kokawa et al. (1983) and Qian (1990). Kokawa et al. introduce failure propagation 
probabilities and failure rates of the plant equipment to prioritise candidate faults., Qian 
builds on the work of Kokawa et al. Frames are used to represent the nodes of the SDG. 
This allows the failure propagation network to be described in more detail. Heuristics are 
presented to allow the effect of loops to be considered. 
Other workers have considered new algorithms to further improve the efficiency of 
the diagnostic search and to reduce the number of unresolvable hypotheses generated 
(Kramer and Palowitch, 1987; Nam et al., 1996; Wilcox and Himmelblau, 1994). To 
improve search efficiency Kramer and Palowitch convert the SDG modelling the plant into 
a set of logical rules. The hypotheses are reduced by incorporating knowledge from 
numerical simulation or operating experience into the rules. Nam et al. propose a 
methodology to automatically construct the logical rules. Search efficiency is improved 
by an SDG partitioning method for on-line fault diagnosis. Wilcox and Himmelblau 
propose the possible cause and effect graph (PCEG) which is a modified SDG. The PCEG 
limits the statements that can be used to describe the root cause of a fault, based on 
material and energy balances. This reduces the size of the search space and the number of 
spurious solutions generated. Approaches to reduce the number of ambiguities inherent 
when using qualitative reasoning are discussed in section 2.2. 
Ulerich and Powers (1988) propose an alternative method to searching the SDG for 
the origin of failure. Fault trees are developed from the plant SDG using the method of 
Lapp and Powers (1977), see section 2.3.1.2. The causal events in the fault tree are 
verified with real-time data. From this a fault-detection tree is derived. Fault diagnosis is 
accomplished with cutsets formed from the fault-detection tree. 
A method for distributed fault diagnosis has been developed by Mohindra and 
Clark (1993). The diagnostic search is conducted by a parallel scheme in which every 
sensor and controller is a smart node participating in the search for possible explanations 
of observed anomalies. 
Tarifa and Scenna (1997) look at providing an explanation for the diagnostic. All 
the potential process faults are found by looking at FMEA (Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis) and HAZOP analysis of the process. A qualitative simulator uses the SDG of 
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the process to find the set of all the symptoms caused by each potential fault. These sets of 
symptoms are compiled into if-then rules, one for each potential fault. Potential faults are 
ranked using fuzzy logic. The qualitative simulation allows an explanation of fault 
diagnosis to be given. 
Multiple fault diagnosis is considered by Vedam. and Venkatasubramaniarn (1997). 
All previous work described in this chapter uses the single fault assumption. Vedarn and 
Venkatasubramaniarn use a knowledge base to screen out physically impossible root 
nodes. Computational complexity is reduced by assuming that the probability of 
occurrence of a multiple fault scenario decreases with an increasing number of faults 
involved. 
The emphasis of many workers in this subject has been on reducing the search time 
for diagnosing the faults. Other approaches consider a variety of facets, e. g. distributed 
fault diagnosis (Mohindra and Clark 1993), providing explanations for the fault (Tarifa 
and Scenna 1997) and multiple fault scenarios (Vedam and Venkatasubramaniam 1997). 
The only approaches to consider ambiguities are those of Kramer and Palowitch (1987) 
and Wilcox and Himmelblau (1994). These workers propose methods to reduce the 
number of spurious solutions generated. 
2.4. QUEEN -A General Purpose Tool 
This chapter has shown that the functional equation and SDG representations have been 
utilised by a range of applications employing a variety of methods to identify and assess 
hazards. It can be seen that it would be possible to construct a general purpose tool using 
these basic representations to undertake several methods. This statement assumes that the 
methods either all use unit modelling or non-unit based modelling. This sub-section 
describes the QUEEN system (Chung, 1993). QUEEN provides a general front-end for 
fault propagation modelling in activities such as hazard identification, fault diagnosis, 
alarm analysis and fault tree synthesis. QUEEN uses the unit-based modelling approach. 
QUEEN is described in some detail. This is because the tool developed to carry 
out the method described in this thesis, Equipment Model Builder, constructs models for 
QUEEN. It should be noted that Equipment Model Builder could easily be modified to 
construct models for other applications utilising unit-based SDG or functional equation 
models. It should not be regarded as an application specific tool. 
QUEEN performs qualitative analysis of the effects of process deviations in 
continuous process plants. A signed directed graph is used to determine how deviations 
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propagate, i. e. to represent the causal relationships. QUEEN takes a file describing the 
topology of a plant as input and generates the complete signed directed graph ftom a 
library file of models describing individual units that are commonly found in process 
plants. The library of models describing individual units is currently built by an engineer 
writing these models in the QUEEN format. 
2.4.1. The Unit Model Structure 
Each unit model is defined as a frame. The basic structure is shown below. 
frame (unit-name isa parentname, 
inports, info 
outports info 
unitports info 
attributeName is 
propLinks info [ 
conditionLinks (include) exclude 
Each model within the unit model library exists within a hierarchy which supports 
the inheritance of characteristics between models. When a unit (child) is defined as being 
of a particular type (parent), the child model inherits all the information contained within 
the parent model which is added to its own information. For example, the units 'open 
tank' and 'blanketed vessel' may inherit infortnation from a parent unit, 'vessel'. The 
parent unit contains information applicable to all its children. A child model contains 
information of relevance to itself but not to other children of its parent. 
The model is composed of a declaration frame which contains a number of optional 
slots, each of which defines a particular type of information. The structure of a slot is: 
'slot_name keyword value(s)'. There are four keywords which can be used in slots: is, 
include, exclude and info. The is keyword is used with attributes and denotes that a default 
value is being assigned to an attribute. The include, exclude and info keywords are used to 
define either structural or propagation information for the model. The keyword include 
corresponds to the addition of information to a model. The keyword exclude causes 
information already held by a model to be deleted. info corresponds to the overwriting of 
information held by a model. Existing model information is present as a result of 
inheritance. 
The inports, outports and unitports slots specify the names of the process inlet, 
outlet and internal ports of a unit. Internal ports are used to refer to distinct regions 
within a unit, for example the liquid and vapour phases in a tank. 
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Attributes are used to define properties of process units. A user can give an 
attribute a value so that it becomes more specific to a particular unit in the plant under 
consideration. The value assigned to an attribute in a unit model is the default value. 
The propLinks slot is used to add SDG propagation arcs to the unit model. More 
information about the propLinks arcs is given below. The conditionLinks slot is used to 
add or overwrite information within the model based on the value of an attribute. An 
example structure of a conditionLinks slot is: 
frame (unit-name isa parent-name, 
[propLinks info 
conditionLinks info 
[attributeName is X, 
[propLinks include 
[attributeName is Y, 
[propLinks include 
This means if the value assigned to attributeName matches with X then add then the 
appropriate information to the model for attribute X. If the value assigned to 
attributeName matches with Y then add the appropriate information for attribute Y. 
A unit model defines qualitatively: 
The propagation of deviations through a unit; 
The faults occurring within a unit and their effect on the process variables (fault 
initiation); 
The consequences of deviations and faults within a unit (fault termination). 
An example unit model for a pipe is: 
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frame(pipe isa unit, 
inports info [in], 
outports info (out], 
propLinks info 
%propagation 
arc([ in, pressure] +, [out, pressure]), 
arc([out, pressure], +, [in, pressure]), 
arc([ in, temp], +, [out, tem p]), 
arcQ in, flow], +, [out, flow]), 
arc([out, flow], +j in, flow]), 
%faults 
arc([fault, 'partly blocked'], -, [out, flow]), 
arc([fault, ['Ieak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [in, pressure]), 
%consequences resulting from faults 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environment', toxic]]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], +, [consequence, 'loss of material']), 
%consequences resulting from deviations 
arc([dev iation, [morePressure, in]], +, [con sequence, 'poss ible rupture']) 
). 
This model says that pipe is a sub-class of unit, i. e. it inherits the attributes and the default 
values associated with a unit. A pipe has one inport called in and one outport called out. 
The propLinks slot stores a list of arcs that define the mini signed directed graph related to 
a pipe. The information contained within the propLink arcs (i. e. the plant unit's faults and 
deviations and their resulting consequences) is specific to the individual plant unit. 
It can be seen from the example pipe unit model that there are four types of 
propLinks are: 
(i) deviation linked to deviation, e. g. ([in, flow], +, [out, flow]); 
(ii) fault linked to deviation, e. g. ffault, 'partly blocked'], -, [out, flow]); 
(iii) fault linked to consequence, 
e. g. ([fault, 'leak to environment'], +, [consequence, 'loss of material']); 
(iv) deviation linked to consequence, 
e. g. ([deviation, [morePressure, in]], +, [consequence, 'possible rupture']). 
A deviation linked to deviation arc defines the effect of a deviation of one process 
variable in the unit on another. The syntax of such an arc is 'arc ([port I, variable I], 
influence, [port2, variable2])'. This thesis applies the influences defined by Larkin et al. 
(1997, see section 2.1.2. ) to the QUEEN models. Note that for arcs containing the process 
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variables 'noFlow' and 'reverseFlow' influences can only be valid from the sub-set of 
++ 9 and '- 2. 
A fault linked to deviation arc defines the effect of a possible fault on a process 
variable in the unit. The syntax is 'arc ffault, 'fault descriptor', influence, 
[port, variable])'. In a fault linked to deviation arc the influence may take the value '+' 
indicating that the fault causes an increase in the variable or '-' which indicates that the 
fault causes a decrease in the variable. 
The syntax of a fault linked to consequence arc is 'arc ffault, 'fault descriptor'], 
[consequence, 'consequence descriptor'])'. The influence of a fault linked to consequence 
arc is always '+'. 
A deviation linked to consequence arc defines the possible consequence of a 
process variable deviation within the unit. The syntax of this arc type is 'arc ([deviation, 
[deviation label, port] ], +, [consequence, 'consequence descriptor'])'. The deviation label 
is a keyword specifying the type of deviation, e. g. moreTemperature or lessFlow. The 
influence of a deviation linked to consequence arc is always '+'. 
The unit models constructed are generic. However, some of the faults and 
consequences within a unit model may not occur within a certain plant, depending on its 
operating conditions and the properties of the process fluids. The use of physical 
conditions allows the feasibility of a fault or consequence to be determined. The syntax of 
the fault and consequence descriptors is altered when a physical condition is present to 
'['descriptor", physical condition]'. For example, consider the arcs from the pipe model 
'(ffault, ['Ieak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [in, pressure])' and ([fault, 'Ieak to 
environment'], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environment', toxic]])'. If on resolution of 
the condition the fault or consequence is found not to be valid, it is excluded from the 
output report. 
2.4.2. The Plant Description 
The plant description file for QUEEN can be partially generated from a CAD system or 
constructed using a text editor. The units in the plant are specified using 'instance' 
statements. The following sample description shows that a outlet unit is connected to the 
outport of a pipe, the pipe is connected to the outport of a valve and that the valve is 
connected to the outport of pump. The plant described is illustrated in figure 2.17. 
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instance (tail I is a outlet, 
[outports info 
instance (pipe I isa pipe, 
[outports info 
[out is [taill, in]] 
instance (valve I isa valve, 
[outports info 
[out is [pipel, in]], 
aperture is open 
instance (pumpJ I isa pump, 
[outports info 
[out is [valvel, in]] 
in out out I in out 
in 
7ing valve I pipel tail I 
PUMPJ I 
Figure 2.17 A Sample of a Plant Section 
This example shows the use of instance statements to represent a specific pump, valve, 
pipe and outlet occurring in a plant. Compare the frame statement describing a unit model 
of a pipe given in section 2.4.1. with the instance of pipe I in the plant. 
The valve unit instance, valvel, is assigned an attribute 'aperture is open'. This 
means that information from the matching conditionLinks slot of the generic unit valve 
model will be added to 'valve V. The outlet unit instance, tail I, obviously is not connected 
to any plant units. This is shown by '[ ]'. 
2.4.3. Facilities Provided 
QUEEN provides a number of commands to analyse how a plant behaves. A user may 
examine a list of all the paths between any two given process variables, a list of effects due 
to the propagation of a deviation through the paths and the effect one process variable has 
on another process variable given a deviation. Other commands analyse control loop 
behaviour and construct fault trees. 
40 
A driver, CHEQUER (Jefferson et al., 1995), has been developed for QUEEN to 
emulate conventional HAZOP. Like the other applications undertaking HAZOP described 
in this chapter, CHEQUER follows the method used by conventional HAZOP. 
CHEQUER uses a fluid library to filter its output as certain faults and consequences are 
only applicable given particular fluid properties. For example, the possibility of fire or 
explosion requires that the fluid be flammable. Fluids present in the plant are specified 
within the constituent units of the plant model using physical conditions. 
QUEEN has only been developed to handle continuous processes so far. This 
reduces the number of guide words and process variables that need to be handled by 
CHEQUER. For process plant the main process deviations that can be generated from the 
combination of guide word and variable are: 
HIGH/LOW FLOW 
NO FLOW 
REVERSE FLOW 
HIGH/LOW PRESSURE 
HIGIPLOW TEMPERATURE 
HIGH/LOW LEVEL 
HIGH/LOW CONCENTRATION. 
Further work on QUEEN and CHEQUER has resulted in the system of Larkin et 
al. (1997) described in section 2.3.2. 
2.5. Related Work 
None of the applications described in this chapter, with the exception of Larkin et al., 
(1997), consider how to build the models which they employ. The method for creating 
models provided by Larkin et al. is not easy to use. A graphical user interface is provided 
by Vaidhyanathan and Venkatasubramanian (1995; 1996) and Leone (1996) to allow 
model information to be input. Models will be created for the other applications with a 
text editor. The emphasis of the work within the applications described is placed upon 
constructing the inference engine. The work discussed in this section considers model 
building but does not use the functional equation or SDG representations. Tools which 
construct unit-based models and provide an interface to help the user build new unit 
models are described. These constraints are chosen because this thesis looks at providing 
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a method for building unit models. Two approaches fall within this category, those of 
Price et al. (1997; 1998) and Schut and Bredweg (1993; 1994; 1995). 
Price et al. (1997; 1998) develop a system called FLAME which undertakes 
automated Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) of electrical systems. FLAME 
takes as input circuit descriptions from a design tool. FLAME verifies that its component 
(unit) library contains descriptions of the operation and failure modes for each type of 
component (unit). The unit models are combined with circuit/function links and with the 
intended circuit functions and used to analyse the safety of the design. Functionality is 
modelled by functional labels that describe what the system is intended to do. These 
labels are held in a database along with risk priority numbers which describe the 
importance of each failure. The FLAME system calculates significance values for the 
effect of each failure. When the effects are ambiguous or when FLAME is unable to 
decide on the significance values of complex effects the entry is left blank for the engineer 
to fill in. An interface, Component Builder, exists to specify specialised units. The units 
are of the same types that engineers employ during design. Component Builder consists of 
a set of forms which provides an engineer with a guide as to what information is required 
to build a unit model. 
Schut and Bredeweg (1994) divide qualitative model construction into two main 
subtasks: specification and debugging. Model specification is decomposed further into 
specifying basic building blocks and constructing compound building blocks out of the 
basic blocks. They describe a graphical user interface that supports a knowledge engineer 
in defining the models. The functionality and layout of the interface are based on a task 
analysis and an explicit assignment of tasks to user and system. 
Model debugging is decomposed into a diagnostic task and a repair task (Schut and 
Bredeweg, 1993). A qualitative simulator is used to derive the expected behaviour of the 
device. The knowledge engineer is required to point out the discrepancy between 
predicted and expected behaviour. A technique is described which identifies and removes 
irrelevant detail from the qualitative model. Irrelevance is defined as existing in two 
forms: superfluous (unused) model behaviour and behaviour that is overly detailed. Rules 
are used to specify the conditions under which the model behaviour is either relevant, 
overly detailed or superfluous. Further work looks at eliminating incorrect derivatives 
(Schut and Bredeweg, 1995). The user identifies one or more derivatives that are incorrect 
and the derivatives that are expected. Hypotheses are generated that eliminate the 
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incorrect derivative and realise the expected derivative. These candidates for model 
adaptation are presented to the user who decides whether the hypothesis is accepted or not. 
2.6. Conclusions 
Fault propagation considers the propagation of deviations of process variables initiated by 
a causal fault. The process variable deviations may be represented qualitatively. This 
chapter considers fault propagation using the functional equation and SDG representations. 
Using qualitative modelling means that ambiguities may arise. Current approaches to 
resolve ambiguities fall into three categories: 
1. those due to the initial and final effects within feedback; 
2. those due to unrealistic scenarios; 
3. those due to multiple causal paths. 
Many of the applications described in this chapter do not consider ambiguities. 
The applications that do take ambiguities into account (for example, Lapp and Powers 
(1977), Chang and Hwang (1992), Kuo et al. (1997), Rose and Kramer (1991), Oyeleye 
and Kramer (1988), Chang and Yu (1990) and Fanti et al. (1993)) use specific rules to 
cope with ambiguities occurring in certain models. Further work is needed to resolve the 
problems caused by ambiguities in applications undertaking fault propagation. This thesis 
will consider ambiguities due to multiple causal paths. 
There are two possible approaches for dealing with this type of ambiguity. One 
way would be to develop an analytical method to resolve some or all of the ambiguities 
which occur when unit models are combined. This could result in a large amount of work 
being generated each time a new plant model is created. Combining an analytical method 
with the existing unit models would cause model clarity to be lost as the existing unit 
models may describe incorrect behaviour when they are combined. The user would have 
to refer to the analytical method to understand the behaviour of the process plant. 
The approach considered in this thesis to overcome ambiguities due to multiple 
causal paths is a modular modelling approach. It considers the influence exerted by a 
plant module (e. g. a recycle loop) as a whole on the other plant units. The plant module 
forms a complete new unit. Creating a module removes the multiple causal paths which 
lead to ambiguities. The advantage of this method is that the user is able to see clearly 
what influences the new models are describing. The modules created may be reused in 
other process plants. This modular approach is detailed in chapter 5. 
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This chapter has described applications using the functional equation and SDG 
representations for fault tree synthesis, hazard emulation and diagnosis. A general purpose 
tool providing a common set of procedures for these applications and related work which 
discusses the creation of qualitative models have also been described. The majority of the 
applications using functional equations and SDG's concentrate on construction of the 
inference engine. How the fault propagation models used are created is not considered. 
There is a need for a method to allow an engineer to create models simply and correctly. 
A method is proposed in chapter 4. 
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3. Knowledge Acquisition Tools 
Knowledge acquisition deals with the structuring of expertise for expert systems. 
Knowledge acquisition tools enhance the knowledge acquisition process for gathering and 
structuring knowledge. They allow experts to develop their own knowledge bases. Some 
tools do not require an intermediate knowledge engineer to structure and encode the 
knowledge. The expert should only be required to have basic computer literacy. Hence 
knowledge acquisition tools reduce the human effort. Ideally experts will be more 
efficient when they are entering the knowledge directly into a tool than when having to 
teach developers all the knowledge relevant for a system (Neale, 1988; Eriksson, 1994). 
Many knowledge acquisition tools consist of workbenches or toolsets, for example 
AQUINAS (Boose and Bradshaw, 1988), ETS (Boose, 1986), PATHFINDER (Cooke and 
McDonald, 1988) and KRITON (Diederich et al., 1988). This means that they comprise 
several tools that undertake different knowledge acquisition techniques (see later for a 
description of these techniques). Diederich et al. (1988) justify the use of workbenches 
with the observation that "no single acquisition method will be powerful enough to 
overcome the so called knowledge acquisition bottleneck in knowledge engineering. " 
Workbenches allow one knowledge acquisition technique to complement another in order 
to elicit more information or to enable better structuring of information. 
Ways of classifying knowledge acquisition tools are those of Musen (1989), Boose 
(1989a; 1989b and 1990) and Eriksson (1994). Musen (1989) uses a taxonomy based on 
the terms and relationships that a given toot uses to establish the semantics of a user's 
entries. Musen calls these relationships conceptual models and distinguishes three types: 
1. models based on the data-structures required by the expert systems e. g. 'if .. then' rules; 
2. models based on a generic problem-solving method; 
3. models based on a set of application tasks to be performed e. g. OPAL (Musen et al., 
1988) presents a model of this type. 
Musen further classifies the generic problem-solving methods into explicit and implicit 
methods. In an explicit method the way in which knowledge for a generic task is used to 
arrive at a problem's solution is modelled. Implicit methods shield the user from specific 
details of the problem-solving method. Musen admits that some knowledge acquisition 
tools may not fit into this taxonomy. 
Boose (1989a, 1989b and 1990) uses a similar classification method to Musen but 
groups the problem-solving methods together with methods based on application tasks, i. e. 
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categories (2) and (3) above. Boose justifies this by arguing that "most problems are 
strongly linked to certain types of problem-solving methods. Consequently, certain types 
of domain knowledge and possibly control knowledge should be acquired to build the 
corresponding knowledge-base. " 
Eriksson (1992 and 1992a) defines four major tool types: 
1. conceptualisation tools; 
2. task specific knowledge acquisition tools; 
3. domain oriented knowledge acquisition tools; 
4. refinement tools. 
Conceptualisation tools present a picture to the expert of the way the domain knowledge 
elicited is structured although none of them build a domain model. They appear to 
comprise the same category as tools modelling Musen's implicit methods although 
Eriksson makes no claims as to problem-solving methods. Conceptualisation tools utilise 
psychological techniques. Some tools are based on psychological theories, others on 
computing theories. Task specific knowledge acquisition tools are the same as tools 
using Musen's explicit methods. Domain oriented tools are based on a conceptual domain 
model i. e. perceptions about the data on which they operate. For example, spreadsheet 
programs conceptualise their data as rows and columns of interdependent numbers. 
Domain oriented knowledge acquisition tools adopt conceptual models that reflect 
recurring domain tasks to be performed. The methods by which they are performed are 
not depicted in the tool. These tools can be seen to be the same as those in Muself s class 
(iii). Refinement tools aim at improving an existing knowledge base. These categories are 
not mutually exclusive. Also some of the tools may not fit into any of the categories. 
Eriksson's scheme is not totally definitive but is only intended as a guide. 
For brevity this thesis does not classify the whole field of knowledge acquisition 
tools. The discussion is limited to looking at the applications of the knowledge acquisition 
tools from two angles: the tasks the tools undertake and the domains they undertake those 
tasks in. Some tools are generic in that they can be applied to several domain areas. 
These will be referred to as 'tools for generic tasks'. The second category of tools, the 
'domain oriented tools', is usually applied to specific application areas, for example to 
develop medical protocols for cancer treatment. There is an overlap between these 
categories. Tools for generic tasks are the same as tools using Musen's explicit methods. 
Eriksson's term "task specific knowledge acquisition tools" is not used as the tasks 
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referred to are generic. Domain oriented tools are the same as Musen's class of tools using 
conceptual models based on a set of application tasks. 
This chapter begins by discussing tools for generic tasks and domain oriented 
tools. Metatools are described to show where current research is leading. Finally, 
knowledge acquisition tools are surveyed. The survey considers their desirable features in 
relation to qualitative modelling. 
3.1. Tools for Generic Tasks 
Generic tasks may be divided into analysis tasks and synthesis tasks. Analysis tasks 
involve identifying sets of objects based on their features. Synthesis tasks require a 
solution to be built up from component pieces or sub-problem solutions. Analysis and 
synthesis tasks can be further broken down into sub-problem areas. For example, 
diagnosis is a sub-problem of an analysis task. It consists of inferring system 
malfunctions from observables. Design is a sub-problem of a synthesis task. It consists of 
configuring objects under constraints. A problem may require a combination of both 
analysis and synthesis tasks. It will not be attempted to break down the tasks further as 
sources disagree and contradict about which area the sub-problems should be classified in 
(Eriksson 1992a; Eriksson and Larses, 1992; Boose, 1989a, 1989b and 1990; Clancey 
1985). 
A generic task may be used as a building block to which a particular knowledge 
acquisition problem may be matched. The problem-solving method for the generic task is 
already provided by the tool. The method is used to describe the task. The user must 
conceptualise the entered knowledge in terms of this problem-solving method. 
Analysis tasks use the heuristic classification problem-solving method. In heuristic 
classification problem features are mapped onto solution features. The solution features are 
refined down through a hierarchy of solutions into specific solutions. In this method a 
solution to the problem is selected. For example, MOLE (Eshelman, 1988) asks the expert 
to list relevant events (hypotheses and symptoms) for its application area. MOLE then 
requests knowledge which may explain the symptoms. Knowledge which helps 
differentiate which hypothesis is the most likely explanation of a symptom is also 
requested. MOLE uses the knowledge elicited to build a network of associations where 
each node is an event and the links represent explanatory relationships. 
In synthesis tasks the solution to a problem cannot be pre-enumerated. Reasons for 
this might be that there are no pre-existing links for mapping problem descriptions to 
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solutions directly or that there are too many potential solutions to enumerate. If a solution 
to a problem cannot be pre-enumerated the solution must be constructed. This comprises 
the heuristic construction method. SALT (Marcus, 1988) is one of the few knowledge 
acquisition tools to use this method. The expert provides procedures for obtaining initial 
values for pieces of a design, procedures for obtaining any constraints on these values and 
revisions for violated constraints. The expert may supply this knowledge in any 
convenient order. Thus SALT takes a bottom-up approach to building the knowledge 
base, exploiting the knowledge that experts find easiest to provide. SALT checks that all 
pieces of design mentioned by the expert have associated procedures and that all 
constraints that might be violated have remedies. This propose and revise process 
continues until no more additions can be made to the design. 
Using the above definitions it is now possible to choose tools using an appropriate 
problem-solving method for the task in hand. For example, MORE (Kalin, 1988), MOLE 
(Eshelman, 1988), TDE (Kahn et al., 1988) and YAKA (McDermott, 1988) are examples 
of tools using methods specific to analysis problems. The problem-solving methods used 
are specialised forms of heuristic classification. SALT (Marcus, 1988), on the other hand, 
employs a method to solve a synthesis problem. 
3.2. Domain Oriented Tools 
In domain oriented tools the relationships within the application area itself are used to 
govern access to an expert system's knowledge base. Defining a particular application area 
requires that users apply the explicit terms and relations of a generic task model to a 
specific task instance. Users are insulated from implementation details of representing 
knowledge permitting information to be entered in more familiar terms. 
Given the power of domain oriented tools relatively few have been developed. The 
reason could be that a large amount of effort is required to develop this type of tool. The 
narrow field to which the resulting tool can be applied may not justify this laborious task. 
Domain oriented tools are useful in application areas where multiple related knowledge 
bases are required. In these areas each task may be viewed as an instantiation of a 
common model. The tools provide knowledge structures specialised to the experts field. 
This means the experts will have a better understanding of the knowledge structure being 
used by a tool. Eriksson (1992b) claims that this more specialised support will lead to a 
better acceptance of the knowledge acquisition tool among experts. 
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Examples of domain oriented tools are: Plo (Eriksson, 1992b) specialised to the 
application area of protein purification planning; OPAL (Musen et al., 1988) specialised 
to creating medical protocols for cancer treatment; ALF-A (Eriksson and Larses, 1992) 
specialising in troubleshooting laboratory equipment; Student (Gale, 1988) for the domain 
of statistical data analysis and MU (Gruber and Cohen, 1988) specialised to the application 
area of prospective diagnosis. KNACK (Klinker, 1988) is the only example of a domain 
oriented tool in the literature that is not domain specific. KNACK requires that it is 
possible to document the task with a report. The conceptual domain model of KNACK 
can be custornised for a particular domain. KNACK also comes within the category of 
tools for generic tasks. KNACK is applicable to design tasks. Although not originally 
intended as one, KNACK can be regarded as a metatool. 
3.3. Metatools 
Recent research in knowledge acquisition is turning towards metatools. These are defined 
as "automated methods for creating tools" (Eriksson and Musen, 1993) or as "tools that 
enable developers to generate new domain-oriented knowledge acquisition tools from high 
level descriptions" (Eriksson, 1993). Metatools are intended to be used by a knowledge 
engineer to build a knowledge acquisition tool for use by an expert. The proponents of 
metatools claim that they can be used to reduce significantly the work required to 
implement domain-oriented tools. Metatools are designed to "custom-tailor" new 
knowledge acquisition tools to meet the requirements of a particular domain. Most of the 
work on metatools has been carried out by Eriksson and Musen (1992 and 1993) and their 
classification scheme will be used as it is the only one currently in existence. 
The metatools are classified in terms of their high level descriptions or metaviews. 
A metaview is the conceptual model that a metatool presents to its users. Three metaviews 
are defined: the method-oriented view; the abstract-architecture view and the ontological 
view. The method-oriented view "lets the developer instantiate a model of a problem- 
solving method by mapping the concepts and relationships used by the method to the 
appropriate terms in the application domain - in effect creating a template for a generic 
method" (Eriksson and Musen, 1993). The abstract-architecture view allows developers 
to instantiate and combine subcomponents into specifications of knowledge acquisition 
tools, independently of the method. These are then used to instantiate target tools. The 
ontological view describes terms and relationships shared by both the problem-solving 
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method and the knowledge acquisition tool. The ontological view bridges the method- 
oriented view and the abstract-architecture view. 
PROTEGE (Eriksson and Musen, 1992) is a metatool that supports a method- 
oriented view. PROTEGE was abstracted from OPAL (Musen et al., 1988). Two 
examples of metatools that support the abstract-architecture view are DOTS 
(Eriksson, 1993) and SIS (Kawaguchi et al., 1991). DOTS is designed to enable 
development of tools whose knowledge acquisition techniques utilise graphical knowledge 
editing by domain experts. SIS can be used to create interview-oriented knowledge 
acquisition tools - i. e. those that conduct a question and answer dialogue. DASH (Eriksson 
and Musen, 1993) supports an ontological metaview. DASH uses the relationships among 
classes defined in the ontology for generating the dialogue structure of the knowledge 
acquisition tool. 
3.4. Features of Knowledge Acquisition Tools 
This project has surveyed twenty knowledge acquisition tools and desirable features have 
been identified. Any new knowledge acquisition tool to be built should possess most of 
these features in order to be functional. Representative examples of knowledge 
acquisition tools are surveyed rather than attempting to include all existing tools. Features 
of the tools are identified and what techniques the individual tools use to achieve these are 
presented. This survey was carried out in order to show the desirable features of 
knowledge acquisition tools in relation to qualitative modelling. Only the aspects of the 
tools relevant to this survey will be expanded upon. No attempt will be made to describe 
or summarise the way individual tools work. 
The desirable features identified are: 
(i) a differentiation facility; 
(ii) verification testing; 
(iii) an explanation facility; 
(iv) the ability to rank information; 
(v) a user interface. 
Not all of the knowledge acquisition tools have all of these features but a "good" 
tool should exhibit most of them. The features are interlinked, e. g. an explanation facility 
may show how information is differentiated. The key features are detailed in the sub- 
sections below and examples of techniques used by the tools to provide these features are 
given. 
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3.4.1. Differentiation 
A differentiation facility is the ability to classify components as separate entities. It is 
required to distinguish between information segments. For example, tools eliciting 
knowledge within the medical field might need to differentiate patient age, type of drug 
required, dosage etc. Tools eliciting knowledge on chemical plants might need to 
differentiate between units of equipment, faults occurring within those units and the 
resulting deviations and consequences. It may be necessary to differentiate between rules 
created in knowledge acquisition tools in order to show that no duplication is occurring. 
Within tools using heuristic classification, differentiation is used to seek symptoms to 
distinguish among diagnosable events. In a similar way within tools for solving synthetic 
problems attributes are used to differentiate between values. Some differentiation 
techniques used by knowledge acquisition tools will now be described. 
The triadic elicitation technique consists of presenting problem solutions 
(elements) in groups of three and asking the expert for attributes (traits) two of them 
share which distinguish them from the third. For example, taking a process plant as an 
application area, the expert might be presented with three valves: a check valve, a relief 
valve and a control valve and initially asked to distinguish the check valve and the relief 
valve from the control valve. The expert might reply that the check and relief valves do not 
have a port to receive signals. The expert might then be asked if there are any other 
distinguishing features. Further traits might be elicited by asking the expert to distinguish 
the control valve and the relief valve from the check valve and the control valve and the 
check valve fromthe relief valve. AQUINAS, ETS, KITTEN (Shaw and Gaines, 1988) 
and KRITON are examples of tools which use triadic elicitation. 
Another technique, card-sorting, consists of preparing cards, each one bearing the 
name of a concept. The concepts presented should be at the same knowledge level in the 
domain, so meaningful sorts can be accomplished. For example, in the process 
engineering domain, it would be inappropriate to sort cards representing 'sulphuric acid 
plant' and 'pipe'. An initial set of cards is chosen, possibly as the output of some other 
knowledge acquisition tool. The expert is allowed to add or remove cards. The expert 
sorts the cards into piles according to any criterion he chooses, with the groups being 
different values of the criterion. There should also be a group 'unknown' else the 
knowledge elicited will be restricted to that which is known by the expert with respect to 
all the cards. The sort is recorded. The task is repeated for all other dimensions along 
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which the expert perceives the concepts to vary. CATO (Major, 1991) uses a 
computerised form of card-sorting. 
Using symptoms associated with hypotheses provides another type of 
differentiation. A symptom is any event or state whose observation may lead to the 
acceptance of an hypothesis. Of particular importance are symptoms that uniquely 
identify an underlying problem. This technique is used by MORE (Kahn, 1988) and can 
be explained as follows: 
"MORE pursues this differentiation strategy when it identifies a pair or 
triple of hypotheses for which there is no differentiating symptom. A 
symptom (S) is said to differentiate one hypothesis (HI) from another 
(H2) when there is a path over one or more links from HI to S and no path 
from H2 to S. For triplets, a symptom differentiates HI when it is 
associated with HI but not with either of the other two hypotheses. 
When MORE finds a pair or triplet without a differentiating 
symptom, it will ask the knowledge-base developer to provide a symptom 
associated with one hypothesis but not the others. " 
In a related manner SALT uses attributes to differentiate between values in order 
to determine which ones to retrieve from its data base. Attributes are used within MORE 
to distinguish between symptoms. The symptom attributes are represented in the MORE 
structuring as conditions attached to the link joining the hypothesis and the symptom. 
Existing knowledge may be used to differentiate between hypotheses. This is 
employed by MOLE (Eshelman, 1988). Given the knowledge that event El explains event 
E2, it can be inferred that the presence of EI is likely to lead to E2, or alternatively, that 
the absence of E2 tends to rule out El. The user can be asked to confirm this. MOLE 
seeks further information for distinguishing between two explanations in a similar way to 
MORE. 
In tools undertaking heuristic classification a different differentiation strategy is 
required if a symptom is found to be directly linked to two hypotheses. Within MORE 
this strategy is called path differentiation. MORE asks the expert for an event caused by 
HI and not H2 that in turn causes S. MORE represents such an event as a symptom with a 
link to HI and S. MORE also employs a strategy which its creators call path division 
which is similar to path differentiation in that it seeks to elicit intermediate events on 
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causal pathways. However, the strategy differs in that the intermediate symptomatic event 
sought (S2) is expected to have a greater probability of occurrence, given the hypothesis 
(H), than the original event (SI). The failure to observe the intermediate event provides 
stronger evidence that the hypothesis has not occurred than the failure to observe the 
original event. S2 is represented as a symptom with a link to H and S 1. 
3.4.2. Verification 
Several definitions exist in the literature of verification. Andert (1992) defines verification 
as "substantiation that the system does the job right. Verification requires determination 
through formal confirmation and/or proof that the system is correct, complete, and 
consistent within itself and its specification". By contrast Hoppe and Meseguer (1993) 
state that verification "checks a knowledge-based system against the specifications 
generated by its totally formalizable requirements. It is performed by checking and not by 
proving knowledge-based system properties". Gupta (1993) defines verification as "a 
process by which the requirements, specifications, and design of the system are tested and 
evaluated for accuracy and consistency. " 
For clarity, verification will be defined here as ensuring that the internal structure 
of each model is complete, correct and internally consistent. Verification should also 
ensure that the model's behaviour is plausible. This means that the model should function 
correctly. This overlaps with some definitions of validation. For example, Gupta defines 
validation as "the functional accuracy or correctness of the system's performance. " 
Ensuring that the internal structure of the model is correct will go some way towards 
ensuring that the model functions correctly. Some of the methods used for verification 
may also be applicable to validation. There is an overlap between verification of a model 
and validation. However complete validation may only be achieved by testing the model 
in the environment in which it is going to be used. 
Verification consists of a number of methods which will vary depending on the 
system being verified. The verification methods must ensure that the model is complete, 
correct and consistent. In order for a model to be consistent it must be correct and concise. 
A field of work exists on the verification of expert systems. The verification 
methods used by knowledge acquisition tools form part of this work. A brief overview of 
the verification methods employed by this field will be given. This will include 
verification methods used by knowledge acquisition tools. Examples of techniques 
individual knowledge acquisition tools use to perform these methods will be given. Only 
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methods used to verify the expert systems knowledge base will be discussed. Methods 
used to verify the inference mechanism will not be mentioned as these are not relevant to 
the thesis. 
To provide a structure for this overview two categories of verification as defined 
by O'Keefe and O'Leary (1993) are used: domain dependent verification and domain 
independent verification. 
3.4. Zl. Domain Dependent Verification 
Domain dependent verification matches meta-knowledge from the domain to ensure 
compatibility within existing knowledge. The verification methods employed by 
knowledge acquisition tools are domain dependent. As the tools accumulate knowledge 
about the domain they use this knowledge to verify new information gained as part of the 
acquisition process. 
Four methods of verification have been identified in the knowledge acquisition 
tools surveyed. These are: 
1. checking for missing information; 
2. preventing conflicting information; 
3. preventing invalid information; 
4. looking for duplicated information. 
These methods can be used to improve the completeness, correctness and conciseness of a 
model. It is unreasonable to expect the expert to be able to remember, or to be aware of, 
all the information used to create a complex system. In order to ensure that knowledge 
acquired is complete information missing is determined. It is quite possible when dealing 
with complex information that the expert will make a mistake. To prevent this kind of 
incorrect information methods exist to prevent conflicting and invalid information. So that 
the knowledge gathered is concise duplicated information is tested for. A user may 
duplicate an object by using a different name to one already entered or by entering the 
same object twice thus creating redundant information. Techniques for performing the 
verification methods will be given. A tool may use the same technique for more than one 
of the verification methods. 
One technique utilised by knowledge acquisition tools to look for missing 
information is to provide an active demon continually testing for the missing information. 
In KRITON (Dierderich et al., 1988) this demon is called the "watcher". The "watcher" 
controls KRITON's intermediate knowledge representation. Every object in the 
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intennediate representation is placed in a taxonomic organisation. The "watcher" looks 
for missing links and sends a message to the user if any are found i. e., if information on 
inheritance paths and part-of relations is missing. Hence KRITON continually checks the 
knowledge as it is acquired. For example, the user may have generated several objects. 
The "watcher" will check that each object's relations to the other objects in the domain 
are specified. Further details of exactly how the "watcher" finds the missing knowledge 
are unclear. Continuous checking will have the disadvantage that error messages will be 
sent indicating information is missing which otherwise would be filled in by the expert in 
due course as knowledge acquisition continued. This could be very annoying to the expert 
and disrupt the natural flow of information. The technique of utilising an active demon to 
look for missing information is also used by AQUINAS. In a similar manner to the 
"watcher" the AQUINAS dialog manager applies a set of rules when there are missing 
pieces of knowledge to recommend to the expert to employ a tool from its workbench to 
complete the knowledge base (Kitto and Boose, 1988). 
Looking for missing information may be performed by the expert system which the 
knowledge acquisition tool acquires knowledge for rather than the tool itself. Iterative 
refinement via test cases provides a technique which makes use of the expert system to 
look for missing and incorrect information. The expert inputs a test case and provides an 
expected set of results. If the results returned by the expert system differ from this, the 
knowledge acquisition tool tries to determine the source of errors and recommends 
possible remedies to the expert. The expert corrects the information and the cycle of 
refinement continues until the two result sets agree. The MOLE knowledge acquisition 
tool (Eshelman, 1988) is an example of a tool using this technique. The user gives the 
expert system a test case and it makes a diagnosis. If an incorrect diagnosis is made 
MOLE tries to determine the source of the error by assuming there is missing information 
and recommends possible remedies. This may mean adding knowledge or qualifying 
existing knowledge but sometimes the interpretation previously provided will need to be 
revised. However, iterative refinements means the system is not checked for completeness 
until after an initial version is built. This could allow a complex series of errors to 
develop, each compounding a previous error, making major modifications necessary. 
The overwriting technique avoids conflicting information by allowing overwriting 
of previous specifications. This also prevents duplication. OPAL (Musen et al., 1988) 
utilises this technique. 
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Tools acquiring numerical information may use a constraint checking technique to 
prevent invalid information by assessing the values provided to see if they fall within a 
predefined range. For example, when pH values are entered into the P10 tool the values 
are constrained to be a real number between 0.0 and 14.0 (Eriksson, 1992b; 1994). 
KNACK also contains a similar testing technique to this (Klinker et al., 1988). 
Duplicated information may be looked for by the overlap of preconditions 
technique. This technique uses heuristics to check that preconditions on multiple 
procedures that contribute to the same object are unique to each procedure. This technique 
is used by SALT (Marcus, 1988). SALT warns the user if overlap of preconditions occurs. 
TDE (Kahn et al., 1988) and KNACK (Klinker et al., 1988) also provide examples of 
tools utilising this technique. TDE looks for duplicated information by monitoring for 
failure-modes which have similar causes and consequences, or those that share the same 
test and repair procedures. KNACK looks for duplication by testing for synonyms, i. e. 
whether two designers are using different words to describe the same facts. 
3.4. ZZ Domain Independent Verification 
Domain independent approaches are based upon the concept of an anomaly. An anomaly 
is a potential error. It may be an actual error needing correcting or it may be intended. 
There are several ways of representing knowledge in an expert system. Some of 
these are: 
1. model-based systems; 
2. case-based reasoning systems; 
3. rule-based systems; 
4. hybrid systems. 
Very little work has been done on verifying model-based systems. Verification of case- 
based reasoning systems will not be described as it is not relevant to this thesis. 
Verification methods applied to the other two representations will now be 
discussed. Most work on verification has been performed on rule-based systems. O'Keefe 
and O'Leary (1993) divide methods for verifying rule-based systems into three categories: 
structure, weights and statistical investigations. The majority of methods developed for 
verifying rule-based systems fall within the structure category. Sources vary slightly as to 
how verification methods which test for structural anomalies are classified (Andert, 1992; 
O'Keefe and O'Leary (1993); Tepandi, 1997). To maintain uniformity this thesis will use 
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the three categories of verification methods previously defined in this chapter. These 
method categories are: completeness, correctness and conciseness. 
Completeness problems include unreferenced attributes. Within rule-based systems 
an unreferenced attribute can prevent the system from arriving at a conclusion. The 
omission of a rule will cause one or more attributes to be unaccounted for. The dead-end 
conclusion check identifies rules with conclusions that can never be utilised. The 
unreachable condition check identifies rules with conclusions whose conditions can never 
be met. 
To ensure correctness within a rule-base methods are used to check that the same 
condition is called by the same name and that the same conclusion is called by the same 
name. The developer may be required to establish lists of attributes and conclusions from 
which rules can be constructed. Correctness checks also ensure that there are no 
illegitimate attributes and the structure of the rule-base is not violated. Illegitimate 
attributes are those values outside a stipulated set pertaining to the application domain. 
Examples of violations are conflicting rules, subsumed rules and circular rules. Conflicting 
rules are rules with identical conditions that lead to conflicting conclusions. They are of 
the form: 
If P then Q 
If P then R 
If Q then not R 
Both 'R' and 'not R' are inferred from the input P thus causing a conflict. A rule is 
subsumed by another rule if both rules have identical conditions and conclusions but the 
subsuming rule has additional conditions and/or conclusions, e. g. 
If P then R 
If P and Q then R and S 
Circular rules start with some condition and return to the same condition. They are of the 
form: 
If P then Q 
If Q then R 
If R then P 
Checks need to be performed to remove the violations. 
To secure conciseness in a rule-base methods detect redundancy. Redundancy 
occurs when a reasoning chain has a redundant rule. For example, 
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If P then Q 
If Q then R 
If P then R 
These rules could be simplified to 
If P then Q and R 
In systems using certainty factors it is important to verify the weights. Verification 
ensures that each rule supposed to have a weight has one and that is developed alongside 
the theory on which it is based. Statistical investigations analyse the attributes, 
conclusions or firing of rules. Any of these rule facets occurring infrequently suggest the 
presence of an anomaly. 
Hybrid systems combine rules with other structures such as frames, procedures and 
objects to represent knowledge. Verification methods developed for rule-based systems 
will also be applicable to hybrid systems but further anomalies may arise within hybrid 
systems which may also need to be considered. Examples will be described for each of the 
hybrids listed. 
O'Keefe and O'Leary (1993) discuss how anomalies may arise within a hybrid 
system using a frame structure. To ensure correctness of the names and labels given to the 
frames and their slots and contents they suggest the use of lists to construct the frames 
from. They also suggest that these lists may be used to test for completeness. Each name 
on a list should be used in a frame, slot or content, otherwise the system is incomplete. 
How redundancy can occur within systems using frames is discussed. Frames, slots within 
frames, contents within frames and connections with other frames may all be redundant. 
Redundant frames may be determined by comparing the contents of frames with each 
other. Redundant slots may be found by comparing slots within a frame to each other. 
Redundant contents may also be found by comparison techniques. Redundant connections 
may be determined by inspecting the connections to other frames, for a given frame. 
Renard et al. (1993) present an algorithm to verify an object-oriented knowledge- 
base of an expert system which combines procedures with rules. The algorithm converts 
the procedures into rules which are added to the existing rules to form an equivalent rule 
set. The equivalent rule set is partitioned into decision subtables. The subtables are 
checked for redundant, conflicting and missing rules and unreferenced attribute values. 
Mukherjee et al. (1997) look at anomalies in a hybrid system combining rules and 
objects. Anomalies due to subsumption by objects and monitor/rule interaction are 
considered. Subsumption by objects occurs due to mixed references to classes and 
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instances in rules. Monitors are side-effect methods attached to attributes in objects that 
react to the accessing of values. A monitor may interrupt a rule matching or firing. 
Mukhedee et al. detect subsumption anomalies by clustering the rule set. 
Adjacency matrices are used to check for subsumption amongst rules within a cluster. An 
algorithm is proposed to detect monitor/rule interaction. The algorithm transforms the 
monitors into rule-like structures. These structures are matched against the rules of the 
knowledge-base. A successful match indicates a possible anomaly. 
3.4.3. Explanation 
An explanation facility is needed to provide the user with feedback as to what is occurring 
within the tool as knowledge is being acquired i. e., it is needed to show the knowledge 
already elicited and how the knowledge acquisition tool has structured this knowledge. 
An explanation facility provides an insight into the methods the tool employs to acquire 
knowledge, for example, why differentiation is occurring within MORE. It is also 
necessary to tell the expert where information is missing or why it may be incorrect. 
An explanation facility may be viewed as the reciprocal of knowledge acquisition 
in that in the first the knowledge must be 'transferred' to the expert whereas in the second 
the expert must 'transfer' knowledge to the tool. A consequence of this relationship is that 
the existing knowledge structures of the tool may also serve as the tool's explanation 
facility. They may be used to show the information acquired by the tool. This in turn will 
enable the expert to see where information is missing or if it is incorrect. This technique is 
used by MOLE (Eshelman, 1988). If, during iterative refinement (see section 3.4.2.1. ), 
the expert indicates that an incorrect diagnosis has been made MOLE responds by listing 
those knowledge structures which have been used by the expert system to reach that 
diagnosis. The expert can see if any of those knowledge structures are incorrect. 
The knowledge structures may be shown as graphic representations of the 
knowledge base. The expert may find this difficult to follow if unaccustomed to thinking 
in this format, i. e. a semantic net. TDE (Kahn et al., 1988) uses this type of explanation 
technique. OPAL (Musen et al., 1988) shows its knowledge structures as filled-in forms. 
3.4.4. Ranking 
Ranking in knowledge acquisition tools may be used at two distinct levels. 
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1. It may be used by the expert to order the knowledge. This information ranking is 
necessary to establish the relative importance of certain facts. This sub-section 
discusses the uses of this form of ranking and which techniques are applied for these 
uses by the tools in the survey. 
2. The knowledge acquisition tool developer uses ranking within the tool to make it more 
user friendly, allowing the expert to locate the most important or urgent information 
first or to make the most efficient use of time. This will be described in the user 
interface (section 3.4.5. ) as this form of ranking may be provided as a function of that 
feature. 
Two sorts of information have been identified that the expert may need to rank as it 
is acquired. These are rules and knowledge elements. 
The expert may be required to rank rules created by the knowledge acquisition 
tool to indicate the reliability of the data obtained. Certainty factors may be used to rank 
rules. MORE (Kahn, 1988) asks the expert to assign positive and negative confidence 
(certainty) factors to the rules generated. The positive confidence factor represents the 
significance of a symptom when all the rules conditions are fulfilled. The negative 
confidence factor represents the measure of disbelief. 
Eshelman (1988) argues against certainty factors on the grounds that experts are 
not very good at specifying their degree of certainty. He found that experts would tend to 
choose a number near the middle of the range. An alternative technique is to rank 
explanations in order of preference. The expert indicates his preference, given some piece 
of evidence, by dividing the possible explanations into those that are more favoured and 
those that are less favoured. This is utilised by MOLE (Eshelman, 1988). 
Ranking may be needed to specify the importance of knowledge pieces or 
elements relative to each other. In the rating scales technique the expert may rank 
knowledge by giving each element a rating showing where it falls on a bipolar trait scale 
with ordinal ratings between I and 5. Bipolar means that the scale is arranged between 
two poles or extremes such as 'hot' and 'cold' or 'easy to use' and 'hard to use'. The rating 
scales technique is utilised by AQUINAS (Boose and Bradshaw, 1988), ETS (Boose, 
1986) and KITTEN (Shaw and Gaines, 1988). 
If the user wished to view information already acquired the developer might use 
ranking within the knowledge acquisition tool to ensure that the most general was 
retrieved first. For example, in a tool acquiring medical knowledge a list of patients 
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undertaking a drug trial might be retrieved in preference to individual patient details. A 
hierarchical-type scheme may be used to retrieve more general information first. OPAL 
(Musen et al., 1988) is an example of a tool using this. OPAL displays its higher level 
forms first. Additional forms show more detailed values for elements contained in 
previous forms. 
3.4.5. User Interface 
The user should be able to enter information and also to browse, search and edit 
information already acquired, i. e. a user interface should be provided. Browsing is a 
passive process. It shows the information within the knowledge acquisition tool in a 
structured format. Searching consists of actively looking for information. As will be seen 
later browsing and searching facilities may be integrated. A knowledge acquisition tool 
should be able to add extra knowledge when it is found to be missing or to alter or delete it 
if it is found to be contradictory or duplicated, either by the user or upon verification. This 
means the tool should be able to edit existing information. In some circumstances a user 
may wish to duplicate an object and edit it to create a new but similar object in order to 
save effort, e. g. a complete set of information about a butterfly valve might be input 
quickly into an expert system by copying and altering information on a generic valve. This 
again requires that the existing knowledge be added to or updated. 
There are two types of browsers: list browsers and graph browsers. List browsers 
present lists of items, possibly sorted according to a criteria, and allow the users to scroll 
(search) through the list. The items can be selected for certain operations such as edit, 
rename, copy and delete. P10 (Eriksson, 1992b and 1994) utilises this sort of browser. A 
graph browser displays the relationship between a set of items. The knowledge acquisition 
tool ALF-A ( Eriksson and Larses, 1992) is an example of a tool using a graph browser. 
By selecting a node and issuing an 'edit' command the user can edit the items that each 
node represents. The items are edited by form-based editors. Forms are also used to edit 
properties of the relationships (links) between the nodes. The graph may also be directly 
edited, e. g. nodes may be moved, copied and deleted, links may be created or deleted. 
The networks created by TDE (Kahn et al., 1988) may also be edited in this way. 
Searching may be achieved by matching a string against the names of knowledge 
base objects. TDE and SALT are examples of tools using this. In TDE the user is allowed 
to specify the class of the object to constrain the search. SALT uses a parameter test plus 
further attribute tests if necessary to narrow the candidate range. TDE also provides an 
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example of a tool allowing duplication and editing of objects. The failure-modes in the 
TDE knowledge base may be copied and edited to form new objects. 
The expert is far less likely to make mistakes if allowed to enter information in a 
way that seems natural but this way must be unambiguous. The expert should be able to 
provide information as it comes to mind or to skip questions whose answers are unknown. 
Tools such as SALT (Marcus, 1988) require the user to visualise solutions in terms of the 
problem-solving model which may seem artificial. TDE's creators (Kahn et al., 1988) 
claim it allows developers to provide information as they wish. OPAL's forms (Musen et 
al., 1988) provide a model of what knowledge is expected. However, OPAL is highly 
structured. The user is unable to specify new domain constructs. As it is impossible to 
anticipate all of the constructs which might be encountered within the domain area this 
limits the amount of knowledge which may be gathered by the tool. 
The user interface should be structured so as to allow the knowledge acquisition 
tool to make economic use of the expert's time. This means there may be some form of 
ranking within the tool in order to make it efficient. Ranking within the tool falls into one 
of three categories: 
1. Ranking the application area; 
2. Ranking the question order; 
3. Ranking knowledge techniques. 
Ranking may be necessary to decide which part of the application area to elicit knowledge 
on first. For example, the tool may be structured so as to allow information on a generic 
valve to be gathered first. This would mean that less would need to be gathered when a 
more specialised example of a valve, such as a butterfly valve, was acquired by the tool. 
This would increase tool efficiency. There are no specific examples of this within the 
tools surveyed. 
Ranking the order in which a knowledge acquisition tool puts questions to the 
expert may also increase tool efficiency or allow more efficient use of the experts time. 
The questions may be ranked so as to suggest that a generic part of the application area 
was worked on first or so as to infer a piece of information whenever possible. This would 
avoid asking the expert unnecessary questions and hence save expensive expert time. 
Heuristics may be used to achieve this. KNACK (Klinker et al., 1988) produces a 
reporting system called a WRINGER which uses heuristics to select which piece of 
information to gather next based on previously gathered information. The WRINGER's 
heuristics are based on the following premises: an inference might make a question 
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unnecessary, the expert might feel more natural providing information in a certain order, 
or information gathered in a certain order might reduce the amount of information needed. 
MOLE also uses heuristics to reduce the number of questions it asks the expert. MOLE's 
heuristics are based on inference too. For example, if some piece of information partitions 
the set of hypotheses explaining some symptom into two, those hypotheses to be rejected 
and those that are viable, and if one subset is considerably larger MOLE will assume the 
reason directly qualifies the hypotheses in the smaller subset. That is, if R is a reason for 
favouring HI and H2 over H3, then MOLE proposes that the reason provides evidence 
against H3- 
Ranking could be needed to order the manner in which knowledge acquisition 
techniques are applied by the tool. The various techniques could be applied in order of 
user preference. In workbench tools, containing several acquisition techniques, the user 
should be guided as to the most appropriate technique to use. The dialog manager in 
AQUINAS "examines heuristics to identify a set of alternatives for the given state of the 
knowledge base and recommends the strategy of greatest potential value, determined by 
accumulated rule priorities" (Kitto and Boose, 1988). 
Directive modelling uses models of the knowledge acquisition process and the 
system task to suggest what to do next in the knowledge acquisition process. Directive 
models identify the task that the application system should perform; they discover which 
knowledge is needed about the application area to perform that task; and they structure the 
information acquired in a way that mimics the structure of the task at hand. Directive 
models are used to provide advice as to which tools to use to elicit knowledge about the 
application area. However, this knowledge is needed to select an appropriate directive 
model. KEW (van Heijst, 1992) attempts to resolve this problem by using generalised 
directive models. These are directive models but they describe parts of the problem- 
solving process at a very general level. Enough structure is provided to guide elicitation of 
more knowledge. This enables further detail to be added so that the model can be made 
more specific. KEW uses the generalised directive model to advise the knowledge 
engineer as to the most appropriate tool to chose from its workbench to elicit the domain 
knowledge. For example, a task might be identified as classification and its domain as 
mushrooms. Kew does not yet know how to classify the mushrooms but as the overall 
task is known it is able to recommend a tool, such as a card-sorting tool (see section 3.4.1), 
to acquire more knowledge. 
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3.4. Conclusions 
The features of knowledge acquisition tools were identified. Reasons why these features 
are necessary was discussed. The attempt was made to show that a knowledge acquisition 
tool is involved with more than the straight and simple transfer of knowledge from the 
expert into a knowledge-based system. 
Knowledge exists in different forms. Providing a workbench which integrates 
knowledge acquisition tools using single techniques overcomes some of the tools' 
individual limitations. Domain oriented tools focusing on the task domain were found to 
be a powerful type of knowledge acquisition tool. This approach allows specialised tool 
support to be provided, leading to better understanding of, and acceptance for, the 
knowledge acquisition tools among experts. However the cost of developing such tools is 
high, considering their restricted fields of application. Metatools enable developers to 
generate new domain oriented knowledge acquisition tools from high-level descriptions. 
These metatools can simplify the task of developing domain oriented knowledge 
acquisition tools and will be able to reduce significantly the amount of work needed to 
implement these tools. No existing metatool is complete in the sense that all conceivable 
knowledge acquisition tools can be specified in'it. Further work is required to improve the 
generality of metatools. 
Desirable features of knowledge acquisition tools were identified as: 
(i) a differentiation facility; 
(ii) verification testing; 
(iii) an explanation facility; 
(iv) the ability to rank information; 
(v) a user interface. 
Some differentiation techniques used by knowledge acquisition tools are the triadic 
elicitation technique, the card-sorting technique and using symptoms associated with 
hypotheses. 
Verification was defined as ensuring that the internal structure of a model is 
complete, correct and internally consistent. A brief overview of the verification methods 
used by expert systems was given. The verification methods used by knowledge 
acquisition tools form part of this work. Verification techniques used by knowledge 
acquisition tools are domain dependent. The tools were found to use demons or the expert 
system itself to look for missing information. Duplicated information was looked for by 
the overlap of preconditions technique, monitoring for similar causes and consequences 
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and testing for synonyms. The domain independent verification techniques used by expert 
systems were described. Among the techniques used by expert systems were checks for 
dead-end conclusions, unreachable conditions and conflicting, subsumed and circular 
rules. 
Knowledge acquisition tools provide an explanation facility by displaying their 
knowledge structures as lists, networks or forms. Ranking techniques used are certainty 
factors, order of preference and rating scales. A user interface is provided to allow the 
user to enter information and to browse, search and edit information already gathered. 
Browsers may be provided as list browsers or graph browsers. The user interface may be 
ranked to make economic use of the experts time. Heuristics may be used to achieve this 
ranking. 
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4. Equipment Model Builder 
This thesis develops a method to construct signed directed graph models for process plants 
simply and correctly. A computer-aided modelling tool, Equipment Model Builder, has 
been constructed to demonstrate this method. The models created by Equipment Model 
Builder are equipment unit models. These models are utilised by the QUEEN system 
(Chung, 1993) described in section 2.4. in order to show that the models created are 
sufficient to be of use. Equipment Model Builder is not application specific. It could 
easily be modified to construct models for other applications utilising unit-based SDG or 
functional equation models. 
Equipment Model Builder is implemented in wxCLIPS. WxCLIPS is essentially 
CLIPS which has been extended to work with an event driven style of programming and a 
set of graphical user interface functions. CLIPS is an expert system tool developed by 
NASA. 
This chapter presents the design philosophy behind Equipment Model Builder and 
the basic features are described. Its more advanced features are described in chapters 5 
and 6. 
4.1. Overview 
The architecture of Equipment Model Builder is shown in figure 4.1 (in text). It consists of 
four main components: 
an output creator; 
a unit model creator; 
a set of module tools; 
a set of verification tools. 
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Figure 4.1 Architecture of Equipment Model Builder 
The output tool takes as input a description of a plant and a library of plant models and 
creates a modified plant description file and a file of unit models occurring within the 
plant. This information forms the input for the expert system as described in section 2.4. 
The description of the plant topology for Equipment Model Builder is a text file which can 
be automatically generated by AutoCAD from a drawing or supplied by the user. More 
details about output creation are given in section 4.2. 
The unit model creator tool allows the user to specify new unit models. Each new 
model specified is added to the model library. This tool will be described in section 4.3. 
Within the input plant topology Equipment Model Builder identifies groups of 
units which could cause ambiguities when combined to form part of the overall plant 
model due to multiple causal paths. How these types of ambiguities arise is described in 
chapter 2. Equipment Model Builder applies a module creation approach to remove these 
ambiguities. To administer this approach Equipment Model Builder possesses a set of 
module tools. Equipment Model Builder automatically identifies two kinds of unit 
groupings which could lead to ambiguities within qualitative modelling. Each unit 
grouping found is checked to see whether a module for it already exists within the model 
library. If there is no existing module which describes the occurrence identified a new one 
needs to be specified by the user. Finally, the module is substituted into the plant system, 
replacing the individual units that make up the module and preventing the ambiguities 
from occurring. The plant description file created is modified to describe the module. A 
model of the module is placed into the output file of plant unit models. The user is also 
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provided with the functionality to define modules from any group of units. Details of the 
modular approach are given in chapter 5. 
Equipment Model Builder possesses a set of verification tools to verify the models 
created. The verification techniques used by these tools are described in chapter 6. 
Upon commencing a session, Equipment Model Builder 'asks' the user to which 
components access is required. The user may choose from: 
" creating a unit model to add to the model library (unit model creator component and 
verification toolset); 
" creating a plant description file and output file of units for QUEEN (output creator 
component, module toolset and verification toolset); 
" creating a user-defined module to add to the model library (part of module toolset and 
verification toolset). 
The design philosophy behind Equipment Model Builder will now be discussed. A 
need has been identified to develop a method to enable an engineer to construct SDG 
models. This method should be simple to use and aid the engineer in building correct 
models. In order to fulfil this requirement ideas from the knowledge acquisition field have 
been utilised. 
Knowledge acquisition tools provide aids to allow the expert to achieve a 
structured input of information without knowledge of the internal format of the expert 
systems that these types of tools are acquiring information for. Knowledge acquisition 
tools are a type of modelling tool although they are not described as such. Knowledge 
acquisition tools were surveyed in chapter 3 in order to determine their desirable features 
in relation to qualitative modelling. 
Equipment Model Builder utilises the following features: 
"a user interface; 
" verification testing. 
Equipment Model Builder provides a graphical user interface for unit model creation. The 
interface also forms part of the module and verification toolsets as described in section 
5.2.3. and chapter 6. The forms of the interface allow an engineer to enter a fault 
propagation model relatively easily using a high level representation. Equipment Model 
Builder converts this into an SDG representation format readable by QUEEN. (See 
section 2.4.1. for an example of a model written in this format). The user interface 
provides list browsers, differentiation facilities and ranks the question order. Information 
may be edited or copied. Details of these facilities are given in section 4.3. 
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The interface forms provide an explanation facility showing what information a 
model contains. Menus on the interface identify which information within a model is 
incomplete (see section 6.1.1.2. ). Explanation is also given during the modularisation 
process. The user is provided with a description of the unit grouping identified as leading 
to ambiguities. 
Equipment Model Builder provides methods to verify the models created (see 
chapter 6). Viewed as a knowledge acquisition tool Equipment Model Builder falls into 
the domain oriented category, defining a process plant as its application area. 
To ensure no ambiguities due to multiple causal paths arise when equipment unit 
models are combined to form a plant model Equipment Model Builder utilises a modular 
approach. This is described in chapter 5. 
4.2. Output Creation 
This sub-section describes the creation of a modified plant description file and an output 
file of unit models occurring within the plant by Equipment Model Builder. These two 
files form the input for QUEEN. To create the modified plant description file Equipment 
Model Builder takes as input a description of the plant topology. This description is 
supplied by the user via a text file or a file generated by AutoCAD. An example file of a 
section of a plant is shown below. 
'tail V, 'outlet', '[ ]', 'unspecified' 
6 pipe V, 'pipe', '[out is [tail l, in]]', 'unspecified' 
&valvel', 'valve', '[out is [pipel, in]]', 'aperture is open' 
&pumpi V, 'pump', '[out is [valve l, in]]', 'unspecified' 
Each line describes a unit. The first field consists of an identifier for the unit. The 
second field is the unit name. The third details the outport connections of the unit. The 
name of the unit's outport, the identifier of the unit it is connected to and the name of the 
inport to which its outport is connected are given. The value '[]' indicates that there are 
no connected units. The example above only shows units with one outport. Units with 
multiple outports may be connected to several units. For example, the third field of a unit 
with two outports such as a divider might be '[out I is [V l, in], out2 is [V2, in]]', were 'V V 
and 'V2' are identifiers for valve units. The last field consists of the unit's attributes. 
Sections 2.4.1. and 2.4.2. provide more detail on unit attributes. The sample described is 
shown below. 
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Figure 4.2 A Sample of a Plant Section 
To create the plant description file to input to QUEEN Equipment Model Builder 
re-formats the file for QUEEN. For example, the plant section shown above would be re- 
written as: 
instance (tail I is a outlet, 
[outports info 
instance (pipe I isa pipe, 
[outports info 
[out is [taill, in]] 
instance (valve I isa valve, 
[outports info 
[out is [pipel, in]], 
aperture is open 
instance (pumpJ I isa pump, 
[outports info 
[out is [valvel, in]] 
To build the output file of unit models occurring within the plant the tool creates a 
list of the types of plant units from the input plant description. The relevant unit models 
are retrieved from the model library and concatenated to form the output file. The modular 
approach utilised by Equipment Model Builder may alter the plant description file and unit 
model file. This is described in section 5.3. 
4.3. Model Creation 
To simplify model construction a graphical user interface is provided. An overview of this 
interface is presented and how its features relate to the overall design philosophy is 
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detailed. The interface must be flexible enough to express the most complicated and 
unusual of models. Problems encountered in the interface design will be discussed. 
The method employed by Equipment Model Builder must take account of the unit 
model structure. A unit model is composed of structural information (the unit name, parent 
name and the inports, outports, unit ports and attribute slots) and fault propagation 
information (the propLinks and conditionLinks slots). A main window, titled 'Unit 
Description', in the graphical user interface allows structural information to be defined. 
The information contained in the conditionLinks forms a specialised subset of the 
propLinks information. This allows the information in these two slots to be defined 
together. The propLinks and conditionLinks arcs are used to add SDG propagation arcs to 
the unit model. There are four types of propLinks and conditionLinks arc: 
(i) deviation linked to deviation; 
(ii) fault linked to deviation; 
(iii) fault linked to consequence; 
(iv) deviation linked to consequence. 
See section 2.4. for more details of the unit model structure. Four sub-windows are 
created to allow fault propagation information to be defined, one for each category of arc. 
The four sub-windows are titled 'Deviatiorf, 'Fault->Deviation', 
'Fault->Consequence' and 'Deviation->Consequence'. The windows of the interface have a 
form layout. This allows model information to be clearly presented and enables the user to 
differentiate between the different arc types. 
On starting a model creation session the main window is shown. This window 
remains accessible throughout the session. Closing the main window closes the 
application. The four sub-windows may be opened and closed by the user at will. Each 
window provides an option to move to any of the other windows. By accessing the main 
window first the interface ranks the order in which the model is created. 
4.3.1. Common Features of the Windows 
Each of the windows possesses drop-down menus which allow the user to access the other 
windows, libraries and verification tools. Three libraries are accessed via the drop-down 
menus. These libraries contain all the faults, consequences and process conditions for the 
models. The process conditions consist of attribute values for the conditionLinks slots. 
The information in the libraries is generic. Each library is displayed using a list browser. 
This allows the user to differentiate between the information contained within the separate 
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libraries. Facilities are provided allowing the user to add to or to change or delete 
members of the libraries. 
Physical conditions under which the faults and consequences occur (see section 
2.4.1. ) are defined by placing the condition after the fault or consequence value and 
separating the condition from the value by a comma. An example of this for a fault would 
be 'blocked by frozen fluid, freezing' and an example for a consequence would be 
'fire/explosion risk, flammable'. When the value is utilised within a model it is converted 
to the correct model syntax. For example, for the fault shown the syntax would be 
'['blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]'. For the consequence the syntax would be 
'['fire/explosion risk', flammable]'. 
To provide the user with quick access a hierarchical structure needs to be 
implemented within these libraries. Time limitations have prevented this from being 
carried out. Verification tools accessed via, the drop-down menu are described in sections 
6.1.1.2. and 6.1.2.3. 
All the windows have a 'Save' button and a 'Cancel' button. The 'Save' button 
has a feature which prevents the user from accidentally over-writing an existing model 
when the intention may have been to alter the model and save it as a new model. Clicking 
on the 'Save' button with the mouse stores the model and creates a specialised file for the 
model. The high level representation of the model information displayed by the forms of 
the interface is converted into an SDG representation and this information is placed within 
the specialised file. The specialised files of the model library are utilised by QUEEN. The 
user is given a choice as to if a specialised file should be created as this might not be 
desired if the model is not yet complete. The user is also asked as to whether the model 
saved should be verified. More details of this are given in section 6.2.1.1. 
Clicking on the 'Cancel' button replaces the model information displayed with that 
stored at the most recent save command. Before the model information is altered the user 
is asked to confirm the cancel command. 
The sub-windows are labelled with the name and parent of the model currently 
being viewed, e. g. 'divider is a pipe'. The 'Deviation' and 'Fault->Deviation' windows 
provide access to a menu of possible SDG influences. This menu has a list of members of 
the process condition library adjoining it (see figure 4-3). The 'Fault->Consequence' and 
'Deviation->Consequence' windows also provide access to this list. The user may select 
one or more process conditions from the list of process condition library members to apply 
to the arcs created. Applying a process condition to an arc means that the arc is placed 
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with a conditionLinks slot within the model with the condition as its attribute value. The 
list ofprocess condition library members has a choicebox associated with it. A choicebox 
is a special kind of menu. The choicebox values allow the user to define the structure of 
arcs to which conditions are applied as 'include' or 'exclude'. The structure of propLinks 
arcs is automatically defined as 'info'(see section 2.4.1. ). 
ýl Deviations and their Process Conditions ; 
Choose Deviation 
u/d 
Choose Condiýoni 
1 purpose is todrai n 
2 purpose is tosplit 
3 purpose is tobypass 
4 aperture is open 
5 aperture is floating 
6 aperture is closed 
7 status is spare 
if applicable else leave blank. 
FncTIu-d-e--[fl process conclition(s) if applicable 
LE 
Figure 4.3 Menus of influences and conditions 
Each member of the process condition library is numbered. The arcs which have 
conditions applied to them are labelled with the relevant numbers of the conditions. By 
referring to the process condition library the user is able to discover which conditions are 
applicable to the arcs. Space does not allow process condition names to be placed on the 
sub-windows. Arcs with conditions applied to them are also labelled either with 'In' or 
'ex'. 'in' means that tile structure of the arcs to which the conditions are applied is defined 
as 'include'. 'ex' stands for 'exclude'. An example of a condition label for an arc with 
two conditions applied to it is '[5 or 7 inj'. This states that this arc is applicable when 
process condition number 5 in the library applies when the model is utilised or if process 
condition number 7 applies or if both conditions apply. 'in' defines the structure of the arc 
in both cases. On the 'Deviation' and 'FaLlit->Deviation' windows the condition label is 
combined with the SDG influence upon the arc, e. g. '+ [5 or 7 inf. 
4.3.2. The Main Window 
The main window provides a set of boxes which allow model structural information to be 
entered, a 'description' box and a list browser (refer to figure 4.4 in text). The main 
window also has ail *Fxit' button. 
By typing in the 'description' box the user may annotate a model. The list browser 
shows a list of the plant Units and modules within the model library. The user may select a 
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model name in this browser to edit or delete the details of the model. To save effort for 
the user the graphical interface allows duplication. A user may view a model, edit it and 
re-save it Linder a different name. The model names are arranged alphabetically within tile 
list browser, allowing the user to easily locate a model. 
When the 'Exit' button is clicked, prior to the application closing, if the model 
displayed is a new model or if changes have been made to an existing model the user is 
queried if the model should be saved. 
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Figure 4.4 Main window 
On start-tip a model containing default values is shown. Selecting one ot' the 
structural information boxes with a mouse allows the user to add or change the value 
selected or delete the value. The structural information determines the labelling and layout 
of the sub-forms. This is the reason the user is presented with the main window first. 
Inputting information into the main window results in changes in the structure of the sub- 
forms. 
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4.3.3. The Deviation Window 
The 'Deviation' window consists of a grid. The ports of the unit model form the first row 
and first column of the grid. There are two choiceboxes, one associated with the first row 
and one associated with the first column of the grid. The choicebox associated with the 
first row is labelled 'Port To', that associated with the first column is labelled 'Port From'. 
The choiceboxes each contain a set of process variable deviations. The user is able to 
select a deviation from the 'Port To' choicebox to act as an influence upon the ports of the 
first row. A deviation may be selected from the 'Port From' choicebox to act as an 
influence upon the ports of the first column. The user may choose from: 
Pressure 
Temperature 
Concentration 
Level 
Flow 
No Flow 
Reverse Flow. 
These are the deviations applicable to continuous process plants. The choiceboxes are set 
to 'Pressure' as a default. The default value for the grid elements is 'U/d', which stands for 
'undetermined', except when the value in the first column of the grid is equal to the value 
in the first row of the grid. In this case the grid element has the value '/'. User input is not 
allowed for these elements. This prevents the user from entering an incorrect arc 
containing a deviation which propagates through a port to influence itself at the same port, 
e. g. 'ffin, flow], +, [in, flow])'. 
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Figure 4.5 Deviation window 
The 'Deviation' window has two buttons named '<-Form' and 'Form->. These 
allow the user to access further 'Deviation' forms when the number of columns needed by 
the model is too large to fit into the horizontal space of the window. Clicking on <-Form' 
with the mouse shows the previous form, clicking on *Form->' shows the next form. Error 
messages are displayed it' there is no previous or next form i. e. if the first or last form of 
the set is being viewed. Between the two buttons a label indicates which one of the 
'Deviation' forms is being viewed and how many 'Deviation' forms exist for the model, 
e. g. I of V. The vertical space of the 'Deviation' window is limited as this was not 
thought to present a problem. The problem with the limited horizontal extent of the 
'Deviation' window could be resolved instead by using a scrolling window. However the 
software used to implement Equipment Model Builder does not provide this functionality. 
To create arcs on the 'Deviation' form the user first chooses the process variables 
in which the deviations of the arcs will occur from the choiceboxes. Selecting a value 
from the *Port From' choicebox automatically sets the *Port To' choicebox to the same 
value. This is to provide ease of use for the user as many process variable deviations 
propagate through to the same process variable. The user is also able to select another 
value for the 'Port To' choicebox if appropriate. Once the process variables have been 
selected the user employs the form's grid to create deviation linked to deviation arcs to 
which these process variables are applicable. 
To make an arc the user links a member of the first column of the grid to a member 
of the first row by clicking on a default *Lt/d' element of the grid with the mouse. This 
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brings up the menu choice of possible influences for the SDG arc being created. The user 
chooses a value from this menu. Any conditions which apply to the arc may be selected 
from the process condition library adjoining the menu. The default grid element is 
replaced with the value chosen. This allows the effect of a deviation at a port of the model 
on a deviation at another port of the model to be modelled, forming a deviation linked to 
deviation arc. To change an existing arc the user selects its influence value within the grid 
to bring up the menu of possible SDG influences. To delete an arc the value 'U/d' is 
selected from this menu. 
4.3.4. The Fault->Deviation Window 
The 'Fault->Deviation' window also presents a grid (see figure 4.6). The first column of 
the grid consists of a box to which faults can be added. The ports of the unit model form 
the first row of the grid. A choicebox of the process variables allows the user to select 
which deviation should influence the ports of the first row. Like the 'Deviation' window, 
the 'Fault->Deviation' window has two buttons with an identifying label in between. This 
allows the user to access further 'Fault->Deviation' forms when the number of columns 
needed by the model is too large to fit into the horizontal space of the window. Initially, 
before any values are added to the form, the boxes comprising the grid on the Tault- 
>Deviation' window are blank. 
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a default grid line to the form, change the element selected or delete a grid line. It' the grid 
is not blank a grid element may be selected. An error message is displayed if the user 
attempts to change a grid element or delete a grid line xvhere none exists. A default grid 
line consists of defining the value 'Li/d' for the fault member in the first Column and for 
each of the grid elements. 
To create a fault linked to deviation arc the user first selects the process variable 
deviation which will be caused by the arc from the choicebox on the window. The form's 
grid is then utilised to create arcs which contain this deviation. Members of the first 
COlUmn of the grid may be defined by selection frorn a list of fault library members. To 
make an arc the user links a member of the first column to a member of the first row of the 
grid by selecting a default 'u/d' element ofthe grid with the mouse. Selecting an element 
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Figure 4.6 Fault-Aeviation window 
In the initial blank grid the user may select the first line of a box on the form to add 
brings Lip the menu of SDG influences and list of process conditions described in sub- 
section 4.3.1. from which the user may choose values. This allows the effect of a fault 
propagating to cause a deviation at port within the model to be modelled, forming a fault 
linked to deviation arc. 
4.3.5. The Fault->Consequence Window 
The 'Fault->Consequence' window consists of three boxes which enable the faults, and 
consequences for arcs of this type and the process conditions under which these arcs are 
applicable to be defined. The process conditions are the attribute values for the 
conditionLinks slots. Bel'ore any valtics arc added to this form the boxes arc blank. 
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Figure 4.7 Fau I t->c on sequence window 
A line of detault values may be added to the Tault->ConseqUence' form via the 
same method as described for the Tault-> Deviation' forrn. In order to define an arc on 
this form the user must fill in a fault and a consequence value on a line and values for the 
process conditions if any are applicable to the arc. The user is able to select these values 
by accessing lists of members of the fault. consequence and process condition libraries. It 
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Faults 
is not necessary to define an influence for this arc type as the value is always '+'. This is 
automatically substituted in the arc within the model by Equipment Model Builder. 
4.3.6. The Deviation->Consequence Window 
The 'Deviation->Consequence' window consists of four boxes allowing the deviation 
labels, ports and consequences for these types of arcs to be defined and in addition the 
process conditions under which these arcs are applicable (see figure 4.8). Like the 
'Fault->ConseqUence' window the boxes are initialiv blank. 
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Forms Lists Unreterenced Attributes 
divider is a pipe 
Deviations Ports Consequences Process Conditions 
More Pressure in possible rupture ufd 
LLaVýEj 
Figure 4.8 Devlation->consequence window 
A line of default values may be added to the 'Deviation->Consequence' form, 
again using the same method as described for the Tault-> Deviation' form. To define an 
arc on this form the user must fill in values for the deviation label, port and consequence 
on a line and values for process conditions if any are applicable to the arc. It is not 
necessary to define an influence for this arc type as the value is always '+' which is 
automatically substituted into the model. The consequence and process conditions are 
80 
defined in the same way as for the 'Fault->Deviation' form. The deviation label value is 
chosen from list. The list members are: 
More Pressure 
Less Pressure 
More Temperature 
Less Temperature 
More Concentration 
Less Concentration 
More Level 
Less Level 
More Flow 
Less Flow 
No Flow 
Reverse Flow 
The port value is chosen from a list of all the ports defined for the model. The 
'Deviation->Consequence' form allows the effect of a deviation at a port propagating to 
cause a consequence to be modelled. 
4.4. Summary 
This chapter has given an overview of Equipment Model Builder. This tool was 
developed to demonstrate a method to construct signed directed graphs for process plants 
simply and correctly. The design philosophy of utilising the desirable features of 
knowledge acquisition tools has been discussed. Two of the tools components, the output 
creator and the unit model creator have been described. 
To facilitate model construction a graphical user interface is provided. The format 
of the interface is based on the model structure. A main window allows structural 
information about the model to be entered. Sub-windows permit fault propagation 
information to be input. A unit model has four types of propagation arc: 
(i) deviation linked to deviation; 
(ii) fault linked to deviation; 
(iii) fault linked to consequence; 
(iv) deviation linked to consequence. 
A separate sub-window exists to allow information to be input for each category of arc. 
Lists are provided within the interface from which the user may select values to 
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input. This saves the user work as the value does not have to be typed in each time it is 
needed. The list method also ensures that the values are uniform for all the models created 
by Equipment Model Builder. The interface provides a simple method to allow the user to 
create models. The interface forms gather all the information from the user that is needed 
to build a model. This information is automatically transcribed into the correct syntax for 
the arc of the model when the specialised files are created. This prevents the user from 
making syntactical errors which are time-consuming to solve. 
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5. A Modular Approach 
The new module creation approach developed provides a method to remove ambiguities 
due to multiple causal paths. Chapter 2 explains how these ambiguities may arise. This 
modular approach takes place in three stages: identification, specification and substitution. 
Equipment Model Builder takes a file describing a plant as input. Within this 
process plant the groupings of units together with the connections between them that could 
lead to ambiguities must be identified. Identical structures consisting of different unit 
instances may occur within the same plant or different plants. For example, the loop given 
in figure 5.5 (see section 5.2) might be found within another plant description with 
different component names. The plant description is searched for a unit grouping which 
could lead to ambiguities. If an occurrence is found it is checked to see whether a module 
for it already exists. If there is no existing module which describes the unit group 
identified a new one needs to be specified. 
In the specification stage the units of the plant fragment are amalgamated to form a 
module. Making a plant fragment into a module removes the causal paths that lead to 
ambiguities or incorrect behaviour. The effect of deviations and faults upon the units 
comprising the module are retained. Where multiple causal paths still exist, the shortest 
path heuristic has the correct influence. The module specified is added to a library of 
models. 
In the final stage, the module is substituted into the plant system, replacing the 
individual units that make up the module. The plant description is modified to describe 
the module. A model of the module is placed into an output file which contains the plant's 
component unit models. The system returns to the identification stage. The plant 
description is searched until no more unit groupings which could lead to ambiguities are 
found. Figure 5.1 gives an overview of the modular approach. 
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Figure 5.1 The Modular Approach 
It can be seen from figure 5.1 that at the specification stage the modular approach is 
interrupted. This allows the user to verify the module specified using an external expert 
system (see section 6.2.1.1. ). This also allows the user to view similar modules within the 
model library or to look at the module's constituent units. How Equipment Model Builder 
executes the three stages of the modular approach will be described. Problems 
encountered and the solutions employed are discussed. 
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5.1. Module Automatic Identification 
The groupings of units which Equipment Model Builder automatically identifies as 
leading to ambiguities within qualitative modelling are different possible configurations of 
recycle loops and divider/header combinations. How some configurations may lead to 
ambiguities is already described in section 2.2. These groupings of units are automatically 
identified as they commonly occur within process plants. Other groupings of units which 
lead to ambiguities may occur. For these groupings of units the user is provided with the 
functionality to define modules. This is described in section 5.4. 
The algorithm used by Equipment Model Builder to search for the unit groupings 
which could lead to ambiguities is shown in figure 5.2 (in text). Two searches of the plant 
description are made: one to identify divider/header combinations and one to identify 
recycle loops. Figure 5.1 shows how these identification procedures relate to the modular 
approach. The same search algorithm is applied to divider/header combinations and 
recycle loops but the two types of unit groupings are identified at different positions within 
the algorithm. Equipment Model Builder first searches for divider/header combinations. 
It is necessary to detect these combinations first before searching for recycle loops as the 
substitution of a module of a recycle loop into the plant system would cause any 
information about possible divider/header combinations located within the recycle loop to 
be lost. Figure 5.3 provides more detailed version of the search algorithm. The algorithm 
shown in figure 5.3 is repeated for all the source units. 
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Figure 5.2 The Search Algorithm 
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The search algorithm will be discussed. Problems encountered by the search algorithm 
and how these are overcome will be described. The methods Equipment Model Builder 
uses to automatically identify the groupings of units leading to ambiguities will be 
described briefly. Types of complex plant structures which can occur are discussed. How 
identification is achieved in the presence of these complex structures is detailed. 
5.1.1. The Search Algorithm 
Equipment Model Builder takes a file describing the units and the connections between 
them in a plant as input. The plant description is searched for groupings of units which 
could lead to ambiguities. The tool conducts a downstream search of the plant. Initially a 
source unit is searched for. The next unit to be searched for is the unit downstream of the 
source unit. This unit is found by searching for the unit linked to the outports of the 
source unit. The unit downstream of the unit linked to the outports of the source unit is 
searched for. The search continues in this manner until the plant outlet is reached. 
It was found to be important to specify a source unit. If a source unit had not been 
specified it would be necessary to conduct a downstream search from every plant unit. 
This would be required so that no potential unit groupings which could lead to ambiguities 
would be missed. Every unit within a plant would have to be treated as a potential plant 
source. Specifying a source unit considerably reduces the amount of time needed to search 
a plant description. 
In order for all the recycle loops and divider/header combinations within a plant to 
be located the plant description must be thoroughly searched. To ensure the whole plant 
is covered, for a plant containing several sources, multiple searches must be carried out 
initiating from each plant source. The units occurring downstream of every source unit in 
the plant description must be located. Equipment Model Builder finds and lists all the 
source units within a plant description. Multiple searches of the plant are made, starting at 
each source unit. 
Whenever a unit grouping is identified which could lead to ambiguities the 
grouping is checked against the modules of the model library to see if it requires 
specifying. If it does not the module describing the unit grouping is substituted into the 
plant description and the search of the plant for more divider/header combinations and 
recycle loops recommences, starting at the plant sources again. 
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Splitters 
The search of the plant is complicated by the presence of certain types of units which shall 
be called 'splitters'. These units have more than one outport which leads to branching of 
process flow stream through the plant. This causes branching of the search path. 
Examples of these types of units are tanks with multiple outports and columns. A column 
might have three outports: a top reflux outport, a bottom outport and an outport linked to a 
heating loop. To guarantee complete searching of a complex plant structure containing 
branches caused by the presence of splitters the following algorithm is used: 
For every plant unit found Equipment Model Builder checks if it has multiple outports (i. e. 
if it is a splitter). If the unit does have multiple outports then the unit's identifier, the 
number of the unit's outports and the search branch taken is noted. When the plant outlet is 
reached the search returns to the last splitter located. A search is made down another 
branch from this splitter to the plant outlet. The search is repeated until all the branches 
found at the splitter have been searched. The number of branches found is equal to the 
number of outports at the splitter. The search then returns to the next to last splitter located 
and the same procedure is carried out, searching all the branches between the splitter and 
the plant outlet. The plant search continues until the number of branches searched is equal 
to the number of outports at each splitter multiplied by the number of splitters in the plant. 
If a loop in the plant structure is located when a search is being made for 
divider/header combinations the plant search breaks and restarts at the last splitter found or 
finishes if there are no remaining splitters noted. This prevents the search from cycling 
infinitely around the loop. If a loop is found when a search is being made for recycle 
loops the user is informed that a loop has been detected and the specification and 
substitution stages commence. 
A divider is a type of splitter. Each splitter found is checked to see if it is a 
divider. If it is then an algorithm which looks for divider/header combinations is utilised. 
If a divider/header combination is found a module is specified and substituted into the 
plant description. If no divider/header combination is found the divider is treated as 
splitter unit and both of its branches are searched using the plant search algorithm detailed 
above. 
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5. I. LZ Heate-xchangers 
A class of plant units exist with multiple outports which do not divide the process flow 
stream within the plant so do not cause branching of the plant search. This class of units 
are heatexchangers. Although a heatexchanger has multiple outports the two process flow 
streams within the heatexchanger remain separate. The materials of the hot and cold 
stream do not mix. Only an exchange of energy occurs within a heatexchanger. There is 
no exchange of mass. This means that when a heatexchanger is located in a plant search it 
must not be treated as a splitter. 
Heatexchangers are treated as a special case. Equipment Model Builder checks 
each unit found in a plant description to see if it is a heatexchanger. If this is so the tool 
backtracks to find the name of the inport of the heatexchanger linked to the process flow 
stream which the tool was searching. The tool must continue to search the plant 
description using this same stream as no joining or mixing of streams occurs in a 
heatexchanger. Equipment Model Builder tests the outports of the heatexchanger to find 
which one is located on the same flow stream as the inport found. The tool continues the 
plant description search down the branch linked to this outport. For example, assume 
Equipment Model Builder is searching a stream which forms the heated stream of a 
heatexchanger. Equipment Model Builder will find the heatexchanger. The tool will 
backtrack and discover that the inport of the heatexchanger linked to the stream being 
searched is 'heated in'. Equipment Model Builder will test the two outports of the 
heatexchanger. These are 'heated out' and 'cooled out'. 'heated out' is identified by name 
as being present on the same stream as the heated inport. Equipment Model Builder 
searches the plant description for a unit linked to the heated outport of the heatexchanger 
to find the plant branch linked to this outport. 
5.1.2. Identifying the Unit Groupings Leading to Ambiguities 
First, the algorithm used to identify divider/header combinations will be described. This 
algorithm is shown in figure 5.4 (in text). 
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Figure 5.4 Algorithm to Identify A Divider/header Combination 
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Equipment Model Builder searches the plant description for a divider. If a divider 
is found units located downstream of branch I of the divider are stored. Any headers 
found among these units are noted. The search continues until the outlet of the plant is 
reached. Units located downstream of branch 2 of the divider are found and stored. If a 
header is found in branch 2 that is also in branch I then a divider/header combination has 
been found. The divider/header unit combination consists of the divider, the header and 
the stored units located between the divider and the header. If a downstream unit is found 
to be a divider this algorithm is repeated. This allows divider/header combinations located 
within divider/header combinations to be identified. 
Each divider/header combination identified is specified and substituted into the 
plant description. Each modified plant description created after such a substitution is re- 
searched for further divider/header combinations. Equipment Model Builder then searches 
the plant description for recycle loops. The following algorithm is used to identify the 
simple plant loops: 
Within a plant description if a unit is found downstream of itself (a re-occurring 
unit) then that unit must be present within a loop. The units of the loop consist of 
the re-occurring unit and those intervening units which link the two occurrences of 
this unit. 
Each plant loop found is specified and substituted into the plant description. Each 
modified plant description created after such a substitution is re-searched for further 
recycle loops. The plant description is searched until no more unit groupings which could 
lead to ambiguities are found and the plant outlet is reached. 
Each grouping of plant units identified which could cause ambiguities is compared 
with the units of Equipment Model Builder's model library to see if a module for it already 
exists. If the units, attributes applied to the units and the connecting ports between the 
units of the plant grouping and a module in the library are the same then the two are 
identical. The instance names of the constituent units of the two need not be the same as 
identical structures consisting of different unit instances may occur in different plants or 
within the same plant. If no existing module is found for the unit grouping then a new one 
needs to be specified. If an existing unit is found the user is queried as to whether it 
should be substituted into the plant description. 
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5.1.3. Complex Plant Structures 
This sub-section has discussed how plant groupings which could lead to ambiguities are 
identified. Problems discovered when searching a plant description for these unit 
groupings have been explained. How these problems are overcome has been described. 
The rest of this sub-section will look at the types of complex structures which could 
possibly occur in plants. How identification of unit groupings which could lead to 
ambiguities is carried out when these complex structures are encountered in a search by 
Equipment Model Builder of a plant description is detailed. 
Within process plants in addition to simple recycle loops and divider/header 
combinations there is the possibility for complex structures consisting of multiple loops, 
multiple divider/header combinations and combinations of loops and divider/header 
combinations to occur. The following types of configuration will be considered: 
(i) divider/header combinations in series; 
(ii) a divider/header combination occurring within a divider/header combination; 
(iii) loops in series; 
(iv) a loop occurring within a loop; 
(v) separate loops sharing one or several units; 
(vi) a loop occurring within a divider/header combination; 
(vii) a divider/header combination occurring within a loop. 
5.1.3.1. Dividerlheader Combinations in Series 
Divider/header combinations in series consist of two or more divider/header combinations. 
The outports of the header of the first combination in the series are linked to the inports of 
the divider of the second combination in the series by a plant unit or units. 
Type (i) configurations are identified by multiple applications of the same method 
used to identify single occurrences of divider/header combinations. Each combination is 
identified separately. 
5.1.3. Z Nested Dividerlheader Combinations 
Type (ii) configurations consist of a divider/header combination located on a branch 
within an outer divider/header combination. Equipment Model Builder first identifies the 
inner divider/header combination. The inner combination is located first as the method to 
test for a divider/header combination is reapplied to every downstream unit found to be a 
divider. A module substitution is carried out, replacing the units of the inner unit 
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grouping. A search of the modified plant description created is made. This time the outer 
divider/header combination is detected. The module created for the inner divider/header 
combination is a member of the group of units comprising the outer divider/header 
combination. Another module substitution is carried out, replacing the units of the outer 
divider/header combination (including the inner divider/header module). The final result 
is that a module is created for the entire structure of a divider/header combination lying 
within another divider/header combination. To avoid loss of information about the unit 
grouping which comprises the inner module, the inner module must be identified and 
substituted into the plant description before the outer divider/header combination is 
detected. 
5.1.3.3. Loops in Series 
Loops in series consist of two or more simple loops. The outports of the first loop in the 
series are linked to the inports of the second loop in the series by a plant unit or units. The 
outports of the second loop may be linked to the inports of a further loop, etc. 
Type (iii) loop configurations are identified by multiple applications of the same 
algorithm used to identify simple loop occurrences. Each loop is identified separately. 
S. 1.3.4. Nested Loops 
Type (iv) configurations consist of a loop whose inports and outports are joined to units 
which form part of a larger loop. The two loops possess a certain number of units in 
common. Equipment Model Builder first identifies the inner loop and carries out a 
module substitution, replacing the units of the inner loop. A search of the modified plant 
description created is made and the outer loop is identified. The module created for the 
inner loop is a member of the group of units comprising the outer loop. Another module 
substitution is carried out, replacing the units of the outer loop (including the inner loop 
module). The final result is that a module is created for the entire structure of a loop lying 
within another loop. 
No algorithm exists to ensure that the group of unit comprising the 'inner' module 
of the loop is identified before the 'outer' module is found. This because for a loop within 
loop configuration the concept of 'inner' and 'outer' loops is relative. The two are 
interchangeable and which unit grouping is identified as the inner module depends only on 
the order in which the units were specified in the plant description. However once the unit 
grouping which comprises the inner module has been identified it is necessary to carry out 
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a substitution before the outer loop module is detected to avoid loss of information about 
the units which comprise the inner loop module. 
5.1.3.5. Loops Sharing Units 
Type (v) configurations consist of two separate loops which share one or more units, i. e. 
the loops are joined in parallel. A common example of a type (v) configuration is a 
continuous distillation column system. This consists of a column joined to two separate 
loops. One loop consists of a heating cycle at the base of the column. The other is a 
reflux cycle at the top. This types of configuration may be regarded as a specialised kind 
of type (iv) configuration. A type (v) configuration is type (iv) configuration in which the 
inner and outer modules share only a small number of units. 
The tool identifies an initial loop. This loop contains the unit(s) common to both 
loops. The module for this initial loop is substituted into the plant description, replacing 
the units of the initial loop. The modified plant description created is searched and a 
second loop is identified. This second loop may be regarded as an outer loop of the kind 
in type (iv) configurations as the initial loop module is a member of the group of units 
which comprises the second loop. Another module substitution is carried out replacing 
the units of the second loop. The final result is to create a module for the entire 
configuration of two separate but joined loops. 
Taking the continuous distillation column system as an example, assume the initial 
loop identified is the reflux cycle. This loop will contain the distillation column along 
with the other units of the reflux cycle. The module for this loop is substituted into the 
plant description. A search is made of the modified plant description and another loop, the 
heating cycle, is identified. This loop may be regarded as an outer loop as amongst the 
group of units that comprise it, it will contain the recycle module. Module substitution is 
carried out, replacing the units of the heating cycle (including the recycle loop module). 
The final effect is to create a module for the continuous distillation column system. 
5.1.3.6. Loops Nested in Dividerlheader Combinations 
Type (vi) configurations are formed by a loop whose inports and outports are linked to 
units which form a branch of a divider/header combination. 
For type (vi) configurations Equipment Model Builder identifies the inner loop 
using the simple loop algorithm. The existence of an outer divider/header combination is 
not detected. It was not thought likely that these types of configurations would occur in 
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process plants. Should they occur they may not give rise to ambiguities like the simple 
divider/header combinations. Not identifying the outer divider/header combination in this 
type of configuration was not judged to be important. 
5.1.3.7. Dividerlheader Combinations Nested in Loops 
Type (vii) configurations consist of a divider/header combination: the inports of the 
divider of this combination and the outports of the header are linked to units which form 
part of a loop. An example of this is shown in benzene purification system case study 
where a divider/header combination to provide a spare pump is located within a reflux 
loop (see section 7.1.1. ). 
For type (vii) configurations Equipment Model Builder will first identify the inner 
divider/header combination. As Equipment Model Builder searches for divider/header 
combinations before commencing searching for recycle loops this ensures that in this type 
of configuration the inner divider/header combination is always identified before the outer 
loop grouping in which it is located. A module substitution is performed, replacing the 
units of the inner divider/header combination. A search of the modified plant description 
created is made and the outer loop is identified. The module created for the inner 
divider/header combination is a member of the group of units comprising the outer loop. 
Another module substitution is carried out, replacing the units of the outer loop 
(including the inner divider/header module). The final result is that a module is created 
for the entire structure of a divider/header combination lying within an outer loop. As 
with the other configurations containing modules lying within outer modules the inner 
module must be identified and substituted into the plant description before the outer 
module is detected to avoid loss of information about the units comprising the grouping of 
the inner module. 
5.2. Module Specirication 
If there is no existing module within the model library which describes the unit group 
identified a new one needs to be specified. Modules are specified for the plant fragments 
identified by amalgamating and modifying existing models of plant units. Modules for 
unit groupings comprising recycle loops and divider/header combinations are specified in 
exactly the same way. An interface exists to allow an expert to add extra information to 
the modules. This interface provides a guide as to what extra arcs are required. The 
amalgamated units models together with the interface serve as a template to allow the user 
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to define the module identified. After it has been defined the module is added to a library 
of component models. 
When the units are amalgamated to form a module the causal paths that lead to 
ambiguities or incorrect behaviour are removed. Internal influences of the module (i. e. 
influences between or within units found within the plant fragment) are retained. It is 
important to model the influence of faults if these lead to important consequences within 
the module or propagate out of the module to cause consequences in upstream or 
downstream units. 
Consider the simple plant loop shown in figure 5.5 below. A partial SDG built up 
from unit SDGs is shown for the plant loop in figure 5.6. Only arcs for the process 
variables 'flow' and 'level', two initiating faults and one consequence are shown. 
PI 
V2 
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TI in I in2 VI, DI 
ou 2.... 
out I 
Figure 5.5 A Simple Plant Loop 
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FigUre 5.6 Partial Signed Directed Graph for a Simple Plant Loop 
Figure 5.7 shows a module of the plant fragment shown in figure 5.5. The module SDG is 
signi icantly simpler than the equivalent unit-based SDG in figure 5.6. 
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Figure 5.7 A Module of a Simple Plant Loop 
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When the plant loop is made into a module some of the propagation paths between the 
units of the module are removed. Propagation paths through the whole module are 
modelled. In this example the influence of 'flow' through the port 71 inl' on 'flow' 
through 'DI out V is modelled. Important internal influences are retained. The 
influence of the faults 'partial blockage of VV and 'leak of PV are important. The 'partial 
blockage of Vl' may cause the level of TI to rise sufficiently to lead to 'overfilling' as a 
consequence. The influence of the 'leak of Pl' propagates out of the module through the 
port 'D I out I'. This influence may cause consequences in downstream units. 
Before specification begins a description of the unit grouping identified as leading 
to ambiguities is presented to the user. This description consists of the identifiers of the 
units composing the plant fragment identified, the ports of the units connecting the units 
within the plant fragment and the attributes applied to each unit within the plant fragment. 
This description is of the same form as that created for the description slot for the module 
template (see later). The user is queried as to whether a new module should be created for 
this unit grouping. If the user agrees Equipment Model Builder commences the 
specification stage. If the reply is negative the session with the tool is ended. 
This sub-section will describe how the module template is provided by Equipment 
Model Builder. The building of the module will be described. The sub-section begins by 
describing the initial module building phase. Two further sub-sections consider how the 
unit models are amalgamated and the interface provided. Difficulties encountered in 
providing the template are detailed within these sub-sections. Unit groupings can occur in 
plant descriptions which should not be modularised. The final sub-section discusses these 
unit groupings and how the user is given a choice of making a module. 
5.2.1. Initial Module Building 
The initial module building phase consists of: 
9 checking that all the units which comprise the module identified are modelled; 
creating and labelling instances of these units; 
creating a description of the module. 
These procedures will be described in turn. 
The identification stage provides Equipment Model Builder with a list of units 
which comprises the unit grouping which could lead to ambiguities. The tool checks the 
list of units against the unit model library to ensure that all the models listed are present in 
the library. If a unit model is found to be missing Equipment Model Builder 'asks' the 
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user whether a model for the missing unit should be created. If the user confirms this the 
model building interface is presented. If the reply is negative the session with the tool is 
ended. 
S. Z1.1. Labelling the Units of the Module 
Having ensured that all the module's constituent units are present an instance for each unit 
occurrence is created from its unit model. The tool labels the arcs of each of these 
individual instances with each instance's identifier taken from the plant description file. 
For example, assume that the part of a file describing the plant generated by AutoCAD 
given below has been identified as comprising a divider/header combination. 
'D V, 'divider', '[out I is [V l, in], out2 is [V2, in]]', 'purpose is toBypass' 
'V V, 'valve', '[out is [H 1, in I ]]', 'aperture is open' 
'V2', 'valve', '[out is [H l, in2]]', 'aperture is closed' 
'Hl', 'header', '[out is [taill, in]]', 'purpose is fromBypass' 
This combination is illustrated in figure 5.8 below. 
IHI 
out vI 
in I 
out 2V2 in 2 K--L 
Figure 5.8 A divider/header combination 
See section 2.4.2. for an explanation of files describing the plant generated by AutoCAD. 
The unit instances comprising the module are DI, VI, V2 and III. Assume that the 
divider unit model contains the following among its arcs: 
([fault, leak to environment], +, [in, flow]) 
([fault, leak to environment], +, [consequence, contaminate environment]) 
([dev iat ion, m ore Pressure, in], +, [consequen ce, possible rupture]) 
The arcs shown of the divider unit will be labelled as: 
([fault, D I leak to environment], +, [D I_in, flow]) 
([fault, D I leak to environment], +, [consequence, contaminate environment]) 
([deviation, morePressure, Dl_in], +, [consequence, possible rupture]) 
Figure 5.9. (in text) shows part of the template provided by the tool for the 
divider/header combination in figure 5.8. 
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Figure 5.9. Partial Template for a divider/header combination 
It can be seen that the faults and the ports of the individual unit arcs are labelled. This is so 
that the faults and ports of the constituent units of a module may be recognised when the 
module is placed within a plant description. For example, it might be important to kno, ýv 
that the divider of the module shown in figure 5.8 has a 'leak to environment. If this fault 
is applied to the whole module it is too broad to be of use. It is important to know which 
unit within the module is leaking. 
The divider of this module has a port 'In'. Other units occurring within the module 
may have identical port names. For example, the valve units may also have a port 'In'. It 
is necessary to label the ports to distinguish which units of the module tile deviations and 
faults have an effect upon. For instance, it may be important to know that the fault 'DI 
leak to environment' has an effect on the deviation 'flow' at tile port 'In' of the divider 
'DI' (see arc I in the arc series shown above). When more than one unit ofthe same type 
occurs within a module this labelling of the ports allows it to be seen which deviations are 
applicable to the individual unit instances. For example, two instances of a valve unit 
occur in the unit grouping shown above. The inports of these instances would be labelled 
'Vl_in' and 'V2_in' so as to distinguish them for the two valve unit instances. 
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The consequences of the individual unit arcs are not labelled with the identifiers of 
the individual unit instances. This prevents multiple repeats of the same consequence 
when the module is placed within a plant description. The next example shows what 
would result if the consequences were to be labelled. Assume all the units of the module 
shown in figure . 
5.8 contain the arc %fault, leak to 
environment], +, [consequence, contaminate environrnent])'. When the module was placed 
in a plant description if all the consequences were labelled the following consequences 
would occur: 'DI contaminate environment', 'V1 contaminate environment', W2 
contaminate environment' and 'Hl contaminate environment'. If several units containing 
identical consequences were present in a group of units comprising a module the user 
would be -overwhelmed with the volume of output. Simply having the consequence 
4contaminate environment' for the entire module removes needless repetition. If the user 
specifically wishes to label a consequence so that it applies to a certain unit within a 
module this can be done using the interface provided. 
The attributes applicable to the unit instances within the module are also labelled, 
so as to be able to distinguish which condition applies to which unit instance. For 
example, the following attributes would be created for the unit grouping shown in figure 
5.8: 'Dl_purpose is toBypass', 'Vl_aperture is open', W2_4perture is closed' and 
'Hl_purpose is fromBypass'. 
When a module is substituted it is given an instance identifier by Equipment Model 
Builder (see section 5.3.1. ). When an inner module is found to form one of the constituent 
units of an outer module this inner module will possess an identifier. Configurations of 
this kind are described in section 5.1.3. In these types of configurations when the arcs of 
the units comprising the outer module are labelled the arcs of the inner module are not 
labelled with the inner module's instance identifier. For example, if a divider/header 
combination occurred within an outer loop module the divider/header module might be 
allotted the identifier 'divheadl'. An arc '([fault, D I leak to 
environment], +, [D I -in, 
flow])' occurring in the inner divider/header module would not be 
labelled %fault, divheadl DI leak to environment], +, [divhead I 
-D 
I 
_in, 
flow])' when the 
arcs of the individual units of the outer module were labelled but would remain in its 
original form. This avoids having very complicated identifiers. An additional label is not 
required as the user is able to determine which unit is being described. 
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S. ZLZ Creating a Module Description 
A description is created for the module and placed within the description slot of the 
template defining the module. The description is created in order to inform the user of the 
module structure. For example, the following description would be created for the module 
shown in figure 5.8. 
'This module is composed of the following units: 
DI out I connected to VI 
_in, DI 
- out2 
connected to V2_in, 
VI 
- 
out connected to HI 
_in 
I, 
V2 
- out connected 
to HI 
_in2. Conditions of the module are: 
Dl_purpose is toBypass, 
VI-aperture is open, 
Hl_purpose is fromBypass 
and this completes the module. ' 
The attributes (conditions) of the individual units of the module are given so that the user 
is able to distinguish between modules which appear identical in structure but which have 
different attributes applicable to their constituent units. The descriptions of the units 
which comprise the module are not included in the module description as these may be 
found by viewing the individual unit models. The name 'module' is added to the module 
template's class slot. 
5.2.2. Amalgamating Unit Instances 
How the unit model instances of the plant fragment identified are amalgamated to form a 
module template will now be described. As shown in figure 5.7 when the units are 
amalgamated causal paths existing between or within the units of the module are removed. 
This is to prevent ambiguities arising. Important internal influences within the module are 
retained. More detail as to precisely which arcs are kept to retain the important internal 
influences when a module is created will now be given. In order to determine which arcs 
of the constituent unit model instances should be retained it is necessary to discover the 
boundary ports of the module. Finding the ports of the module will be discussed. What 
'unlinked module faults' are and how they arise when the unit model instances are 
amalgamated is described. 
S. ZZL Arcs Retained 
A unit model has four types of arcs: 
(i) deviation linked to deviation; 
(ii) fault linked to deviation; 
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(iii) fault linked to consequence; 
(iv) deviation linked to consequence. 
When the module is created the fault linked to consequence arcs and deviation 
linked to consequence arcs of the constituent unit model instances are retained. It is 
important to model the effect of the modules consequences upon a plant. The modules 
consequences are derived from the arcs of its constituent units. 
Fault linked to deviation arcs of the constituent units in which the deviation occurs 
at a boundary port of the module are retained. This is because the faults within these arc 
types have the potential to propagate out of the module through its boundary ports to 
influence units upstream or downstream of the module when the module is present in a 
plant description. It is necessary to model the effect of these faults. 
Fault linked to deviation arcs of the units in which the deviation affects a port 
which is linked to a consequence are also retained. The port may be linked to a 
consequence within a deviation linked to consequence arc. This so that the influence of 
the fault leading to the consequence within the module may be modelled. 
Deviation linked to deviation arcs of the units in which the initiating deviation 
occurs at a boundary port of the module and the caused deviation affects a port which is 
linked to a consequence are kept too. This is so that potential deviations propagating into 
the module via its boundary ports to cause consequences may be modelled. These 
potential deviations may propagate from other plant units when the module is placed 
within a plant description. 
The retention of arcs described enables important internal influences within the 
module to be described. All the other arcs of the constituent unit model instances are 
deleted upon making a module to remove multiple causal paths which have the potential to 
cause ambiguities. The retained arcs of all the unit instances comprising the module are 
added together and with the interface provided form the module template. An example 
will be given to illustrate which arcs are retained when the unit model instances of the 
plant fragment are amalgamated to form a module. 
For simplicity, only one model instance of a unit grouping comprising a module 
will be considered. Assume the module being created is that composed of the plant 
fragment shown in figure 5.5. The unit to be considered is the tank, instance TI. Assume 
that the tank model contains the following arcs: 
arc([inl, flow], +, [Iiquid, level]), 
arc([ in2, flow], +j liqu idjevel]), 
arc([outl, tlowl, -, [Iiquid, level]), 
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arc([fault, 'Ieak to environmenf], +, [inl, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], -, [Iiquid, level]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment' ], -, [out I, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'outletl partly blocked'], -, [out l, flowl), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], +, [consequence, 'contaminate environment']), 
arc([deviation, [moreLevel, liquid]], +, [consequence, 'overfilling']), 
arc([deviation, [moreFlow, inl]], +, [consequence, 'incomplete separation of watee]), 
When the simple loop module shown in figure 5.5 is constructed instances will be created 
for each of its constituent units. Among these a tank model will be labelled to form the 
unit instance TI. The module created will have the inports 'TI-inl' and the outport 
'Dl_outl'. When arcs of the unit instances constituting the simple loop module are 
amalgamated the following arcs of instance TI will be retained within the module template 
created: 
arc([T I_in l, flow], +jTl_liquid, level]), 
arc([fault, 'TI leak to environment'], +, [Tl_in ], flow]), 
arc([fault, 'TI leak to environment'], -, [TI-liquid, level]), 
arc([fault, 'Tt leak to environment'], +, [consequence, 'contaminate environmenf]), 
arc([deviation, [moreLevel, T I 
_liquid]], 
+, [consequence, 'overfilling']), 
arc([deviation, [moreFlow, Tl_inl]], +, [consequence, 'incomplete separation of watee]), 
Example 5.1 Arcs Present due to Instance TI 
The fault linked to consequence arc '([fault, T 1 leak to 
enviromnent'], I, [consequence, 'contaminate environment'])' and the deviation linked to 
consequence arcs '([deviation, [moreLevel, T I -liquid]], 
1, [consequence, 'overfilling])' and 
%deviation, [moreFlow, T I-in I]], +, [consequence, 'incomplete separation of watee])' 
are retained within the module template. The arc 'ffault, 71 leak to 
environment'], +, [T I _in 
l, flow])' is retained as this is a fault linked to deviation arc in 
which the deviation occurs at a boundary port of the module (inport 'TI-in'). The arc 
%fault, 71 leak to environment'], -, [T I -liquid, 
level])' is kept as this is a fault linked to 
deviation arc in which the deviation affects a port which has a consequence. The 
consequence in this example is 'overfilling'. This consequence is linked to the deviation 
in the process variable 'level' at the port 'TI-liquid' in the retained deviation linked to 
consequence arc %deviation, [moreLevel, T I 
_I 
iquid]], 1, [consequence, 'overfilling'j)'. The 
arc '([Tl_inl, flow], +, [Tl_liquid, level])' is retained as it is a deviation linked to deviation 
arc in which the initiating deviation occurs at a boundary port of the module and the 
caused deviation affects a port which is linked to a consequence. The consequence in this 
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case is also Goverfilling'. The arcs '([TI-in2, flow], +, [TI-liquid, level])', 
'([T I 
-out 
l, flow], +, [T I 
_Iiquid, 
level])', '([fault, 'TI leak to environment'], - 
, [TI-outl, flow])', and '([fault, 'TI outletl partly blocked'], -, [T I -out 
l, flow])' are deleted to 
remove multiple causal paths within the module which could result in ambiguities. 
S. ZZZ Identifying Module Ports 
Equipment Model Builder identifies the boundary ports of the module from the 
information contained in the unit model instances and from the information contained in 
the plant description file about the connections between the units that compose the 
module. Only the inports and outports of the constituent units model instances have the 
potential to become inports and outports of the module. The unitports do not. The tool 
finds the all possible inports and outports of the module from information contained in the 
unit model instances. Inports and outports of the unit instances which are used to connect 
the units together to form the module cannot form the inports and outports of the module. 
The tool finds the information about the connecting ports from the plant description file. 
The inports and outports of the module are calculated by removing those inports and 
outports which form inter-unit connections within the module from the list of all the 
possible in- and outports of the module. 
An example will be given to illustrate this. Consider the unit grouping 
comprising a module shown in figure 5.8. Assume that a divider model has an inport 'in', 
a valve model has a inport 'in' and header model has two inports 'inl' and 'in2'. Potential 
inports for the module found in the unit instances are 'DI-in', 'Vl_in', 'V2_in', 'HI-inl' 
and 'HI-in2'. The partial plant description given (in section 5.2.1.1. ) shows that 'VI-in', 
'V2_in', 'Hl_inl' and 'HI-in2' are used to form inter-unit connections within the 
module. Thus it can be deduced that 'DI-in' forms the inport for the module. Similar 
reasoning is utilised to derive the outports for the module. 
The unitports of the module are formed by the ports of the module's constituent 
units which have consequences but which do not form the boundary ports of the module. 
It is necessary to retain these ports as they have consequences. Take the simple unit loop 
module shown in figure 5.5 as an example. See example 5.1 for the arcs present in the 
module template due to the unit instance TI. This module would have 'Tl_liquid' as a 
unitport. This is because 'TI-liquid' is linked to a consequence in the arc 
'([deviation, [moreLevel, T I 
_liquid] 
], 1, [consequence, 'overfilling'])'. The arc 
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'([deviation, [moreFlow, T I 
-in 
I]], +, [consequence, 'incomplete separation of water'])' does 
not result in a unitport 'TI-inl' as 'TI-inl' forms an inport of the module. 
S. ZZ3. Unlinked Module Faults 
When the unit instances are amalgamated the fault linked to deviation arcs in which the 
deviation does not occur at a boundary port or in which the deviation does not affect a port 
which has a consequence are deleted. For example, the arc '([fault, 'TI outletl partly 
blocked'], -, [T 1 -out 
l, flow])' is deleted from the instance TI when it is placed within the 
simple loop module (see section 5.2.2.1. ). These arcs are deleted to remove the multiple 
causal paths which could lead to ambiguities. However the faults of these arcs must be 
retained as they may have an important effect within the module. They may also 
propagate out of the module to cause deviations in other units when the module is placed 
in a plant description. The final effect of these faults is not known. The effect cannot be 
determined unambiguously. This is why the arcs of this kind are deleted. The faults from 
the deleted arcs are stored by Equipment Model Builder as 'unlinked module faults. 
Faults of deleted arcs are only stored as unlinked module faults if they are not 
already present within any of the modules arcs. For example the arcs '([fault, 'TI leak to 
environment'], -, [T 1 -out 
l, flow])' and '([fault, 'TI outletl partly blocked'], - 
, [Tl-outI, flow])' are deleted from the 
instance TI when it is placed within the simple loop 
module. Only'T1 outletl partly blocked' is stored as an unlinked module fault. The fault 
fault, 71 leak to environment' is not stored as it is also present within other arcs within the 
module. These arcs are 'ffaultj I leak to environment], +, [T I _in 
I, flow])', 
%fault, 71 leak to environment], -, [T I _Iiquid, 
level])' and '([fault, 'TI leak to 
environment'], +, [consequence, 'contaminate environment'])'. Unlinked module faults are 
faults with unknown effects upon the module. The effects of faults of deleted arcs which 
are also present within the existing arcs of the modules are known. It would be confusing 
to classify a fault as unlinked if it is causing an effect within the module. A fault of a 
deleted arc may have been causing a different effect to a duplicate fault present within the 
existing arcs of the module. This additional effect is unknown. The user interface provided 
allows more information about the faults to be added to the module. 
5.2.3. Module Interface 
How the module is initially built up and how its constituent units are combined have been 
described. The interface provided to allow the user to add further information to the 
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module will now be considered. The amalgamated arcs of the unit instances comprising 
the plant fragment and a user interface together make up the template for defining the 
module. A user interface is required as further user input to the module may be needed to 
complete the module. Unlinked module faults require consideration. Propagation paths 
through the module as a whole may need to be added as the causal paths between the 
constituent units have been removed. These paths were deleted to remove the multiple 
causal paths which may lead to ambiguities. The user may wish to alter the arcs of the 
amalgamated unit instances. Some of the arcs may be found to be incorrect or irrelevant to 
the module. 
This interface is superficially similar to the basic interface provided to build unit 
models. Like the interface for building unit models it consists of a main window and four 
sub-windows, one for each arc type (see chapter 4). The user is able to add a name to the 
module. There is a 'Save' button so that the user may add the module to the unit model 
library. Verification checks are provided (see chapter 6). These are important as new 
errors may arise when arcs are deleted when the module is formed. The user may add, 
alter or delete the arcs of the module. 
A modification and some additions have been made to the basic interface to form 
the module building interface. The modification prevents the user from utilising the 
module interface to create internal propagation paths within the module. These paths are 
not permitted as they may form the multiple causal paths which cause ambiguities. 
Additions have been made to manage unlinked module faults. These changes will be 
described. 
5.2.3.1. Preventing Internal Propagation Paths 
To prevent internal propagation paths the sub-window for creating deviation linked to 
deviation arcs is modified. The sub-window provided by the basic interface for building 
unit models presents a grid. The ports of the unit model form the first row and first 
column of the grid. The user is able to make a deviation linked to deviation arc by linking 
a member of the first column to a member of the first row by clicking on an element of the 
grid with the mouse. This brings up a menu choice of possible influences for the SDG arc 
being created. The user may replace the default grid element 'U/d' with a member of this 
menu. This allows the effect of a deviation at a port of the model on a deviation at another 
port of the model to be modelled, forming a deviation linked to deviation arc. See chapter 
4 for a fuller explanation of this. 
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The deviation linked to deviation sub-window of the module interface presents a 
modified grid which prevents the user from adding arcs forming internal propagation paths 
within the module. The first row of the grid remains of the same form on the module 
building interface as on the basic unit model building interface. The first row consists of 
all the ports of the module. The first column of the grid is modified. On the module 
building interface it consists only of the boundary ports of the module. This interface 
allows the user to model propagation paths through the whole module, i. e. boundary port 
deviations linked to boundary port deviations. It also allows the user to model the effect 
of boundary port deviations on unitports. It is important to model these effects if 
consequences result from unitport deviations. The interface prevents the user from 
creating internal influences within the module. This prevents the formation of multiple 
causal paths. 
For example, assume the user was creating propagation paths for the simple loop 
shown in figure 5.5. The user would be able to add the arc 
'([TI-inl, flow], +, [DI-outl, flow])' to the module interface. This arc models a boundary 
port deviation propagating to cause a deviation at another boundary port within the 
module. The arcs '([Tl_inl, flow], +, [Tl_liquid, level])', and 
%D I 
-out 
l, flow], +, [T I_Iiquid, level])' could be added to the module interface to model 
boundary port deviations propagating to cause unitports deviations within the module. 
The user would be unable to create the arc %T I _Iiquid, 
level], +, [D I 
_out 
l, flow])' as the 
unitport 'level' is not present in the first column of the deviation linked to deviation sub- 
window of the module interface. This arc may not be created as it models an internal 
influence within the module. This internal influence could form a link in multiple causal 
paths causing ambiguities. The arcs described here which the user can add to the interface 
may be seen within the partial SDG for the simple loop module shown in figure 5.7. 
5.2.3. Z Managing Unlinked Module Faults 
There are two possible ways for the user interface to manage unlinked module faults. One 
way would be to add the unlinked faults to the fault linked to deviation and fault linked to 
consequence sub-windows to form partial arcs for the user either to complete or delete. 
Each fault would be added to a form for each of the process variables (pressure, 
temperature etc. ) on the fault linked to deviation sub-window. This method would result 
in a large number of arcs for the user to check through. The unlinked module faults may 
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only be applicable to fault linked to deviation arcs and not to fault linked to consequence 
arcs as well. It is unlikely that the faults will be applicable to all of the process variables. 
The method utilised is to add all of the modules' faults to the fault library. This 
comprises both unlinked module faults and those faults present within the modules' arcs. 
The conditions of the module are also added to the end of the process condition library. 
This allows the user freedom to create further arcs for the module. The user is able to 
build arcs for the module in the same way in which arcs are constructed for unit models 
(see section 4.3. ). The members of the fault and condition libraries are shown in the list 
browsers accessed via the drop-down menus in capital letters. The faults and conditions of 
the module are shown in small letters so as to distinguish them from the library members. 
When a module creation session is ended the module's faults and conditions are removed 
from the end of the libraries. 
A list of unlinked module faults is provided which may be accessed from a menu. 
This enables the user to see which of the modules faults are unlinked. This list is updated 
when the user adds arcs containing faults to or deletes arcs containing faults from the 
module. The user may delete unlinked faults from this list as some faults of the 
constituent units may not be relevant to the module created. The deletion of these faults 
also deletes them from the fault library. If the user attempts to access the. list of unlinked 
module faults when module is not being viewed an error message is displayed. 
Equipment Model Builder generates a long list of unlinked faults even for simple 
plant loops such as that shown in figure 5.5. This means that the user must spend a large 
amount of time determining the effects of these faults. Fault linked to deviations and faults 
linked to consequences arcs must be created for these unlinked faults or the faults must be 
deleted if their effects are not considered to be important. 
To prevent the creation of a long list of unlinked faults the following procedure 
could be used to enhance the exiting method. An inference engine could trace the effects 
of faults propagating through the units of the plant module. The final effect of the faults 
within the module would be found and arcs linking the faults to their final effects would be 
retained within the module. It would only be necessary to list a module fault as unlinked 
and delete the arcs the fault propagated through if the effects of that fault were found to 
result in contradictory multiple paths. However the effects of most faults might result in 
contradictory multiple paths. If this were so the above method would lead to little saving 
in user time. Further work is required to find out if this is supposition is true. 
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5.2.4. Allowing a Choice to Modularise 
This thesis only considers modularising recycle loops which are relatively small compared 
to the size of the plant. Creating a module for a large loop encompassing most of the plant 
would entail the loss of the unit-based approach. Such a module would not be reusable 
within other plant configurations. Very large loops would group together functionally 
separate parts of the plant. For example, a user might not wish to place plant units 
involved with feed within the same module as those in which reaction occurs. How 'large' 
a recycle loop is will depend on the number of units it comprises compared to the number 
of units comprising the plant in which it occurs. 
No arbitrary value can be assigned to the 'largeness' of a recycle loop as this 
depends on the relative sizes of the loop and the plant in which it is situated. Therefore the 
user needs to be given a choice as to whether the modular approach should be applied 
when a loop is detected in a plant description or whether the original unit models should 
be retained. One way of providing this choice would be for Equipment Model Builder to 
query the user each time a loop was detected as to whether it should be modularised. 
The actual method used is as follows: the user indicates upon starting a session 
with Equipment Model Builder that he wishes to generate a plant description (see section 
4.1. ); the tool provides a menu from which the user chooses the maximum size of recycle 
loop to modularise; the user is queried as to the name of the file containing the description 
of the plant and Equipment Model Builder commences generating the plant system. This 
method has the advantage that the user is not annoyed by queries every time a loop is 
detected within a plant description. Any recycle loops occurring within the plant 
description which are larger than the maximum size input by the user are not identified as 
unit groupings which could lead to ambiguities. If a recycle loop greater than the 
maximum size specified is located during a plant search the search breaks and restarts at 
the last splitter found or finishes if there are no remaining splitters noted. This prevents 
the search from cycling infinitely around the loop. 
5.3. Module Substitution 
In order for a module to be used it needs to be substituted into the plant description. The 
individual units which make up the module are replaced with the module. The use of the 
module within the plant description instead of the individual units which comprise the 
module removes multiple causal paths which lead to ambiguities within the plant structure. 
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A unit grouping which could lead to ambiguities is identified within a plant 
description. A description of the unit grouping identified is presented to the user. This 
description is of the same form as that created for the description slot for the module 
template. The unit model library is searched for a module describing the unit grouping. If 
a module is found the user is 'asked' if this module should be substituted into the plant 
description. If the user confirms this the substitution stage begins. If the user indicates that 
no substitution should occur the session with the tool ends. This prevents the user from 
building a plant model containing unit configurations which could lead to ambiguities. 
If no module describing the unit grouping is located within the model library the 
user is queried as whether a new module should be created for the unit grouping. If the 
user agrees the specification stage commences. If the user does not wish to create a new 
module the session with the tool ends. 
To amalgamate information to form the input for the expert system QUEEN 
(Chung, 1993) the tool begins by taking a file describing a plant as input. This file may be 
a text file or generated by AutoCAD. As described in section 4.2 a modified plant 
description file is created from this file for use by the expert system. An output file 
consisting of the models of all the units found within the plant description is also created 
for use by the expert system. If a unit grouping which could lead to ambiguities is 
identified within the plant the plant description file is altered to describe the module 
specified for this unit grouping. A model of the module is placed into the output file. 
Descriptions of the unit instances comprising the module are removed from the plant 
description. Unit models of these units are not added to the output file unless they are 
required to model other instances of the same units located within the plant but outside of 
the plant fragment comprising the module. This constitutes the substitution stage. How 
the plant description file and the output file are modified will now be described in more 
detail. 
5.3.1. Modifying the Plant Description 
After a module has been identified and specified an instance describing this module is 
placed within a modified plant description file. An example will be used to illustrate this. 
Consider that a plant description is being created for the divider/header combination 
shown in figure 5.8 (section 5.2.1.1. ). Assume that the divider/header combination is 
located between a pipe unit, PI, and a tail unit, taill. Without module substitution the 
following instances would be placed in the original plant description file. 
instance(PI isa pipe, 
[outports info 
[out is [Dl, in]] 
instance(DI isa divider, 
[outports info 
[outl is [Vl, in], out2 is [V2, infl, 
purpose is toBypass 
instance(V I isa valve, 
[outports info 
[out is [Hl, in I]], 
aperture is open 
instance(V2 isa valve, 
[outports info 
[out is [Hl, in2]], 
aperture is closed 
instance(H I isa header, 
[outports info 
[out is [taill, in]], 
purpose is fromBypass 
instance(tail I isa outlet, 
[outports info 
The tool ensures that all unit groupings identified are substituted to prevent ambiguities 
arising within the plant model. The plant description file is modified as follows: 
instance(P I isa pipe, 
[outports info 
[out is [divheadl, Dl_in]] 
instance(divhead I isa module-1, 
[outports info 
[HI 
- out 
is [tail I, infl, 
Dl_purpose istoBypass, 
VI 
- aperture 
is open, 
V2_aperture is closed, 
Hl_purpose is fromBypass 
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instance(tail I isa outlet, 
[outports info 
A module instance describing the divider/header combination is substituted into the 
plant description. The instances DI, V1, V2 and HI are removed from the plant 
description. The identifier of the module instance is composed of the name given to the 
module by the user amalgamated with a unique numerical identifier assigned by the tool. 
In this example the user has decided to call the module created to model the plant fragment 
shown in figure 5.8 'divhead'. The identifier created is 'divheadl'. The connectivities of 
the module instance are the same as those of its constituent unit instances, except that 
inter-unit connectivities within the module have been removed. The conditions of the 
module are composed of the conditions of the units comprising the module. The unit 
instance, PI, located before the divider/header combination is modified so that instead of 
linking to the divider, D 1, it now links to the module, divhead 1. 
5.3.2. Modifying the Output file 
A unit model for each unit type found within the plant description is placed in an output 
file created for use by the expert system. In the case of modules a model is created for each 
instance type and placed within the output file. Each module model created is given the 
name 'module' combined with a unique numerical identifier, e. g. 'module_3'. The reason 
a separate model is created for each module instance type is that more than one occurrence 
of each structure of unit groupings comprising a module may occur within a plant 
description. For example, consider the following file describing the plant generated by 
AutoCAD: 
'Dl', 'divider', joutl is [Vl, in], out2 is [V2, inl]', 'purpose is toBypass' 
'V P, 'valve', jout is [H 1, in I ]]', 'aperture is open' 
'V2', 'valve', jout is [Hl, in2]]', 'aperture is closed' 
'Hl', 'header', jout is [Pl, in]]', 'purpose is fromBypass' 
T P, 'pipe', jout is [D2, in]', 'unspecified' 
'D2', 'divider', joutl is [V8, in], out2 is [V9, in]]', 'purpose is toBypass' 
'V8', 'valve', jout is [H2, inl]]', 'aperture is open' 
'V9', 'valve', jout is [H2, in2]1', 'aperture is closed' 
'HT, 'header', jout is [tai I l, inl]', 'purpose is fromBypass' 
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It can be seen that this file contains two identical divider/header combinations. The 
structure of this divider/header combination is shown in figure 5.8. 
It is important to recognise the faults and ports of the constituent units of each 
module located in the plant description. So that these faults and ports may be identified, 
the arcs of each individual unit instance which forms a constituent unit of a module are 
labelled with each instances identifier. This means that a model must be automatically 
created for each module instance within a plant description. This model is built by 
locating the model describing the module within the tool's model library. The arcs of this 
model are re-labelled with the unit instance identifiers given in the plant description for the 
module instance under consideration. Returning to the example described above, two 
instance module models will be created and placed with the output file. Assume they are 
named 'module_l' and 'module_2'. Example arcs taken from the module_1 instance are: 
([fault, D I leak to environmentl, +, [D I_in, flow]) 
([fault, DI leak to environment], +, [consequence, contaminate environment]) 
([deviation, morePressure, Dl_inl, +, [consequence, possible explosion]) 
Example arcs from the instance created for module_2 are: 
([fault, D2 leak to environment], +, [D I- in, flow]) 
([fault, D2 leak to environment], +, [consequence, contaminate environment]) 
([deviation, morePressure, D2_in], +, [consequence, possible explosion]) 
These examples show the divider unit instance within each module is labelled with its 
relevant identifier. 
Identical occurrences consisting of different unit instances may also occur within 
separate plant descriptions. For this reason also a model must be created for each module 
instance. The model is re-labelled with the instance identifiers given in the plant 
description within which the module is currently being used. This allows reuse of 
modules. 
5.4. User-derined Modules 
This section will introduce the concept of user-defined modules. First, why user-defined 
modules are needed will be explained. In order to demonstrate methods of looking at the 
concept of user-defined modules a detailed example of where this type of module might be 
utilised is given. The first sub-section describes the features an ideal method would 
possess to deal with the concept of user-defined modules. In the following sub-sections 
three possible ways of looking at the concept are examined and the one implemented is 
described. These ways are applied to the detailed example. This section ends by 
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explaining the advantages and disadvantages of these ways. The way chosen to be 
implemented is detailed. How the features provided by the way chosen compare to those 
of the ideal way are considered. 
User-defined modules allow the user to create modules from a set of plant units in 
a similar way to which modules are created for recycle loops and divider/header 
combinations. There are three main reasons why the user might wish to have the 
functionality to create his own modules. 
(1) The user may wish to create a module when the combination of plant units results in an 
incorrect plant model. 
(2) The user may wish to create modules for groups of plant units which commonly occur 
together in order to save time when creating plant descriptions. 
(3) The user may wish to create modules for groups of units which are logically found 
together. 
Combinations of plant units resulting in an incorrect plant model have already been 
identified as occurring in recycle loops and divider/header combinations. These types of 
combinations are detected by Equipment Model Builder which defines module templates 
for them. Other combinations of plant units which lead to an incorrect model may occur. 
A user-defined module would allow the user to create a correct plant model when these 
combinations are found in a plant description. 
An example of a commonly occurring group of plant units would be a column 
combined with a reflux loop. Examples of groups of plant units logically found together 
would be those groups located in the feed and reaction sections of plants. 
An example of a group located in the reaction section of a plant will be described 
below. This provides a basis for discussing methods for looking at the concept of user- 
defined modules. The group of plant units being used as an example forms part of an 
MTBE (methyl tertiary butyl ether) process refinery at Jujiang in China (McGreavy et al., 
1997). The group consists of a heatexchanger, a reactor and a pressure relief valve. The 
heated outport (htot) of the heatexchanger is connected to the feed of the reactor. The 
pressure relief valve is situated on top of the reactor. A diagram of the group of units is 
given in figure 5.10 below. These units comprise the catalytic reactor of the plant. 
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Figure 5.10 Catalytic Reactor of a MTBE Plant 
5.4.1. Features of the Ideal Method 
The ideal method for dealing with the concept of user-defined modules would cause the 
minimum of additional work for the user and minimum increase in system complexity. 
Additional work for the user could arise when specifying the module within a plant 
description, when defining the module or if a module were unintentionally duplicated. 
Ideally, when specifying the user-defined module in a plant description only one 
icon for the entire module would be required, instead of an icon for each of the units of 
which the module was composed. This would make drawing and specifying the module 
much simpler. 
To aid the user to define the module the arcs of the units comprising the module 
should be amalgamated. This would provide the user with a partially defined module and 
hence reduce the amount of user input required to build the module. The user should be 
guided as to what extra arcs need to be added or deleted to build the module. This means 
that a form of module template should be provided. A module template has been defined 
in section 5.2. as consisting of the amalgamated unit models and a user interface which 
together guide the user in creating a module. The user should not need to create any 
additional faults, consequences or conditions for the module. All the variables required to 
build the arcs of the module should be provided by the module template. 
To prevent module duplication the system should possess information on what 
units the module contains and how these units are connected. The system would be able to 
use this information to 'check' whether a module being defined is already present in the 
model library. 
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Increases in system complexity could occur if additional searching was required to 
locate plant fragments matching user-defined modules within plant descriptions. Ideally 
no additional searching should be necessary. 
5.4.2. Default Method 
To apply this method the user would create an icon for the module within the AutoCAD 
system. This would be used in the plant diagram created by AutoCAD when the user 
specifies a plant description for use by Equipment Model Builder. The module would be 
built using Equipment Model Builder's user interface in the same way in which ordinary 
units are built, i. e. the module is treated exactly like a single unit. There is no system 
support to aid the users in defining their own modules at all. The module is specified 
within a plant description like a unit model. 
Using the example given in figure 5.10 the user would create an icon which would 
represent all the units shown. Equipment Model Builder's user interface would be used to 
create a 'catalytic reactor' module. Unlike the modules created for recycle loops and 
divider/header combinations the individual units of modules defined using the default 
method have no identifiers. The tool's standard user interface used by the default method 
provides no means of designating identifiers for the individual units of the module. 
However it is important to specify which units within the module contain faults. A 
fault such as 'leak to environment' is too broad to be of use. Knowledge about which unit 
is leaking is required. This means that the user must create faults containing generic unit 
identifiers. This is illustrated by examples given below. The examples are of a fault linked 
to deviation arc and of a fault linked to consequence arc which might be present in the 
catalytic reactor module when it is defined by the default method. 
([fault, heatexchanger partly blocked (heating side)], -, [heatcxchanger_cdot, flow]) 
[fault, reactor leak to environment], +, [consequence, contam inate environment]) 
The generic unit identifiers are 'heatexchanger' and 'reactor'. The faults containing the 
generic unit identifiers would be added to Equipment Model Builder's fault library. 
This results in a larger and more complex fault library. The library will contain 
faults applicable to unit models such as 'leak to environment'. It will also contain 
duplicates of these faults which have been paired with a generic identifier, e. g. 'reactor 
leak to environment', 'pressure valve leak to environment. 
When a modified plant description is created for QUEEN, for example the MTBE 
plant, the module built by the default method is specified and used like a unit model (see 
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section 4.2. ). Like a unit model its specialised file is amalgamated with the specialised 
files of the other units specified within the plant description to form an output file of 
models occurring within the plant. Unlike the modules created for recycle loops and 
divider/header combinations the module created by the default method may be directly 
reused within other plant descriptions with no modifications. The generic identifiers 
contained within arcs of the module built by the default method are applicable to any plant 
description in which the module may be located. 
5.4.3. Extending the Default Method 
The default method could be extended to include more features. Equipment Model 
Builder would create queries to ask the user to indicate what units the module is to 
contain. From this information Equipment Model Builder could search the model library 
for the unit models. The unit models could be used to provide the user with a list of faults 
present in the units of the module. This gives some help to the user by making clear what 
possible faults have to be considered for the module. Some of the information required to 
be present in the module is given. However this method does not allow a template for the 
module to be defined. None of the advantages provided by having a template would be 
available to the user. 
The default method could be further extended. The tool would create more queries 
requiring the user to indicate the inports and outports of the module as well as what units 
the module is to contain. The user would also be asked to give an identifier for each unit 
of the module. From this information Equipment Model Builder would be able to create a 
template for defining the module. This template would be created in the same way as the 
templates created for recycle loops and divider/header combinations. This template 
provides the method for detecting unlinked module faults, a way of verifying the module. 
The user is guided in creating a complete module. As in the templates created for recycle 
loops and divider/header combinations the fault and condition libraries would be 
temporarily enlarged while the module is being built. Unlike the default method no 
permanently extended fault library is created. 
This method shall be referred to as the 'extended-default' method. The extended- 
default method has been implemented as part of the Equipment Model Builder tool. 
Further details of this method will now be discussed. Equipment Model Builder presents 
the user with a menu listing the units contained in the model library. From this the user 
chooses a unit to place within the module. Equipment Model Builder provides the user 
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with a box to fill in an identifier for the unit. The queries are repeated in order to choose 
another unit and identifier. A module may be composed of a minimum of two unit 
models. The tool 'asks' the user whether all the models which the user-defined module is 
comprised of have been chosen. If the reply is negative then the series of menu, box and 
question is repeated until the user affirms that the set of units the module is comprised of 
is complete. 
A list of possible inports is prepared for the module. Possible inports are the 
inports of the modules constituent units. Equipment Model Builder labels the inports with 
the unit identifiers which have been provided by the user. A menu showing this list is 
presented to the user. From this the user chooses the actual inports of the module. The 
same method is used to discover the outports of the module from the user. For instance, to 
create a module for the example given in figure 5.10 the user would choose the following 
units: 'heatexchanger', 'reactor' and 'pressure relief valve'. Possible identifiers might be 
'hl', 'rl' and 'pvl'. The user would choose 'hl-cdin' and 'hl-htin' as the inports of the 
module and 'h I _cdot', 
'r I 
_btot' 
and 'pv I 
_out' as 
the outports of the module. 
When this stage is reached Equipment Model Builder amalgamates the units 
specified to create a template defining the module. An interface is provided which allows 
the user to alter the template or to add more information to it. This interface is the same as 
that provided for recycle loops and divider/header combinations (see section 5.2.3. ). It 
provides a method for detecting unlinked module faults. The faults and ports of the 
module are labelled by unit identifiers taken from the users specification. For example, if 
a template were defined for the units shown in figure 5.10 it might contain the following 
arcs: 
ffault, h I partly blocked (heating side)], -, [h 1-cdot, flow]) 
ffault, rl leak to env ironment], +, [consequence, contam inate environment]) 
A description is created for the module and placed within the description slot of the 
template describing the module. As the connectivities of the module are unknown this 
description cannot be of the same form as that created for recycle loops and divider/header 
combinations. A simpler description consisting only of the units of the module is created. 
For example, the following description would be created for the unit shown in figure 5.10: 
'This user-defined module is composed of the following units: hl, rl and pvl. ' 
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When the user module is placed within a plant description faults due to its 
constituent units are recognised by the identifiers input by the user for the units when 
specifying the module. Unlike recycle loops and divider/header combinations unit instance 
names within the module are not replaced by those of each new occurrence of the module. 
Should two or more instances of the same user-defined module occur within a single plant 
description it is still be possible to differentiate which user-defined module the faults of 
the constituent units occur in. This is because although the identifiers of the user-defined 
modules' constituent models are identical the identifiers of the modules within the plant 
description are not. For example, assume two instances of a user-defined module are 
present within a plant description. The identifiers of these instances are 'usermodl' and 
'usermod2'. Assume the user-defined module has a valve, identifier 'vl', as one of its 
constituent units. If this valve were to contain a fault such as 'closed in error' then the 
following faults would be present in the output file of models created for the plant 
description. 
'usermodl: vl closed in error' 
'usermod2: vI closed in error' 
If a user-defined module forms one of the constituent units of an outer module (i. e. 
a recycle loop, a divider/header combination or a user-defined module) the module 
identifier of the constituent user-defined module is retained. This ensures that the faults of 
the units comprising the new outer module possess unique identifiers. For example, the 
new module could consist of a valve, identifier vI, and a user-defined module, usermodl. 
Assume usermod I has a valve, identifier v I, among its constituent units. The identifier of 
the new outer module created is newmodl. The following faults would be present in the 
specialised file describing the new module. 
'newrnodl: v1 closed in error' 
'newmod I: usermodl-v I closed in error' 
It can be seen that retaining the user-defined module identifier allows the faults of a 
modules constituent units and modules to be uniquely recognisable. 
When a recycle loop module forms one of the constituent units of an outer recycle 
loop module or a divider/header module forms one of the constituent units within a recycle 
loop module or a divider/header module (see section 5.1.3. ) the module identifier of the 
inner module is removed. The module identifier is not required in this case to maintain 
unique identifiers for the faults of the new model as unit instance names within the inner 
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module are replaced by those of each new occurrence of the module. The outer module 
will not contain units with the same identifiers as the inner module as all unit identifiers 
will be unique within a plant description. 
When recycle loop modules and divider/header modules form constituent units of a 
user-defined module the module identifier of the inner module (i. e. recycle loop or 
divider/header) is retained as unit instance names within the inner module are not replaced 
in this case. This ensures that the faults of the constituent units of the new user-defined 
module built are unique. For example, assume a user-defined module consists of a valve, 
identifier vl, and a divider/header module, identifier bypsl. Assume bypsl has a valve, 
identifier, vI among its constituent units. The identifier of the new outer module created 
is newmod2. The following faults would be present in the new module's specialised file. 
'newrnod2: vI closed in error' 
'newmod2: bypsl-vt closed in error' 
5.4.4. Auto matic-identification Method 
This approach would take place in same three stages as the method for modularising 
recycle loops and divider/header combinations. These are identification, specification and 
substitution. However unlike recycle loops and divider/header combinations when user- 
defined modules are created the user is free to specify the unit combination. This means 
that the structure of a user-defined module is not known, therefore the initial stage must be 
specification. The automatic-identification method would take place in the following 
order: specification, identification and substitution. 
First, user specifies a module composed of multiple units. This could be done in 
the same way in which plant descriptions are generated by an AutoCAD file or a text file 
describing the module. When the user specified the units and their connectivities within a 
module Equipment Model Builder would be able to store this information within the 
model library. Whenever a new user-defined module was specified the tool would be able 
to 'check' the new units and connectivities given against this information. The tool would 
be able to determine if a module was being specified which was already present as a user- 
defined module within the model library. Duplication of modules could be prevented. 
To build a module defined by the automatic-identification method Equipment 
Model Builder would amalgamate existing plant unit models as specified by the user. As 
with modules created for recycle loops and divider/header combinations causal paths 
existing between the units of the module would be removed. Important internal influences 
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would be retained. See section 5.2. for more details. The faults and ports of the module 
would be labelled by unit identifiers taken from the users specification. An interface 
would exist which would allow the user to add extra information to the module. This 
would provide a template for defining the module. This template would provide benefits 
detailed in the extended-default method. 
The next stage is identification. From the specification given by the user 
Equipment Model Builder would be able to identify the groupings of units together with 
the connections between them that composed the user-defined module within a plant 
description. Equipment Model Builder would take a plant description as input. In 
addition to identifying recycle loops and divider/header combinations the tool would also 
identify modules defined by the automatic-identification method occurring within the 
plant. 
Each time the module was used when a file describing the plant was created the 
user would have to draw and specify its individual units. When using a text file to create a 
plant description containing the module this could simply be a matter of copying existing 
material but when using AutoCAD this could be time-consuming. Additional searching 
would be required for plant fragments matching user-defined modules within the plant 
description. , 
In the final stage, Equipment Model Builder would substitute each occurrence of a 
user-defined module found into the plant description. The user would be informed that 
this substitution was occurring. The individual units of the unit group which comprised the 
user-defined module would be replaced with the module. Unit identifiers within the user- 
defined module would be replaced with those specified for the new occurrence in the plant 
description. A specialised file would be created for each new occurrence found. This 
would be done by updating the existing specialised file for the user-defined model with the 
identifiers specified for the new occurrence in the plant description. The new specialised 
files created would be amalgamated with the specialised files of the other units specified 
within the plant description to form an output file of models occurring within the plant. 
How the automatic-identification method may be applied to the example given in 
figure 5.10 will be described. First the user will specify the module. This could be done 
by using a description generated by AutoCAD. An example of a description of the group 
of units shown in figure 5.10 might be: 
'heatexl', 'heatexc hanger', '[htot is [reactor I, feed], cdot is [taill, infl', 'unspecified' 
'reactorl', 'reactor', I[btot is [tail2jn], tpot is [presvalvel, infl', 'unspecified' 
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4presvalvel', 'pressure relief valve', '[out is [tail3, in]]', 'unspecified' 
See section 2.4.2. for an explanation of plant descriptions generated by AutoCAD. 
Equipment Model Builder would amalgamate plant unit models for a 
heatexchanger, reactor and a pressure relief valve to form a template for defining the 
module. The user would add additional information to this template, for example a name 
such as 'catalytic reactor'. Example arcs from this template are given below. These arcs 
show how faults and ports of the module have been created by combining unit identifiers 
taken from the user's specification with faults and ports of the unit models comprising the 
module. 
([fault, heatex I partly blocked (heating side)], -, [heatex 1-cdot, flow]) 
([fault, reactorl leak to environment], +, [consequence, contaminate environment]) 
Example 5.2 Arcs from Template for Catalytic Reactor Module 
From the description given and information contained in the unit models Equipment 
Model Builder would be able to determine the in- and outports of the module. These are 
the in- and outports of the constituent units which are not used to link the units of the 
module. For the catalytic reactor module inports would be 'heatex-htin' and 
'heatex_cdin'. Outports would be 'heatexl_cdot, 'reactorl-btot' and 'Presvalvel-out'. 
Arcs containing ports which link the units of the module would be removed. This would 
remove causal paths existing between units of the module. The first arc shown above is 
present within the module template as it contains a fault linked to deviation arc in which 
the deviation occurs at a boundary port of the module. The second arc is present as it is a 
fault linked to consequence arc. 
When a plant description is created, for example the MTBE plant, the identification 
stage would take place. Using this example, Equipment Model would detect that the cdot 
port of a heatexchanger is linked to the feed of a reactor. The tool would also detect that 
the tpot port of this reactor is linked to the inport of a pressure relief valve. From this 
information Equipment Model Builder would identify that these units constitute a user- 
defined module present in the model library. 
Finally, the individual units of the unit group which comprised the user-defined 
module would be substituted by Equipment Model Builder with the catalytic reactor 
module. Unit identifiers within the arcs of the catalytic reactor module would be replaced 
with those specified for the new occurrence in the plant description. The following 
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example will show what is meant by this. Assume the unit group which comprises the 
catalytic reactor was specified in the MTBE plant description as: 
'hl', 'heatexchanger', '[htot is [rl, feed], cdot is [taill, in]]', 'unspecified' 
trl', 'reactor', '[btot is [tail2, inl, tpot is [pvl, in]]', 'unspecified' 
4pvl', 'pressure relief valve', '[out is [tail3, in]]', 'unspecified'. 
The arcs given in example 5.2 would now become: 
([fault, hl partly blocked (heating side)], -, [hl-cdot, flow]) 
([fault, rt leak to environment], +, [consequence, contaminate environment]) 
A specialised file would be created for this new occurrence found. 
5.4.5. Method Chosen 
The advantages and disadvantages of the three methods detailed above are summarised in 
tables 5.1 and 5.2 below. 
Method 
Advantages Ideal Default Extended- 
default 
Automatic- 
identification 
Only one icon required for the module 
within a plant description. 
A template for defining the module 
exists. 
-V/ 
A larger fault library is not required. V -W/ 
User will recourse to this method. 
User specifies the units and how they are 
connected together io form the module. 
V/ 
No additional system searching needed. 
_ Table 5.1. Three Ways of Dealing with User-detined Models- Advantages 
Method 
Disadvantages Ideal Default Extended- Automatic- 
default identification 
No template for defining the module. 
Requires additional work for the user 
when specifying the module in a plant 
description. 
Larger fault library required. 
System has no information on units and 
how they are connected to form the 
module. 
Additional system searching. 
Table 5.2. Three Ways of Dealing with User-defined Models- Disadvantages 
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Any method provided to deal with the concept of user-defined modules needs to be 
simple and efficient to use otherwise the user will use the default method. As this method 
is already provided by Equipment Model Builder the user will use it anyway if other 
methods for creating user-defined modules are found to be too complicated or time- 
consuming. 
The extended-default method was chosen to create user-defined modules and 
implemented as part of Equipment Model Builder. Table 5.1 shows that this method 
possesses all but one of the advantages of the ideal method. This method is simple to use. 
Its disadvantage is that the system has no information on units and unit connectivity of the 
module. Equipment Model Builder is unable to 'check' whether the module being defined 
is already in the model library. Duplication of modules cannot be prevented. However 
ordinary units are not checked to see if a duplicate already exists in the unit library when 
they are created. Equipment Model Builder only checks that unit names are not 
duplicated. 
This sub-section has described the concept of a user-defined module. Possible 
methods for modelling user-defined modules have been discussed. From these a method 
has been derived which is believed to offer most help in defining modules to a user. How 
this method is applied by Equipment Model Builder was described. 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter has described a new module creation approach which provides a method to 
remove ambiguities due to multiple causal paths. This modular approach takes place in 
three stages: identification, specification and substitution. 
The groupings of units which Equipment Model Builder automatically identifies as 
leading to ambiguities within qualitative modelling are different possible configurations of 
recycle loops and divider/header combinations. Other groupings of units which lead to 
ambiguities may occur. For these groupings of units the user is provided with the 
functionality to define modules. 
To identify the unit groupings which could lead to ambiguities Equipment Model 
Builder makes two searches of the plant description input: one to identify divider/header 
combinations and one to identify recycle loops. Divider/header combinations are searched 
for first. It is necessary to detect these combinations first before searching for recycle 
loops as the substitution of a module of a recycle loop into the plant system would cause 
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any information about possible divider/header combinations located within the recycle 
loop to be lost. 
The search of the plant is complicated by the presence of certain types of units 
which have been called 'splitters'. These units have more than one outport which leads to 
branching of process flow stream through the plant. This causes branching of the search 
path. Examples of these types of units are tanks with multiple outports and columns. 
Heatexchangers have multiple outports but do not divide the process flow stream within 
the plant so do not cause branching of the plant search. Heatexchangers are treated as a 
special case. 
Algorithms used to identify divider/header combinations and recycle loops within 
plant descriptions have been described. Within process plants in addition to simple 
recycle loops and divider/header combinations there is the possibility for complex 
structures consisting of multiple loops, multiple divider/header combinations and 
combinations of loops and divider/header combinations to occur. How identification of 
unit groupings which could lead to ambiguities is carried out when these complex 
structures are encountered has been detailed. 
If there is no existing module within the model library which describes the unit 
group identified a new one needs to be specified. Modules are specified for the plant 
fragments identified by amalgamating and modifying existing models of plant units. 
Modules for unit groupings comprising recycle loops and divider/header combinations are 
specified in exactly the same way. An interface provides the user with a guide as to what 
extra information needs to be added to the module and enables the user to add this 
information. 
The amalgamated units models together with the interface serve as a template to 
allow the user to define the module identified. When the units are amalgamated to form a 
module the causal paths that lead to ambiguities or incorrect behaviour are removed. 
Internal influences of the module are retained. After the module has been defined it is 
added to a library of component models. 
The initial module building phase consists of- 
" checking that all the units which comprise the module identified are modelled; 
" creating and labelling instances of these units; 
" creating a description of the module. 
When the unit instances are amalgamated the fault linked to deviation arcs in 
which the deviation does not occur at a boundary port or in which the deviation does not 
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affect a port which has a consequence are deleted. These arcs are deleted to remove the 
multiple causal paths which could lead to ambiguities. However the faults of these arcs 
must be retained as they may have an important effect within the module. They may also 
propagate out of the module to cause deviations in other units when the module is placed 
in a plant description. The faults from the deleted arcs are stored by Equipment Model 
Builder as 'unlinked module faults'. The interface provided allows the user to add more 
information about these faults to the module. 
This thesis only considers modularising recycle loops relatively small compared to 
the size of the plant. The maximum size of recycle loop to modularise is chosen by the 
user. 
In the substitution stage the individual units which make up the module are 
replaced with the module. The use of the module within the plant description instead of 
the individual units which comprise the module removes multiple causal paths which lead 
to ambiguities within the plant structure. 
A unit grouping which could lead to ambiguities is identified within a plant 
description. The model library is searched for a module describing the unit grouping. If a 
module is found the user is 'asked' if this module should be substituted into the plant 
description. If the user confirms this the substitution stage begins. If no module describing 
the unit grouping is located within the model library the user is queried as whether a new 
module should be created for the unit grouping. If the user agrees the specification stage 
commences. 
To amalgamate information to form the input for the expert system QUEEN 
(Chung, 1993) the tool begins by taking a file describing a plant as input. A modified 
plant description file is created from this file for use by the expert system. An output file 
consisting of the models of all the units found within the plant description is also created 
for use by the expert system. If a unit grouping which could lead to ambiguities is 
identified within the plant the plant description file is altered to describe the module 
specified for this unit grouping. A model of the module is placed into the output file. 
Descriptions of the unit instances comprising the module are removed from the plant 
description. Unit models of these units are not added to the output file unless they are 
required to model other instances of the same units located within the plant but outside of 
the plant fragment comprising the module. This comprises the substitution stage. 
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The penultimate section of this chapter considers the concept of user-defined 
modules. Why they are needed is explained. Three possible methods of looking at the 
concept were examined: 
1. the default method; 
2. the extended-default method; 
3. the automatic identification method. 
The default method would use Equipment Model Builder's user interface to build 
user-defined modules in the same way in which ordinary units are built, i. e. the module 
would be treated exactly like a single unit. 
The extended-default method queries the user as what units the module is to 
contain and the identity of the module outports. The user is be asked to give an identifier 
for each unit of the module. From this information Equipment Model Builder is able to 
create a template for defining the module. The user is guided in creating a complete 
module. 
The automatic identification method would take place in same three stages as the 
method for modularising recycle loops and divider/header combinations. However the 
automatic-identification method cannot take place in the same order as the other modular 
approaches as the structure of a user-defined module is unknown. The automatic- 
identification method would take place in the following order: specification, identification 
and substitution. 
The advantages and disadvantages of the three methods were discussed. The 
method offering the user most help in defining modules was found to be the extended- 
default method. This was the method chosen and implemented to aid the user in creating 
user-defined modules. 
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6. Verification 
Verification has been defined in chapter 3. Verification methods were split into three 
categories: those that check for completeness, correctness and conciseness. In this chapter 
the verification methods used in Equipment Model Builder are discussed within the 
context of these categories. The development of models to evaluate the verification 
methods is described. 
Some of the methods shown below are purely verification methods whereas others 
may also be thought of as part of the user interface, duplication checking or explanation 
facilities (i. e. part of the knowledge acquisition facilities) provided by Equipment Model 
Builder. 
What an 'ideal' model consists of will be described for each category. Verification 
techniques used by Equipment Model Builder to achieve this 'ideal' model will be 
discussed. Some techniques may fall into more than one category. Any shortcomings 
with the unit model after it has been verified will be detailed. 
6.1. Completeness 
A complete model has no missing information, i. e. all the information that ought to be in 
the model is contained in the model structure. It will be able to function in all possible 
situations that arise in the application. As what information the model should contain is 
unknown it is impossible to ensure that a model is complete. The set of all the possible 
ways that the model might be required to behave is unknown. Although there are ways of 
identifying some aspects of missing information, completeness cannot be guaranteed. 
This section explains the different ways in which incomplete information can occur 
in the unit models created by Equipment Model Builder. Techniques for identifying this 
incomplete information are described. Other types of missing information are then 
considered. 
Two types of incomplete information will be discussed. The first type is 
incomplete arcs. Each arc within a unit model should contain an initial node, an influence 
and an influenced node. Equipment Model Builder will not allow a user to save a model 
until all the arcs within the model are complete. The user is informed which forms contain 
incomplete arcs. This makes up part of Equipment Model Builder's user interface and will 
not be discussed further. The second type of incomplete information described is 
unreferenced attributes. 
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6.1.1. Unreferenced Attributes 
The term 'unreferenced attributes' has been taken from the body of work describing 
verification of rule-based systems (see section 3.4.2.2. ). There are two types of 
incompleteness check for unreferenced attributes relevant to this thesis: the dead-end 
conclusion check and the unreachable condition check. 
An SDG may be compared to a rule. Consider the arc shown below. 
+1- 
x 
The node X may be compared to the conditions or left hand side of a rule. The node 'Y' 
may be compared to the conclusions or right hand side of a rule. The completeness 
checks for rule-based systems are also applicable to systems constructing SDG models. 
The following description explains how unreferenced attributes may occur in the unit 
models created by Equipment Model Builder. 
As described previously (section 2.4.1. ) the unit model has four types of arcs. 
These are: 
(i) deviation linked to deviation; 
(ii) fault linked to deviation; 
(iii) fault linked to consequence; 
(iv) deviation linked to consequence. 
The initiating node W of the SDG shown could be a process variable deviation or 
a fault. The influenced node 'Y' could be a deviation or consequence. A consequence 
may occur directly as a result of a fault (arc type iii). e. g. 
ffault, leak to environment], +, [consequence, [loss of material, expensive]]). 
It may also occur as a result of a fault propagating through a deviation or series of 
deviations. For example, in a tank model the following fault propagation might occur, 
leading to the consequence shown: 
([tank, fault, extemal fire], +, [tank, vapour, ternperature]) 
([tank, vapourjemperature], +, [tank, liquidjernperature]) 
([tank, deviation, [moreTemperature, liquid]], +, [tank, consequence, crystallisation]). 
The nodes in the path are of the types ii, i and iv respectively. The fault (failure mode) 
initiating a propagation path need not be present in the same unit as the resulting 
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consequence. The fault may occur in an upstream unit and cause a deviation which 
propagates into another unit via its inports, or in a downstream unit and cause a deviation 
which propagates into another unit via its outports, to result in a consequence. For 
example, a pipe model linked upstream of the tank model could cause the following 
consequence in the tank model: 
([pipe, fault, partly blocked], -, [pipe, out, flow]) 
([pipe, out, flow], +, [tank, inl, flow]) 
([tank, inl, flow], +, [tank, liquid, level]) 
([tank, deviation, [IessLevel, liquid]], +, [tank, cOnsequence, vessel emptying]) 
Thus in order for a fault to have the potential to cause a consequence it must fall 
into one of the following categories: 
1. The fault must be directly linked to the consequence. 
2. The fault must cause a deviation which propagates within the unit model to cause a 
consequence. 
3. The fault must cause a deviation which propagates out of the unit model via its inports 
or outports resulting in a consequence in another unit. 
Any fault that does not fall into one of more of these categories is an unreferenced attribute 
as it has no overall effect. An unreferenced fault (failure mode) causes a deviation with no 
effect. 
Deviations with no effect may be present in fault linked to deviation arcs as 
described above. They may also be present in deviation linked to deviation arcs in which 
the deviation does not propagate to a boundary port. Deviations propagating from 
boundary ports (i. e. in and out ports) are assumed to have an effect as they may propagate 
out of the unit model resulting in a consequence in another unit. For example, the 
deviation 'out, flow' in the arc '([pipe, in, flow], +, [pipe, out, flow])' could propagate out of 
the pipe unit to cause a potential effect in a downstream unit if the pipe unit was present in 
a plant description. 
In order for a consequence to occur it must either be: 
1. directly linked to a fault; 
2. result from a fault causing a deviation to propagate within a unit model; 
3. be linked to the inports or outports of the unit model. This is so that deviations may 
propagate in to the unit to cause the consequence. An example of this last case for a 
tank model would be: 
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([tank, deviation, [moreFlow, out]], +, [tank, consequence, vessel emptying]) 
Any consequences not fulfilling these criteria are unreferenced attributes as they will never 
occur. An unreferenced consequence is linked to a deviation without a cause. 
Deviations without causes may be present in deviation linked to consequence arcs 
(described above). They may also be present in deviation linked to deviation arcs in which 
the deviation does not initiate at a boundary port. Deviations initiating at boundary ports 
are assumed to have a cause. The cause may propagate into the unit via its boundary ports 
from elsewhere in the plant. For example, the deviation 'inl, flow' in the arc 
'([tank, int, flow], +, [tank, liquid, level])' may be caused by a fault propagating into the 
tank unit from an upstream unit when the tank unit is present in a plant description. 
Another type of unreferenced attribute arises when modules are created. Unlinked 
faults occur when fault linked to deviation arcs are deleted within the module. This has 
been described in section 5.2.2.3. The final type of unreferenced attributes to be described 
are undetected faults. 
6.1.1.1. Undetected Faults 
The unit models created using the Equipment Model Builder interface are intended for use 
in systems undertaking hazard identification (e. g. Parmar and Lees, 1987; Chung, 
1993; Vaidhyanathan and Ventkatasubramanian, 1995; 1996). Systems of this type 
examine deviations associated with the units. Causes are identified that give rise to these 
process deviations. Propagation paths are followed from the causes to identify 
consequences. 
Only faults linked to process deviations are detected and the consequences of those 
faults identified. Within systems undertaking hazard identification consequences linked to 
undetected faults will not be located. In order to detect consequences in the fault linked to 
consequence arcs of a unit model the faults of those arcs must also be present in the fault 
linked to deviation arcs of the model. 
6.1. ]. Z Identification Techniques 
For a given model, Equipment Model Builder maintains lists of deviations with no effect, 
deviations without causes and undetected faults. Each new arc added or deleted is checked 
to see if it causes these lists to require updating. 
To allow a deviation with no effect to cause a potential effect the new arc must 
allow the deviation to propagate to an inport, outport or consequence. The new arc must be 
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applicable under the same model conditions as the process variable deviation with no 
effect. This means it must share the same conditions as the deviation with no effect or have 
no specific conditions, making it applicable to the whole model. Instead of allowing the 
deviation with no effect to propagate to an effect a new arc might simply alter the 
deviation by lengthening the propagation path. For example, a new arc 
'([vapour, temperature], +, [liquid, temperature])' might simply change a deviation with no 
effect from 'temperature vapour' to 'temperature liquid'. 
In order to allow a cause to propagate to a deviation without a cause the new arc 
must contain the correct influence and process variable. For example, the arc 
'([Iiquid, level], - -, [in, flow])' cannot bring about the deviation 'moreFlow, in'. Although 
a propagation path is provided to the process variable 'flow' the influence '- -' cannot 
cause an increase in the variable flow. The new arc must also be applicable under the same 
model conditions as the deviation without a cause. 
In order to allow a fault within a fault to consequence arc to be linked to a 
deviation the fault linked to consequence arc must share the same model conditions as the 
fault linked to deviation arc. 
Equipment Model Builder allows the user to access the lists of deviations with no 
effect, deviations without causes, and undetected faults from a drop-down menu. This 
means that the lists need not be visible until the user wishes to verify the model. The user 
will not be annoyed by the presence of extra information until it is required. The lists also 
contain the conditions under which the deviations with no effect, deviations without 
causes and undetected faults are applicable. When the model is saved the user is informed 
if any deviations with no effect, deviations without causes or undetected faults remain. 
Unlinked module faults are also listed. Again, this list may be accessed from a 
drop-down menu. This is described more fully in section 5.2.3.2. 
6.1.2. Missing Information 
Three kinds of missing information will be considered: 
1. missing units within the unit library; 
2. missing faults and consequences; 
3. missing propagation paths. 
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6. LZ1. Missing Units 
Equipment Model Builder's unit library needs to be complete in order for it to create 
modules and complete output files of models of a plant's units. When a module or output 
file is created Equipment Model Builder checks that all the component units are present 
within its model library. If a model for a unit is found to be missing the user is queried as 
to whether he wishes to create the missing model. 
6. ]. ZZ Missing Faults and Consequences 
Omissions by the user will result in missing faults and consequences within the unit 
model. These are difficult to detect simply because it is not known what is missing. A 
missing fault could result in an unreferenced consequence and which would lead to a 
deviation without a cause. However, a unit model with no consequences or deviations 
without causes does not necessarily have no missing faults. The consequences or 
deviations may be caused by more than one fault. If any of the faults is missing the 
consequences and deviations will still have a cause. No deviation without a cause will be 
detected. 
Missing consequences can result in unreferenced faults and hence deviations 
without effects in a unit model. However, a fault may cause multiple consequences 
within a unit model or propagate out of the unit model to cause consequences in other 
units within a plant description. If one of the multiple consequences is missing this fault 
will still be able to cause a consequence. A deviation without an effect will not be 
detected. I 
In order to aid the user to discover missing faults Equipment Model Builder could 
present the user with a different view of the model. This could be done by showing the 
user a list of model faults (failure modes) and querying the user if this list were complete. 
Missing faults could be added to the list. The user could then be asked whether the fault 
lead to a consequence or a deviation. When this was established the fault could be placed 
on the relevant forms within Equipment Model Builder. A similar list could also be 
provided for model consequences. Missing consequences could be added to the list. The 
user could be asked if the consequence were linked to a deviation or a fault. The 
consequence could also be placed on the relevant forms. 
134 
6. LZ3. Missing Propagation Paths 
In order for unit models to function correctly within a plant model deviations in process 
variables will need to be able to propagate through them. This means that process variable 
deviations need to be able to propagate from a unit's inports to its outports and from its 
outports to its inports. Exceptions to this are models for the source and outlet of the plant. 
Some unit models may not propagate all deviations. For example, an open tank will not 
propagate an increase in flow from its outport to its inport. However most units will 
propagate most deviations. 
Equipment Model Builder identifies process variables with no propagation path 
through a unit model and provides the user with a list, accessible via a drop-down menu. 
These variables will be called unlinked boundary deviations. This does not mean that the 
model is not complete if there are process variables with no propagation path. For 
example, in the case of the open tank there is no propagation path for flow from the tank's 
outports to its inports. It only means that the model might be not be complete. The list is 
intended to act as a memory aid for the user. The process variable 'level' is not tested for 
propagation as this tends only to be linked to the internal ports of models. This list of 
process variables with no propagation paths will help to ensure that the unit models 
behaviour is plausible. 
6.2. Correctness 
A correct model is an accurate representation. A correct model has no conflicting 
information or illegitimate attributes. An illegitimate attribute is one which does not occur 
within the set of attribute values allowed for the model. A correct model contains no 
wrong information. A correct model will function correctly. However, there may be 
misconceptions about how a model should function. The models role or the type of 
systems in which it will be used may not be understood. 
This sub-section will first look at how conflicting information occurs within a 
model and a technique will be described as to how its effects might be detected. 
Techniques for preventing illegitimate attributes will be discussed. Techniques for 
identifying wrong information are looked at. 
. 
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6.2.1. Conflicting Information 
Conflict may occur within an SDG model when there is more than one possible 
propagation path between the nodes within the model. The following SDG will be used to 
illustrate this: 
in, flow- + --*out, flow "'Sý 
-/ 
fault, leak 
From this SDG two propagation paths may be traced between the fault 'leak' and 
'out, flow'. The two paths are: 
fault, leak --: -+ out, flow 
fault, leak--+---* in, flow + out, flow 
For the first path the effect of a leak is an decrease of 'out, flow'. For the second path the 
effect is a increase of 'out, flow'. 
The qualitative analysis results in two contradictory paths with the first path having 
the correct influence. In order to deal with ambiguities a heuristic that is commonly used 
is that when there is more than one acyclic path through the SDG the shortest path is used. 
This heuristic is used as it is applicable to many cases. 
6. ZLL Detecting the Effects of Conflicting Information 
A technique has been devised which allows the user to check that the shortest path within 
the unit model leads to correct model behaviour. To avoid duplication of work the 
technique for verifying the shortest path uses the QUEEN (Chung, 1993) system. 
Equipment Model Builder 'asks' the user when a model is saved as to whether the shortest 
paths should be verified. If the user wishes to verify the shortest paths Equipment Model 
Builder builds a plant description and specialised file for the model to enable QUEEN to 
test the model. Equipment Model Builder prepares a file of queries to send to QUEEN. 
QUEEN generates the shortest paths and their effects from these queries. The user verifies 
that these shortest paths are correct. To verify the model certain query types are needed to 
cover all the kinds of propagation path which may occur between the node types within the 
SDG model. 
Within the unit model deviations may propagate to cause effects along four 
different types of path. The deviation may propagate: 
(1) from a boundary port to a boundary port; 
(2) from a fault to cause a consequence; 
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(3) from a fault to a boundary port; 
(4) from a boundary port to cause a consequence. 
Equipment Model Builder prepares an exhaustive list of queries to test for shortest 
paths between all the two node combinations which might occur within the model. The 
tool tests all possible paths. Not all of the paths tested for may exist. To provide a base 
for describing these queries a simple model is given below (in text). It is intended for 
illustration only. 
frame(pipe isa unit, 
inports info [ in 
outports info [out], 
propLinks info [ 
%propagation 
arc([ in, pressure] 1+, [out, pressure]), 
arc([out, pressure], +, [in, pressure]), 
arc([in, temperature], +, [out, temperature]), 
arc([ in, flow], +, [out, flow]), 
arc([out, flow], +, [ in, flow]), 
%faults 
arc([fault, 'partly blocked'], -jout, flow]), 
arc([fault, ['Ieak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [in, pressure]), 
%consequences resulting from faults 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environment', toxic]]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environmenf], +, [consequence, 'loss of material']), 
%consequences resulting from deviations 
arc([deviation, [morePressure, in]], +, [consequence, 'possible rupture']) 
To verify type (1) paths a complete list of process variable deviations is prepared 
for every boundary port. Queries are prepared to test for shortest paths between each of 
the process variable deviations at a boundary port and each of the process variable 
deviations at the other boundary ports within the model. Examples of some of the paths 
queried for the pipe model shown are 'in, pressure' propagating to 'out, pressure', 
'in, pressure' propagating to 'out, temperature' and 'out, pressure' propagating to 
'in, pressure'. Queries are also prepared to test for shortest paths for deviations 
propagating from a boundary port back to the same port but a different process variable, 
e. g. 'in, flow' propagating to 'in, temperaure'. Queries are not set up for deviations 
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propagating from a boundary port back to the same variable at the same port, e. g. 'in, flow' 
propagating to 'in flow'. To provide more detail an example set of paths queried for a 
tank model is shown in appendix A. 2. The resulting output from the QUEEN system for 
these queries is shown in appendix A. 3. The unit model these queries were generated for 
is shown in appendix A. I. 
To verify type (2) shortest paths Equipment Model Builder compiles a list of faults 
from the fault linked to deviation arcs within the model. Equipment Model Builder also 
creates a list of consequences contained in the deviation linked to consequence arcs within 
the model. Consequences contained in the fault linked to consequence arcs are not added 
to the list as the shortest paths propagating to these consequences are known. Queries are 
prepared to test for the shortest paths between each of the faults in the fault list and each of 
the consequences in the consequence list. The paths queried for the pipe model would be 
'partly blocked' propagating to 'possible rupture' and 'leak into vacuum system' 
propagating to 'possible rupture'. 
For type (3) paths queries are written to test for shortest paths from each of the 
faults in the fault list to each of process variable deviations at each of the boundary ports. 
Examples of some of the paths queried for the pipe model are 'partly blocked' 
propagating to 'in, pressure', 'leak into vacuum system' propagating to 'in, pressure' and 
'leak into vacuum system' propagating to 'out, temperature'. 
To test type (4) paths queries are prepared to test for shortest paths between each of 
the process variable deviations at each of the boundary ports and each of the consequences 
in the consequence list. Examples of paths queried for the pipe model would be 
'in, pressure' propagating to 'possible rupture', 'in, temperature' propagating to 'possible 
rupture' and 'out, pressure' propagating to 'possible rupture'. 
As all possible shortest paths within the model are tested for, the user is able to see 
where paths do not exist as well as where they do. The omission of an arc may mean that 
a path does not exist where the user might expect to find one. QUEEN returns the shortest 
path and (where relevant) the effect of this path. The effect is not relevant for type (4) 
paths. The value of the deviations propagating into the unit's boundary ports in these 
paths is not known. Therefore it is not known whether these deviations will have an effect 
(i. e. cause a consequence) or not. QUEEN's output enables the user to check that both the 
shortest path and the effect are correct. 
The technique for verifying the shortest path is intended to be the final verification 
procedure performed upon the model. Errors which could result in missing or incorrect 
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shortest paths such as deviations with no effect and deviations without causes are detected 
prior to this test to reduce the number of problems found. The model at this stage should 
be complete and correct to the best of the user's knowledge. The user tests the unit model 
using the technique for verifying the shortest path. If any errors are found within the 
model the user will correct them and test the model again. A cycle of testing and 
correcting the model is carried out until the user is satisfied with it. 
6. Z]. Z A Limitation with the Detection Technique 
A limitation with this technique for verifying that the shortest path within the unit model 
leads to correct model behaviour is that it is exhaustive. All possible paths within the 
model are tested for. This results in a large numbers of queries generated and a large 
amount of information for checking. Appendix A. 3. gives an indication of the size of the 
output for a tank model for queries testing the existence of shortest paths between 
boundary ports. Possible ways of simplifying the results would be: 
" to list positive output (where paths exist) in a separate file to negative output; 
" to allow the user a choice of which resiilts to view; 
" to limit the pairing of variables; 
" to write the output more concisely. 
The user may not wish to view all of the results generated. The user may only wish 
to look at paths which contain more than two arcs or those containing a certain process 
variable deviation. Looking at paths containing two or more arcs would detect errors 
caused by the unforeseen interaction of arcs, which the user may feel to be the most likely 
source of error. For example, the arc from the pipe model '([fault, 'Ieak into vacuum 
system', vacuum], +, [pipe, in, pressure])' is correct, as is the arc '([pipe, in, pressure], 
[pipe, out, pressure])'. However the these arcs lead to the path: 
leak into vacuum system in, pressure out, pressure 
The effect of this path is an increase in 'out, pressure'. This effect may not be intended to 
occur within the model. 
The user may feel it is only necessary to view paths containing a certain process 
variable. For example, if a heatexchanger were being modelled the user might decide that 
only the shortest paths containing the process variable deviation temperature were of 
interest. The other paths might be assumed to be correct. If a blanketed vessel model 
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were being created by extending a closed vessel model the user might wish to limit the 
results to those shortest paths containing pressure. These paths would be present as a 
result of new arcs added when the closed vessel model was extended. Other shortest paths 
within the blanketed vessel model would already have been verified as the arcs containing 
these paths would have been copied from the closed vessel model. The closed vessel 
model would have been verified when it was created. The user may also wish to condense 
the results viewed in other ways. Providing a choice would allow the user to restrict the 
output to those results of interest. 
Shortest paths queried between pairs of variables could be limited to possible 
paths. For example, paths propagating from the process variable 'level' need not be tested. 
A deviation will not propagate from the process variable 'noFlow' to the variable 'flow'. 
To write the output more concisely instead of returning: 
There is no path between [tank 1, in I, pressure] and [tank 1, in l, temperature] 
There is no path between [tank 1, in I, pressure] and (tank 1, in l, concentration] 
There is no path between [tank 1, in I, pressure] and [tank 1, in 1,1evell 
There is no path between [tankl, inl, pressure] and [tank 1, in 1, flow] 
There is no path between [tank 1, in I, pressure] and [tank 1, in I, noFIow] 
There is no path between [tank 1, in I, pressure] and [tank 1, in I, reverseFlow] 
the output could retum: 
There is no path between [tank 1, in l, pressure] and [tankl, inl; tem perature, concentrat ion, 
level, flow, noFlow and reverseFlow]. 
6.2.2. Preventing Illegitimate Attributes 
The port names allowed for the model are defined by the user. Any ports found within the 
model that are not members of the set of names defined by the user are illegitimate 
attributes. This may occur when the user deletes or changes a port name. Equipment 
Model Builder deletes any arcs within the model containing the port which the user has 
deleted or changed. 
Equipment Model Builder creates unit models for the QUEEN (Chung, 1993) 
expert system. The QUEENs syntax places some constraints upon the values allowed 
within the model. The parent and unit names of the model may not contain any spaces. In 
order for QUEEN to function correctly the parent name of the model must be different to 
the unit name. Equipment Model Builders user interface prevents the user from inputting 
values into the model which violate these constraints. The user is requested to enter 
another value if an incorrect value is entered. 
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Equipment Model Builders user interface also prevents the user from entering an 
arc containing a deviation which propagates through a port to influence itself at the same 
port, e. g. ([in, flow], +, [in, flow]). 
The following set of values are allowable as model influences: ++, --, +++ and - 
- -. When the user indicates he wishes to input an influence Equipment Model Builder 
presents with a list of influences to chose from. This ensures that no values outside of this 
list can be entered. For the process variables 'noFlow' and 'revFlow' only the influence 
values '++' and '- -' are valid. When influences for these process variables are being 
entered Equipment Model Builder will present the user with a list of only these two values. 
For fault linked to deviation arcs only the influence values '+' and '-' are valid. When 
influences are being entered on the 'Fault->Deviation' form Equipment Model Builder lists 
only these two values. 
A file describing the plant is created for Equipment Model Builder using 
AutoCAD. The file output from AutoCAD should be checked to ensure that it is in a 
correct forniat to be read into Equipment Model Builder. The syntax of the file should be 
correct, e. g. all the brackets and commas within the file should be correctly matched. This 
will ensure that the modified plant description files that Equipment Model Builder creates 
to be input into QUEEN are correct. All the units referred to within the file should either 
be linked to a plant outlet or be linked to other units from which a link to a plant outlet can 
be traced. This will prevent search algorithms within Equipment Model Builder from 
looping infinitely. The unitport names referred to within the AutoCAD file should be 
identical to those within the models in Equipment Model Builders unit library in order for 
QUEEN to function correctly. 
6.2.3. Identifying Wrong Information 
Unreferenced attributes might be present because the arcs containing them are wrong. 
There may be no propagation path to or from the unreferenced attribute because it should 
not occur. As the deviations with no effect, deviations without causes and undetected 
faults may be wrong Equipment Model Builder does not force the user to link them. 
When a model is saved the user is simply informed if any exist. 
As what comprises an accurate model is not known it is impossible to say which of 
the pieces of information it contains might be wrong. The user might make errors when 
inputting information. For example, the arc '([fault, leak], +, [in, flow])' might be input as 
'([fault, blockagel, +, [in, flow])'. This mistake cannot be detected by checking the internal 
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structure of the model as no unreferenced attributes or conflicting information may result 
from it. The only technique by which this kind of error might be found is to test the 
model within a simple system to see if it behaves in the way expected. A malfunctioning 
model will indicate an error is present. The onus is on the user to trace which error is 
causing the malfunction. This technique should be performed as a final test after 
Equipment Model Builder has carried out all its verification procedures on the internal 
structure of the model. Otherwise extra work would be given to the user in tracing errors 
which could have been more easily detected by tests on the internal model structure. 
6.3. Conciseness 
A concise model has no redundant, duplicated or superfluous information. No model can 
be assumed to be totally concise. As the set of all the possible functions that the model 
might be required to perform is unknown, whether any of the information within the 
model is superfluous to requirements is also unknown. It is not known what these 
requirements might be. A model which is not concise is confusing to the user. The user 
would find the model hard to understand. Duplication within the model would allow 
errors to be easily made. 
This sub-section will describe how Equipment Model Builder tests for redundant 
information and prevents the addition of duplicated information to the model. 
Unreferenced attributes (deviations with no effect and deviations without causes) might 
be present because the information they contain is redundant. 
Equipment Model Builder's interface contains checks to prevent the addition of 
duplicated information to the model. The user is prevented from adding duplicated port 
names to the model. This ensures that all port names are unique. When the user defines a 
module the user interface checks that the identifiers of the modules constituent units are 
not duplicated. 
The prevention of duplicate ports within a unit model and duplicate identifiers 
within a module model allows a user interface check to be made preventing the addition of 
duplicate arcs to a model. 
Equipment Model Builder tests for duplication within the lists of fault, conditions 
and consequences. In spite of this test duplication within these lists and hence within the 
model created could still occur. The reason for this is the wide variety of ways of 
conveying the same meaning within the English language. For example, the fault 
6upstream fire' could also be listed as 6fire upstream', 'conflagration upstream' or 
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cupstrearn conflagration'. The development of a natural language processor would be 
required to prevent duplication of this kind. This is outside the scope of this thesis. 
6.4. Verification Testing 
To test the effectiveness of the major verification techniques described above a series of 
test models has been developed. In order to ensure thorough checking testing was done on 
both unit and module models. The techniques tested are: verifying propagation paths; 
detection of deviations without causes; detection of deviations with no effect and verifying 
the shortest path. To avoid creating complicated models separate model series were 
developed to test each of the verification methods. The models were constructed to test if 
the verification techniques would correctly detect the following types of propagation 
paths: 
propagation of deviations between different process variables; 
propagation when conditional arcs are present; 
propagation under all the influence (sign) types. 
To complete verification testing propagation paths were removed from the models to show 
that Equipment Model Builder could detect missing propagation paths. For example, a 
simplified version of the model built to test the verification of propagation paths is shown: 
frarne(test I isa unit, 
[inports info [in I], 
outports info [outl], 
proplinks info [ 
%propagation 
arc(fint, flow], +Jout I, flow]) 
11 
). 
This model shows that a propagation path is detected between 'inI flow' and 'outl flow'. 
Removing the arc '([inl, flow], +, [outl, flow])' results in 'flow inl' being placed in the 
unlinked boundary deviation list. This shows that Equipment Model Builder has detected 
that there is no propagation path for the variable flow from the port in I through the model. 
Examples of the test models developed are listed in appendix B. 
6.5. Conclusions 
Verification is necessary to detect modelling errors which may give rise to wrong results 
when the models are utilised. A series of verification techniques for signed directed graph 
models has been described. However, some modelling errors may still remain as the 
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expert may be unaware what information is missing or incorrect. As a final verification 
technique the models should be tested in a simple system to show that they are behaving in 
an expected manner and are satisfactory for their intended purpose. 
In this thesis verification methods have been split into three categories: those that 
check for completeness, correctness and conciseness. The verification methods used in 
Equipment Model Builder have been discussed within the context of these categories. 
Main causes of incompleteness were found to result from: 
9 unreferenced attributes; 
missing propagation paths. 
Correctness is checked for by looking for conflicting information, preventing the 
entry of illegitimate attributes into the model and identifying wrong information. Conflict 
may arise within a SDG model as a result of multiple propagation paths between two 
nodes within the model. 
Conciseness is checked for by testing for redundant information and preventing the 
addition of duplicated information to the module. 
The development of models to evaluate the verification methods has been 
described. 
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7. Case Studies 
This chapter presents two case studies in order to assess whether: 
1. the unit models created by using Equipment Model Builder are sufficient to be of use; 
2. the tool's user interface is easy to use; 
3. the verification techniques described in this thesis are effective; 
4. the modular approach developed by this thesis removes ambiguous inference. 
The application QUEEN (Chung, 1993) was chosen to demonstrate the use of the 
models as it is an expert system utilising SDG unit models to which access was available. 
QUEEN's HAZOP emulation system was employed to show the models in use. HAZOP 
emulation was used in preference to fault tree analysis as a complete HAZOP assessment 
allows the entire plant model to be thoroughly tested. Fault tree analysis only considers 
those parts of the plant model affected by certain faults. 
For each test case two sets of input data were prepared. For the first set of data a 
plant description was created using AutoCAD. Models of the plant units were built using 
Equipment Model Builder's user interface and added to the tool's library. The plant 
description was supplied to the tool. A modified plant description file and a file of unit 
models occurring within the plant was created by the tool to form the input for QUEEN. 
The second set of data was prepared in the same way but for this set the modular approach 
was applied. The models and modules were verified after they were created. HAZOP 
emulation was applied to both sets of input. Modified plant descriptions, files of models 
occurring in the plants and examples from the HAZOP results for both sets of input data 
are given in appendix C for the first test case. Appendix D contains this data for the 
second test case. 
This chapter begins by describing the two test cases. Further sections consider 
how Equipment Model Builder performed when creating models for the case studies. 
Equipment Model Builder's user interface, verification techniques and modular approach 
are evaluated. Limitations with the tool are described. Improvements are suggested which 
could be implemented if more time were available. 
7.1 Plant Descriptions 
The test cases described are public domain examples of plant systems. The first case 
consists of the purification section of a plant producing benzene (Wells and Seagrave, 
1976). The second case is an olefin dimerisation plant which has been used in a well- 
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known example of an application of the HAZOP methodology (Lawley, 1974). The plants 
used as test cases were chosen to contain recycle loops and divider/header combinations in 
order to assess the modular approach. 
7.1.1. Benzene Puriflcation System 
Ibis purification system forms part of a plant producing benzene by the catalytic 
dehydroalkylation of toluene (Wells and Seagrave, 1976). The test case was restricted to 
the purification section of this plant in order to provide a relatively small example. 'Me 
plant description used is given in figure 7.1. The distillation column (TlOl) separates the 
toluene and benzene components in its feed. 'Me benzene is produced as the top product 
and the toluene as the bottom product. The top product is condensed by cooling water in 
exchanger E104 and then collected in reflux drum D103. The benzene is pumped by pump 
PlOla from the reflux drum and is divided into a reflux stream and a product stream. Ile 
product stream is cooled by cooling water in exchanger E105 before going to storage. 
Pump P101b is spare. All the valves in the system have open apertures. Figure 7.1 
differs from the Wells and Seagrave plant in that there is no kick-back line from the P101 
pumps and control facilities are omitted. 71be control facilities are omitted as Equipment 
Model Builder is currently unable to create unit models that have control structures. 
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7.1.2. Olefln Dimerisation Plant 
The plant description of this test case is given in figure 7.2 and is based on figure 1 from 
Lawley (1974). Pumps Jla and J2a are working, pumps Jlb and J2b are spare. Valves 5, 
6,9,13 and 14 have closed apertures. All other valves in the plant have open apertures. 
Notable differences between this plant description and Lawley's example are the omission 
of kickback lines from the J2 pumps, the pressure relief valve on the heat exchanger and of 
control facilities for the plant. 
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Figure 7.2 Olefin Dimerisation Plant 
7.2. Evaluation of the User Interface 
To thoroughly evaluate the user-friendliness of the interface a full set of user trials would 
be required. However, no major difficulties were encountered with the interface when 
creating models for the case studies. The interface achieved its objective of being simple to 
use. Although it is a difficult thing for the designer herself to judge, the interface was 
believed to be reasonably intuitive. 
Compared to the original method of creating models by using a text editor it was 
found to be easier to use Equipment Model Builder. It was considerably easier to create 
arcs comprising the models by clicking on a grid element with the mouse or by choosing 
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nodes from a menu than by typing in the whole arc as in the previous method. It was 
possible to create some models by modifying similar models, saving time and work. For 
example, when creating models for the olefin dimerisation plant described in section 
7.1.2., the closedvessel model (instantiated as 'reactorl') was modified by adding further 
arcs and ports to describe a nitrogen blanket. This modified model formed the 
decantingvessel model (instantiated as 'storagetank'). 
A limitation with the interface was discovered. This was the limited vertical extent 
of the 'Fault->Consequence' and 'Deviation->Consequence' forms. (See section 4.3. for a 
description of the forms of the interface). This limitation bqcame apparent when modules 
were created as these are large models. The limitation did not restrict the creation of 
modules for the case studies presented in this chapter. However if large, complex models 
were created the limited vertical extent of the interface forms would cause a problem 
which would also extend to the 'Deviation' and 'Fault->Deviation' forms. The software 
used to implement Equipment Model Builder does not provide the functionality to have 
vertical scroll. However, a method of overcoming this problem needs to be found. 
Two improvements which could be made to the user interface will be considered. 
The first improvement would be to provide the user with a menu detailing which of the 
forms of the 'Deviation' and 'Fault->Deviation' windows contain arcs. Selecting a 
process variable from a choicebox on one of these windows displays a new form showing 
the arcs possessing that process variable. The 'Deviation' window has two choiceboxes 
containing process variable deviations. This gives 49 forms for this window. The 'Fault- 
>Deviation' window has 7 forms. The user does not wish to search all these forms to 
check what arcs have been created. The majority of the forms will not contain any arcs. A 
menu of forms with contents would indicate which forms to view. 
The second improvement would allow a partially built model to be saved. At 
present, to prevent a model with incomplete information being created, the user is 
prevented from saving partial models. However to create a large model takes quite a 
length of time. To enable the user to break from the task the facility to retain the 
information in a partially defined model needs to be provided. To avoid possible sources 
of error partial models would need to be clearly labelled as such and stored separately to 
the members of the model library. 
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7.3. Evaluation of the Verification Techniques 
Verification of the models was found to be useful. A user would find that the verification 
techniques offered by Equipment Model Builder provided sufficient reason in themselves 
to choose to use the tool. The techniques found to be of greatest benefit were those used to 
check for deviations with no effect, deviations without causes (see section 6.1.1. ) and the 
technique for verifying the shortest path (see section 6.2.1.1. ). The presence of deviations 
with no effect or deviations without causes provided a clear indication that the model 
created was faulty. It was found most useful to check for the presence of deviations with 
no effect and deviations without causes when the model was considered to be complete to 
check that it was not faulty. 
Verifying the shortest path presented a different view of the model, thus allowing 
mistakes to be detected. This technique detected the following types of errors: 
simple mistakes; 
unexpected paths; 
missing arcs. 
Simple mistakes caused paths to be present where they were not expected. Examples of 
simple mistakes located in the models created for the case studies are: 
6arc([inl, flow], +, [in2, revFlow])', should be 'arc([out, flowl, +, [in2, revFlow])', 
6arc([in, IeveIj, +, [out, fIow])', should be 'arc([in, fIow1, +, [out, flow1)'. 
These are entry errors caused by the user clicking on the wrong grid element of the 
interface with the mouse or selecting the wrong variable from a choice box. 
Unexpected pathways occur when arcs the user has entered into the model interact 
in a way which the user did not expect. For example when creating a divider model for the 
case studies, assume the user has entered the following arcs; 
6arc([out2, flow], +, [in, flow])' 
6arc([in, flowj, +, [outI, flow])' 
The divider model is instantiated as 'dividerl' and 'divider2' in both the benzene 
purification system and olefin dimerisation plant. The arcs shown are both individually 
correct but lead to the path: 
out2, flow p in, flow 
+0 outl, flow 
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The effect of this path would be for an increase in 'out2, flow' to increase 'outl, flow'. 
This may be not intended to occur within the model. 
Missing arcs may be detected when expected propagation paths in the model are 
not found or when unexpected propagation paths are found. For example, if 
6arc([out2, flow], -, [in, flow])' were missing from the divider model the unexpected 
propagation path shown above might result. 
A limitation with the technique for verifying the shortest path is the amount of 
output that it generates. This limitation and possible ways of overcoming are discussed in 
section 6.2.1.2. 
If time permitted the verification techniques for deviations with no effect and 
deviations without causes could be improved by providing the functionality to show the 
user which arcs they are derived from. This would allow the user to clearly see how these 
unreferenced attributes have arisen and provide a guide as to what steps are needed to 
eliminate them. 
7.4. Evaluation of the Modular Approach 
This section will discuss the modular approach and look at its advantages and limitations. 
Modules created for the case studies are detailed. For each test case, HAZOP emulation 
results output when the modular approach is applied are compared to those of the standard 
approach (appendices C and D contain the HAZOP results). The aim of the modular 
approach to remove ambiguities occurring due to multiple causal paths when unit models 
are combined was found to succeed. Details of ambiguities eliminated or replaced in the 
case studies by the modular approach are given in section 7.4.2. 
The HAZOP analyses of the data sets to which the modular approach was applied 
had faster run-times than those of the standard data sets. The benzene purification system 
had a run-time of 43.10 seconds on a SPARC station LX for HAZOP analysis of the data 
to which the modular approach was applied. The run-time for the standard data set was 
275.25 seconds. The olefin dimerisation plant had a run-time of 186.68 seconds for 
HAZOP analysis of the modular data standard data set and 1522.37 seconds for the 
standard data set. The reason for this was that the data sets to which the modular approach 
was applied contained fewer models than the standard data sets. This was because several 
models had been combined to form modules. This meant that the propagation paths were 
shorter when the modular approach was applied to the plant systems and there were fewer 
paths to explore, resulting in faster analysis times. 
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The results of the HAZOP analyses to which the modular approach was applied 
were of a similar length to the results generated by the standard approach. The report 
length for the benzene purification system was 4778 words for modular approach and 5220 
words for the standard approach. The length of the result report for the olefin dimerisation 
plant was 8390 words when the modular approach was applied and 7674 words for the 
standard approach. The two approaches produced results of similar complexity. 
If appendices C and D are viewed it will be seen that there are further differences 
between the HAZOP analysis results of the modular data sets and the standard data sets of 
the case studies other than the errors described in the following sub-section 7.4.2. The 
differences arise due to the result filtering mechanism employed by QUEEN. This 
mechanism reduces the amount of output. 
7.4.1. Module Creation 
This sub-section will describe the modules created for each of the case studies in turn. It 
will be seen that one of the modules created for the first case study is re-used in the second 
case study where it is used twice. Two limitations found with the creation of modules will 
be discussed. 
When the modular approach is applied to the plant description of the benzene 
purification system Equipment Model Builder first identifies a divider/header combination 
consisting of units: dividerl, valve5, pumplOla, valve6, valve7, pumplOlb, valve8 and 
headerl (see figure 7.1). This is because the tool first searches for divider/header 
combinations before searching for loops. A module for this unit grouping is specified and 
substituted into the plant system. Next, Equipment Model Builder identifies a recycle loop 
consisting of the distillation column T 10 1 and the heatexchanger E 106. A module for this 
is specified and substituted into the plant description. Finally, the tool identifies an outer 
recycle loop consisting of units: cooler E104, reflux drum D103, divider2, valve3 and the 
divider/header combination and recycle loop modules already identified. An outer module 
for this loop is specified. Another module substitution is carried out, replacing the units of 
the outer recycle loop (including the two inner modules). 
When the modular approach is applied to olefin dimerisation plant Equipment 
Model Builder first identifies a divider/header combination consisting of units: dividerl, 
valve3, pumpJla, valve4, valve5, pumpJlb, valve6 and headerl (see figure 7.2). This unit 
grouping is identical to the divider/header combinations found in the benzene purification 
plant. A module already exists within the tools library for this divider/header 
151 
combination. The module is re-labelled with the identifiers of the unit grouping located in 
the olefin dimerisation plant and substituted into the plant description. Next, Equipment 
Model Builder identifies a divider/header combination consisting of units: divider2, 
valve 11, pumpJ2a, valve 12, valve 13, pumpJ2b, valve 14 and header2. This unit grouping 
is the same as the first unit grouping detected. The existing module is re-labelled with the 
identifiers of the second unit grouping and substituted. Finally, Equipment Model Builder 
identifies a loop consisting of units heatexl, heatex2, reactorl and valvel6. A module for 
this loop is specified and substituted into the plant system. 
The first limitation when a module is created is that Equipment Model Builder 
generates a long list of unlinked module faults. These occur when arcs are deleted to 
remove potential ambiguities when unit models are combined to form a module (see 
section 5.2.2.3). The user must spend a large amount of time determining the effects of 
these faults. Fault linked to deviations and faults linked to consequences arcs must be 
created for these unlinked faults or the faults must be deleted if their effects are not 
considered to be important. 
The second limitation is that some arcs that should be deleted upon modularisation 
are retained. Upon modularising fault linked to deviation arcs of the units in which the 
deviation affects a port which is linked to a consequence are retained (see section 5.2.2.1. ). 
Deviation linked to deviation arcs of the units in which the initiating deviation occurs at a 
boundary port of the module and the caused deviation affects a port which is linked to a 
consequence are kept too. The arcs retained need to be restricted to those arcs in which the 
deviation affects a port which is linked to a consequence for that same deviation. 
Consider the following example of the type of error currently arising. Assume a 
module contains the arc 
'([deviation, [moreLevel, unit I _liquid]], 
+, [consequence, 'overfilling'])'. This would allow 
an arc %fault, 'unitl leak to environment'], -, [unit I -liquid, 
level])' to be retained as this is 
a fault linked to deviation arc in which the deviation affects a port which has a 
consequence. However an arc 'ffault, 'external fire'], -, [unit I -liquid, 
temp])' would also be 
wrongly kept within the module. 
7.4.2. Comparison of Results 
For each test case, the results of the HAZOP analysis for the set of input to which the 
modular approach was applied are compared to those for the standard set of input data. 
Errors which occur in the results of the standard set of input data due to ambiguous 
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inference are tabulated. Only the causes of deviations are shown as no erroneous 
consequences due to ambiguous inference were found. How these errors are eliminated or 
correctly replaced when the modular approach is applied is explained. 
No errors due to ambiguous inference were found when analysing the recycle loops 
of the benzene purification plant. Errors were only found to result from the divider/header 
combination. For this reason a second case study was carried out on a larger plant, the 
olefin dimerisation plant. This was in order to demonstrate that the modular approach 
does remove ambiguities caused by recycle loops. Limitations discovered when the 
modular approach was applied to the benzene purification system are detailed. 
7.4. Zl. Benzene Purification System Results 
Error no. Deviation Cause 
I D 103 less flow out I dividerl: branch2 partly blocked 
2 D103 more level liquid dividerl: branch2 partly blocked 
3 PlOlb less flow out valve8: thermal expansion of contents 
4 PlOlb more flow out valve8: leak to environment 
P 10 1 b: spare unit turned on 
5 P 10 1b more pressure out valve8: thermal expansion of contents 
P 10 1 b: spare unit turned on 
6 valve8 no flow out headerl: branch2 completely blocked 
7 valve8 less flow out headerl: branch2 partly blocked 
8 valve8 more flow out valve8: open or passing 
Table 7.1 Errors in the HAZOP Analysis of the Standard Result Set for the Benzene 
Purification Plant. 
Error numbers 3 to 8 shown in table 7.1 occur with the divider/header combination of the 
benzene purification system. This unit grouping consists of plant units: dividerl, valveS, 
pumplOla, valve6, valve7, pumplOlb, valve8 and headerl (see figure 7.1). Errors I to 8 
may not take place as the plant line to which they refer has no flow. When the modular 
approach is applied to the plant system these errors are eliminated. 
Two limitations discovered with the modular approach while undertaking this case 
study will now be discussed. The first limitation concerns the sequence in which 
Equipment Model Builder searches a plant. This sequence depends upon the order in 
which the outports of any splitter units within the plant are written in the plant description 
(see section 5.1.1.1. ). The search sequence affects the order in which loops are detected. 
For simple loop structures this is not important. However for nested loops and loops 
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sharing units, such as the plant fragment located in the benzene purification system, the 
order in which loops are detected is of relevance. 
How this applies to the benzene purification system will be detailed. The 
distillation column TIO1 is a splitter unit. If its outports were written in a different order, 
instead of detecting the loops described above, Equipment Model Builder would first 
identify a loop consisting of TIOI, cooler E104, the divider/header module, divider2 and 
valve3. The user would be asked to specify a module for this which would be substituted 
into the plant description. Equipment Model Builder would then identify an outer loop 
consisting of the loop already identified and heatexchanger E106. The user would be 
asked to specify a module for this and another module substitution would be carried out. 
Assume a plant fragment identical to the one found in the benzene purification 
system was located in another plant. This plant fragment would only be recognised as 
being comprised of existing modules in the tool's model library if the plant description of 
the other plant was written in the same order as that of the benzene purification plant. 
This shows that modules specified for nested loops and loops sharing units are of limited 
re-use. 
The second limitation is that Equipment Model Builder requires a user to specify 
the inner modules of plant fragments composed of complex structures. Complex 
structures are loops nested inside loops, divider/header nested inside loops, loops sharing 
units and combinations of these. Specifying the inner modules is necessary to avoid loss 
of information about the unit grouping which comprises the inner module. When the outer 
module is specified causal paths existing between or within the units of the module are 
removed. Arcs created for the inner module may have to be re-specified when the outer 
module is created. This leads to duplication of work for the user. 
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7.4.2.2. Olefin Dimerisation Plant Results 
Error no. Deviation Cause 
I storagetank less flow outl dividerl: branch2 partly blocked 
2 storagetank more level liquid dividerl: branch2 partly blocked 
3 dividerl no flow out2 dividerl: branch 2 completely blocked 
4 valve5 more flow out pumpJ I b: leak to environment 
5 pumpJ Ib less flow out valve6: thermal expansion of contents 
6 pumpJ Ib more flow out valve6: leak to environment 
pumpJ I b: spare unit turned on 
7 pumpJlb more pressure out valve6: thermal expansion of contents 
pumpJ I b: spare unit turned on 
8 valve6 no flow out header I: branch 2 completely blocked 
9 valve6 less flow out headerl: branch2 partly blocked 
10 valve6 more flow out valve6: open or passing 
II buffertank less flow out I divider2: branch2 partly blocked 
12 buffertank more level liquid divider2: branch2 partly blocked 
13 divider2 no flow out2 divider2: branch2 completely blocked 
14 valve 13 more flow out pumpJ2b: leak to environment 
15 pumpJ2b less flow out valvel4: thermal expansion of contents 
16 pumpJ2b more flow out valve 14: leak to environment 
pumpJ2b: spare unit turned on 
17 pumpJ2b more pressure out valvel4: thermal expansion of contents 
pumpJ2b: spare unit turned on 
18 valve 14 no flow out header2: branch2 completely blocked 
19 valve 14 less flow out header2: branch2 partly blocked 
20 valve 14 more flow out valve 14: open or passing 
21 reactorl less level liquid heatexl: holed heatexchanger 
Table 7.2 Errors in the HAZOP Analysis of the Standard Result Set for the Olefin 
Dimerisation Plant. 
In table 7.2 errors number 3 to 10 form an identical set to errors 13 to 20. This is because 
these two error sets occur within identical divider/header combinations located in the 
olefin dimerisation plant. Error numbers 3 to 10 occur with the divider/header 
combination consisting of plant units: dividerl, valve3, pumpJla, valve4, valve5, 
pumpJlb, valve6 and headerl. Errors 13 to 20 occur within the combination consisting of 
units: divider2, valve 11, pumpJ2a, valve 12, valve 13, pumpJ2b, valve 14 and header2. 
Error numbers I to 20 may not take place as the plant lines to which they refer have no 
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flow. When the modular approach is applied to the plant system these errors are 
eliminated. Although these divider/header combinations are identical to the one located in 
the benzene purification system the sets of errors occurring in these unit groupings differ 
to the error set resulting from the divider/header combination located in the benzene 
purification plant. This is because of the result filtering mechanism employed by QUEEN. 
Error number 21 arises as a result of ambiguous inference occurring within the unit 
grouping comprising a loop. The loop consists of units heatexl, heatex2, reactorl and 
valvel6. This loop is a heating recycle loop not a true recycle loop, hence it might be 
supposed that ambiguous inference would not take place. However, when the fault 
'heatexl: holed heatexchanger' shown in error 21 occurs, this allows the loop to operate as 
a mass recycle loop. This means that ambiguous inference may take place and an error 
results. 'Heatexl: holed heatexchanger' causes the flow out of the heating loop to be 
decreased. This cannot lead to the deviation 'reactorl less level liquid' shown in table 7.2 
as the decrease in flow out increases the overall volume of liquid within the heating loop. 
The HAZOP analysis of the data set to which the modular approach was applied replaces 
this erroneous result and shows the fault 'heatexl: holed heatexchanger' causing the 
deviation 'reactor more level liquid'. 
7.5. Conclusions 
These case studies show that the models created by using Equipment Model Builder are 
sufficient for a purpose. In order to show this the models were used by the expert system 
QUEEN to perform HAZOP emulation. However, the models could be utilised by any 
application which requires SDG models. The case studies also show that the models may 
be re-used, both within the same plant and within different plant systems. The tool's user 
interface was found to be simple and easy to use. Despite some limitations the verification 
techniques were found to be useful. 
The modular approach developed by this thesis removed ambiguities which 
occurred due to multiple causal paths when unit models were combined. Applying the 
modular approach eliminated errors due to this ambiguous inference in the HAZOP 
analysis results of the case studies. Using the modular approach produced faster run-times 
for the HAZOP emulation and did not create larger or more complicated outputs of results. 
Modules specified for nested loops and loops sharing units were found to be of 
limited re-use. The user had to duplicate work when specifying modules for complex 
structures. For these reasons automatically identifying these types of structures may not 
156 
be desirable. To remove ambiguities it is still necessary to apply the modular approach to 
these structures, but it may be better for the user to define modules. The user-defined 
modules would be completely re-usable. There would be no need to specify inner 
modules to avoid loss of information about the unit groupings comprising the inner 
modules as information about the structure's units is supplied by the user. 
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8. Conclusions and Future Work 
The research described in this thesis develops a method for creating and testing equipment 
models for process plants. A computer-aided modelling tool, Equipment Model Builder, 
has been constructed to demonstrate this method. The models created describe how the 
different plant equipment behaves in qualitative terms. The models use the SDG 
representation and may be utilised by applications requiring a library of unit models of this 
type. The models are used to model fault propagation in process plants. The SDG 
representation has been utilised by computer aids for fault tree synthesis, HAZOP 
emulation and diagnosis. 
This chapter will describe the contributions made by this thesis. Limitations of the 
work will be considered and possibilities for future work discussed. 
8.1. Contributions 
A method has been developed to construct unit models simply and correctly. Three main 
contributions have been made by this thesis. These are: 
1. Creating a front end interface enabling an engineer to enter modelling information 
directly; 
2. Developing a novel modular approach which provides a methodology to remove 
ambiguities caused by multiple causal paths when unit models are combined to form a 
system; 
3. Developing verification techniques for the models created. 
8.1.1. The User Interface 
The models were previously built by engineers writing the models in an application 
specific format. An engineer unfamiliar with the application would find this difficult. An 
alternative is to use a knowledge engineer to gather information from the expert and 
convert it into the application format. This is expensive and both methods would take up a 
lot of the expert's time. A front end interface has been designed and built which enables 
an expert to enter information directly without needing to understand details of the model 
format or the application. This interface incorporates ideas from the knowledge 
acquisition field in order to produce a tool that is simple to use. 
Knowledge acquisition tools provide aids to allow the expert to achieve a 
structured input of information without knowledge of the internal format of the expert 
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systems that these types of tools are acquiring infonnation for. Knowledge acquisition 
tools were surveyed in order to determine their desirable features in relation to qualitative 
modelling. The desirable features identified are: 
(i) a differentiation facility; 
(ii) verification testing; 
(iii) an explanation facility; 
(iv) the ability to rank information; 
(v) a user interface. 
Equipment Model Builder possesses: 
a user interface; 
verification testing. 
Differentiation facilities, an explanation facilities and the ability to rank 
information are implemented as part of the user interface. 
The features need to take account of the structure of the unit models created. A 
unit model is composed of structural information (the unit name, parent name and the 
inports, outports, unit ports and attribute slots) and fault propagation information (the 
propLinks and conditionLinks slots). The information in the propLinks and 
conditionLinks slots is defined together. There are four types of propLinks and 
conditionLinks arc: 
(i) deviation linked to deviation; 
(ii) fault linked to deviation; 
(iii) fault linked to consequence; 
(iv) deviation linked to consequence. 
The interface has four sub-windows which allow fault propagation information to be 
defined. There is one sub-window for each category of arc. This enables the user to 
differentiate between the different arc types. 
The user interface provides drop-down menus which give access to libraries. For 
example, there are libraries containing all the faults, consequences and process conditions 
for the models. Each library is displayed using a list browser. This allows the user to 
differentiate between the information contained within the separate libraries. 
The interface forms provide an explanation facility showing what information a 
model contains. Explanation is also given during the modularisation process. The user is 
provided with a description of the unit grouping identified as leading to ambiguities. 
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On starting a model creation session a 'main' window is shown. The main window 
provides a set of boxes which allows model structural information to be entered. By 
accessing the main window first the interface ranks the order in which the model is 
created. 
The user interface provides list browsers. Information may be edited or copied. 
The interface allows well-defined, uniform models to be built. The models created were 
found to be sufficient for their purpose. The models may also be re-used. With minor 
modifications these models may also be used by a range of applications. 
8.1.2. The Modular Approach 
Unit-based qualitative modelling can lead to incorrect or ambiguous inference. The type 
of ambiguities considered by this thesis are those due to multiple causal paths. Problems 
can occur when one path has a contradictory effect compared to another. The result of the 
addition of the effects of these paths cannot be determined unambiguously. The 
methodology developed here identifies some situations were these types of ambiguities 
may arise. The situations identified occur when groups of unit models are found to 
comprise divider/header combinations or recycle loops. A new modular approach has 
been developed to overcome the problem caused by these ambiguities. The advantage of 
this modular approach is that the user is able to see clearly what influences are described 
by the modules. 
This modular approach takes place in three stages: identification, specification and 
substitution. Equipment Model Builder takes a file describing a plant as input. Within 
this process plant the groupings of units together with the connections between them that 
could lead to ambiguities are identified. Each unit grouping found is checked to see 
whether a module for it already exists within the model library. If there is no existing 
module which describes the occurrence identified a new one needs to be specified by the 
user. In the specification stage the units of the plant fragment are amalgamated to form a 
module. Making a plant fragment into a module removes the causal paths that lead to 
ambiguities or incorrect behaviour. Finally, the module is substituted into the plant 
system, replacing the individual units that make up the module. The plant description 
created is modified to describe the module. A model of the module is placed into an 
output file which contains the plant's component unit models. In addition to those 
automatically identified, other groupings of units which lead to ambiguities may occur. 
For these groupings of units the user is provided with the functionality to define modules. 
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8.1.3. Verification Techniques 
All forms of modelling errors occur due to omissions and mistakes. Verification is 
necessary to detect modelling errors which may give rise to wrong results when the 
models are utilised. The method developed presents a series of verification techniques for 
signed directed graph models. Verification is defined in this thesis as ensuring that the 
internal structure of each model is, as far as possible, complete, correct and consistent. 
Verification should also ensure that the model's behaviour is plausible. 
Verification consists of a number of techniques. The choice of techniques used 
will depend on the system being verified. The verification techniques must ensure as far 
as possible that the model is complete, correct and consistent. In order for a model to be 
consistent it must be correct and concise. 
"A complete model is free from missing information. It contains sufficient information 
to be able to function in all possible situations that arise in the application. All the 
information that ought to be in the model is contained in the model structure. 
"A correct model is an accurate representation and contains no wrong information. It 
has no conflicting information or illegitimate attributes. An illegitimate attribute is one 
which does not occur within the set of attribute values allowed for the model. A correct 
model will function correctly. 
"A concise model has no redundant or duplicated information. It has no information 
which is superfluous or unnecessary. A model which is not concise may lead to 
additional processing and may be ambiguous. 
Some of the techniques described are purely verification techniques whereas others 
may be thought of as part of the tool's user interface, duplication checking or explanation 
facilities. A series of models has been developed to test the verification techniques used. 
Incompleteness can occur due to a number of reasons. Main causes of 
incompleteness result from: 
unreferenced attributes; 
missing propagation paths. 
Unreferenced attributes occur within SDG arcs when an initial node X of the arc can 
never be effected or an influenced node of the arc 'Y' can never cause an effect. The 
unreferenced attribute X is a process variable deviation without a cause. Causes may 
occur within the unit model or the unit model may have the potential for causes to 
propagate into it from other units within the plant. 'Y' is a process variable deviation 
with no effect. Deviations may cause effects within the unit model or the unit model may 
161 
allow a deviation to propagate out of it to cause an effect within another plant unit. For a 
given model, Equipment Model Builder maintains lists of deviations with no effect and 
deviations without causes. 
In order for unit models to function correctly within a plant model deviations in 
process variables will need to be able to propagate through them. This means that process 
variable deviations need to be able to propagate from a units inports to its outports and 
from its outports to its inports. Exceptions to this are models for the source and outlet of 
the plant. Some unit models may not propagate all deviations. For example, an open tank 
will not propagate an increase in flow from its outport to its inport. However most units 
will propagate most deviations. 
Equipment Model Builder identifies process variables with no propagation path 
through a unit model and provides the user with a list. This does not mean that the model 
is not complete if there are process variables with no propagation path. For example, in 
the case of the open tank there is no propagation path for flow from the tanks outports to 
its inports. It only means that the model might be not be complete. The list is intended to 
act as a memory aid for a user. 
Correctness is checked for by identifying wrong information, preventing the entry 
of illegitimate attributes into the model and looking for conflicting information within the 
model. Deviations with no effect and deviations without causes may also occur because 
they contain wrong information. The layout of Equipment Model Builders front end 
interface prevents the user from entering illegitimate attributes. 
Conflict may occur within the component model when there is more than one 
possible path through the SDG. Problems occur when one path has a contradictory effect 
compared to another. In order to deal with ambiguities a heuristic that is commonly used 
is that when there is more than one acyclic path through the SDG the shortest path is used. 
A method has been devised which allows the user to check that the shortest path within the 
component model leads to correct model behaviour. To avoid duplication of work the 
technique for verifying the shortest path uses the QUEEN (Chung, 1993) system. A file of 
queries to test the effects of the shortest paths within the model is prepared. This file and 
the component model are given to QUEEN. The user checks the output from QUEEN to 
ensure that the model functions correctly. 
Equipment Model Builder checks for conciseness by testing for redundant 
information and preventing the addition of duplicated information to the model. 
Deviations with no effect and deviations without causes might be present because the 
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information they contain is redundant. Equipment Model Builders user interface prevents 
the addition of duplicate arcs to the model. 
8.2. Limitations 
Equipment Model Builder has been shown to be versatile with the ability to cope With 
many types of units and plant configurations. However, some limitations with the method 
have been identified. Certain limitations exist because insufficient time was available to 
remove them. How future work could remove these limitations is discussed in sub- 
section 8.3.1. Three remaining limitations are described in this section. The way to solve 
these limitations is unclear. These are all limitations of the modular approach. 
The first limitation is that when a module is created Equipment Model Builder 
generates a long list of unlinked module faults. These occur when arcs are deleted to 
remove potential ambiguities when unit models are combined to form a module (see 
section 5.2.2.3). The user must spend a large amount of time determining the effects of 
these faults. Fault linked to deviations and faults linked to consequences arcs must be 
created for these unlinked faults or the faults must be deleted if their effects are not 
considered to be important. An enhancement to shorten the list of unlinked faults was 
suggested in section 5.2.3.2. This consisted of utilising the expert system QUEEN to 
determine the effects of the faults propagating through the units of the plant module. It 
would only be necessary to list a module fault as unlinked and delete the arcs the fault 
propagated through if the effects of that fault were found to result in contradictory multiple 
paths. However the effects of most faults might result in contradictory multiple paths. It is 
not known whether this method would be effective. 
The second limitation concerns the modularisation of recycle loops. This thesis 
only considers modularising recycle loops relatively small compared to the size of the 
plant. Creating a module for a large loop encompassing most of the plant would entail the 
loss of the unit-based approach. There is no way of assessing the 'largeness' of a recycle 
loop. This depends on the relative sizes of the loop and the plant in which it is situated. To 
overcome this problem the user is required to state the maximum size of recycle loop to 
modularise. 
Complex plant structures represent the third limitation. When specifying modules 
for complex structures containing modules within modules the user has to duplicate work. 
Arcs created for the inner module may have to be re-specified when the outer module is 
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created. Modules specified for nested loops and loops sharing units were found to be of 
limited re-use. 
8.3. Recommendations for Future Work 
The first set of recommendations discussed in this sub-section looks at ways of removing 
limitations identified with Equipment Model Builder and some ways in which the tool 
may be enhanced. Time constraints have prevented the removal of the limitations. The 
second set considers how the method defined in this thesis may be further developed. 
8.3.1. Removal of Limitations 
These recommendations fall into four categories: improved interface; a correction to the 
method for creating models; improving the output from the verification techniques and 
improved software compatibility. 
Improvements to the interface are: 
" To implement a hierarchical structure within the tool's fault, consequence and 
condition libraries in order to provide the user with quick access. 
" To provide lists of the faults and consequences within a model and to query the user if 
these lists are complete. This would serve as a further check to ensure model 
completeness (see section 6.1.2.2. ). 
To provide a vertical scroll to enable large models to be built. 
To provide a menu of 'Deviation' and 'Fault->Deviation' forms with contents 
indicating which forms to view. 
To allow the information in a partly defined model to be retained. 
A correction to the method for specifying modules is required to prevent some arcs 
that should be deleted upon modularisation being retained. Upon modularising fault linked 
to deviation arcs of the units in which the deviation affects a port which is linked to a 
consequence are retained (see section 5.2.2.1. ). Deviation linked to deviation arcs of the 
units in which the initiating deviation occurs at a boundary port of the module and the 
caused deviation affects a port which is linked to a consequence are kept too. The arcs 
retained need to be restricted to those arcs in which the deviation affects a port which is 
linked to a consequence for that same deviation. 
Improving the output from the verification techniques would consist of- 
Reducing the amount of output generated by the technique for verifying the shortest 
path (see section 6.2.1.2. ). 
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9 The verification techniques for deviations with no effect and deviations without causes 
could be improved by providing the functionality to show the user which arcs they are 
derived from. 
Improvements to the compatibility are: 
9 The file output from AutoCAD should be checked to ensure that it is in a correct 
fonnat to be read into Equipment Model Builder (see section 6.2.2. ). The length of 
unit names within the file should be restricted to be compatible to the size of the tool's 
interface. 
8.3.2. Future Developments 
Four ways in which the method may be further developed are considered. These are: 
To construct unit models using the functional equation representation; 
To allow control structures to be modelled; 
To ensure that the user interface is as user-friendly as possible. 
To assess where the modular approach could be of most use. 
Currently models are constructed using the SDG representation. As shown in 
section 2.1.2. these two representations are equivalent. The method could be extended to 
allow the user to construct unit models using either representation. This would increase 
the number of applications which could employ the models created by using Equipment 
Model Builder. 
The same high level representation of the fault propagation model input into the 
tool's interface could be used to create two models, one using the SDG representation and 
one using the functional equation representation. This would mean that a single high level 
representation could converted to be input into applications utilising the SDG 
representation and applications utilising the functional equation representation. This 
would increase the number of applications which could use a single high level 
representation after it was converted to the appropriate format. The number of times each 
high level representation could be used during the design and commissioning of a plant 
would be increased. This would save time and work for the expert. 
Allowing control structures to be modelled would enlarge the number of plant units 
which could be modelled using Equipment Model Builder and allow existing models to be 
given more structure. This development would be necessary to allow the tool to pass 
beyond a prototype stage. All functioning plant systems will contain some form of control 
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structure. In order to be of use the method which Equipment Model Builder is based on 
will need to consider control. 
Control loops may lead to the presence of ambiguous inference. When considering 
fault propagation this may lead to further interpretations being found in addition to the true 
fault origin or the exclusion of the true fault origin. The work of Chang and Yu (1990) is 
an initial attempt to resolve this problem. Further work could look at whether it would be 
appropriate to extend the modular approach developed in this thesis to control loops. This 
would consider whether the modular approach could remove ambiguities within control 
loops. 
This thesis has surveyed knowledge acquisition tools in order to determine their 
desirable features in relation to qualitative modelling. Part of this survey considered the 
features that a user interface should possess. Future developments could look at how to 
increase the user-friendliness of Equipment Model Builder's interface. Guidelines are 
emerging which direct the developer when designing and implementing a user interface 
(Hunt, 1990). How these guidelines relate to the tool could be examined. Applying these 
guidelines to qualitative modelling would be novel. Increasing the user-friendliness of the 
tool would increase its acceptance and use among users. 
The modular approach developed in this thesis has been shown to be effective in 
eliminating the ambiguities caused by multiple causal paths. Currently recycle loops and 
divider/header combinations are automatically identified as unit groupings which lead to 
ambiguities. Work is required to determine more types of plant unit grouping which lead 
to ambiguities. This would enable these groupings to be automatically identified and 
increase the usefulness of the modular approach. 
The modular approach requires extra user input in order to create the modules. 
Modules for complex plant structures were found to be of limited re-use. More case 
studies are required to assess where the modular approach could be most effective. This 
would be for plant fragments in which ambiguities are definitely found to occur, as 
opposed to where they might occur, and for commonly occurring plant fragments. This 
would justify the extra work involved by the modular approach. 
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Appendix A 
Verification Example 
A. 1. Tank Model Verified 
/* ----------------------------- --------- - --------- 
vin and vout are input and output for nitrogen 
/* -------------------------------------------------- 
frame(tank isa closedvessel, 
inports info [ in I, vin 1, 
outports info out I, vout 
unitports info liquid, vapour 
propLinks info [ 
%propagation 
arc([in l, temperature], +, [Iiquid, temperature]), 
arc([Iiquid, temperature], +, [out l, temperature]), 
arc([in l, flow], +, [liquid, levelj), 
arc([out l, flow], -, [liquid, level]), 
arc([vin, flow], +, [vapour, pressurel), 
arc([vout, flow], -, [vapour, pressure]), 
arc([vout, flow], +, [in I, flow]), 
arc([vin, flow], -jin I, flow]), 
arc([inl, noFlow], - -jliquid, level]), 
arc([out l, noFlow], ++jIiquid, level]), 
arc([vout, noFlow], ++, [vapour, pressurel), 
arc([in l, noFlow], ++, [out I, noFlow]), 
arc([vin, noFlow], ++jin I, flow]), 
arc([vout, noFlow], - -, [in I, flow]), 
arc([out l, reverseFlow], ++, [Iiquid, level]), 
arc([in l, pressure], +, [vapour, pressure]), 
arc([vin, pressure]l+, [vapour, pressurel), 
arc([vout, pressure] I+, [vapour, pressure]), 
arc([in l, pressure], +, [liquid, level]), 
arc([out l, pressure], +, [I iqu id, level]), 
arc([out I pressure], +, [vapour, pressure]), 
arc(lin I, concentrat ion], +, [ I iqu id, concentration]), 
arc([Iiquid, concentration], +, [out l, concentration]), 
arc([v in, concentrat ion], +, [vapour, concentrat ion]), 
arc([vapour, concentrat ion], +, [vout, concentration]), 
%faults 
arcffault, 'outletl partly blocked'], -, [out I, flow]), 
arcffault, 'outletl completely blocked'], +joutI, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], -, [Iiquid, level]), 
arc([fault, 'extemal fire'], +, [Iiquid, temperaturel), 
arc([fault, 'cold weatheel, -, [Iiquid, temperature]), 
arcffault, 'inlet I siphon breaker blockage'], +j in I, reverse Flow]), 
arc([fault, [1eak into vacuum system', vacuumfl, +j in l, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], -, [outl, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], +jinI, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'outietl partly blocked'], +, [vapour, pressure]), 
A-1 
arc([fault, 'outleti completely blocked'], +, [vapour, pressure]), 
%consequences resulting from faults 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment! ], +, fconsequence, ['contaminate environmenf, toxic]]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['fire/explosion risk', flammable]]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment! ], +jconsequence, ['loss of material', expensivefl), 
arc(ffault, 'external fire'], +, [consequence, 'structuraI weakening! ]), 
arc([fault, ['Ieak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [consequence, 'possible explosive mixture']), 
%consequences resulting from deviations 
arc([deviation, [moreLevel, liquid]], +, [consequence, 'overfilling']), 
arc([deviation, [moreConcentration, liquid]], +, [consequence, 'rubber lining corrosion in hot caustic']), 
arc([deviation, [moreConcentration, liquid]], +, [consequence, 'emutsification of contents']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, liquid]], +, [consequence, 'increased evaporation']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, liquid]], +, [consequence, 'flammable or toxic vapour release']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, liquid]], +, [consequence, 'crystallisation']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, liquid]], +, [consequence, 'viscosity increase']), 
arc([deviation, [IessTemperature, liquid]], +, [consequence, 'viscosity decrease']), 
arc([deviation, [IessLevel, liquid]], +, [consequence, 'vesseI emptying']), 
arc([deviat ion, [m orePressure, vapourl ], +, [consequence, 'possib le rupture']), 
arc([deviation, [noFlow, vin]], +, [consequence, ['Ioss of blanket and explosion risk', flammablefl), 
arc([deviation, [IessFiow, vin]], +, [consequence, 'vacuum collapse]), 
arc([deviation, [moreFlow, vout]], +, [consequence, ['Ioss of material', expensivefl), 
arc([deviation, [moreFlow, inl]], +, [consequence, 'incomplete separation of water']) 
A. 2. Verification Queries to Test for the Existence of Shortest Paths 
Between Boundary Ports For Tank Model 
Examples from a set of queries prepared for the QUEEN expert system (Chung, 1993) are 
shown below. 
Key: P= Path, E= Effect 
% Testing all possibilities for shortest paths from boundary ports to boundary ports 
spe([tank I, in l, pressure], [tank I, in l, temperature], P, E). 
spe([tank 1, in l, pressure], [tank I, in I, concentrat ion], P, E). 
spe([tank 1, in l, pressure], [tank 1, in l, level], P, E). 
spe([tank I, in l, pressure], [tank 1, in l, flow], P, E). 
spe([tanki, inl, pressure], [tankl, ini, noFlow], P, E). 
spe([tank 1, in l, pressure], [tank 1, in l, reverseFlow], P, E). 
spe([tank 1, in l, pressure], [tank l, vin, pressure], P, E). 
spe([tank 1, in l, pressure], [tank l, vin, temperature], P, E). 
spe([tank 1, in l, pressure], [tank I, v in, con centration], P, E). 
spe([tankl, inl, pressure], [tank l, vin, level], P, E). 
spefftank l, in l, pressure], [tank l, vin, flow], P, E). 
spe([tank I, in l, pressure], [tank 1, vin, noFlow], P, E). 
spe([tank 1, in I, pressu re], [tank I, v in, reverseF low], P, E). 
spe([tank 1, in l, pressure], [tank I, out I, pressurej, P, E). 
spc([tank I, in l, pressure], [tank I, out l, temperature], P, E). 
spe([tank I, in I, pressure], [tank I, out l, concentration], P, E). 
spe([tank I, in l, pressure], [tank I, out l, level], P, E). 
spe([tank 1, in I, pressure], [tank I, out l, flow], P, E). 
spe([tank I, in l, pressurel, [tank I, out l, noFlow], P, E). 
spe([tank 1, in l, pressure], [tank I, out l, reverseFlow], P, E). 
spe([tank I, in l, pressure], [tank l, vout, pressure], P, E). 
spe([tankl, inl, pressure], [tank l, vout, temperature], P, E). 
A-2 
spe([tank 1, in l, pressure], [tank l, vout, concentration], P, E). 
spe([tank 1, in l, pressure], [tank I vout, level], P, E). 
spe([tankl, inl, pressure], [tankl, vout, flow], P, E). 
spe([tankl, inl, pressure], [tankl, vout, noFlow], P, E). 
spe([tankl, inl, pressure], [tank l, vout, reverseFlow], P, E). 
spe([tank 1, in l, temperature], [tank 1, in l, pressure], P, E). 
spe([tank 1, in l, temperaturel, [tank 1, in l, concentration], P, E). 
spe([tank 1, in l, temperature], [tank 1, in l, level], P, E) ... etc. 
spe([tankl, inl, concentration], [tank l, inl, pressure], P, E) ... etc. 
spe([tank 1, in l, levell, [tank 1, in l, pressure], P, E) ... etc. 
spe([tankl, inl, flow], [tankl, inl, pressure], P, E) ... etc. 
spe([tank 1, in l, noFlow], [tank 1, in l, pressure], P, E) ... etc. 
spe([tank 1, in l, reverseFlow], [tank 1, in l, pressure], P, E) ... etc. 
spe([tankl, v in, pressure], [tank l, inl, pressure], P, E) ... etc. 
spe([tank I, out l, pressure], [tank 1, in l, pressure], P, E) ... etc. 
spe([tank l, vout, pressure], [tank 1, in l, pressure], P, E) ... etc. 
seen. 
A. 3. Queen Output for Verification Testing for the Existence of Shortest 
Paths Between Boundary Ports 
Examples of output from the QUEEN expert system are given below. 
There is no path between [tank I, in I, pressure] and [tank 1, in 1, temperature] ... etc. 
The shortest path between [tank I, in l, temperature] and [tank I, out l, temperature] is: 
[[tank I, in l, temperaturel, [tank 1,1 iqd, tem perature], [tank I, out l, temperature] 
The effect of propagating an initial increase is: I 
The effect of propagating an initial decrease is: -I 
There is no path between [tank I, in l, temperature] and [tank I, out 1, concentration] ... etc. 
The shortest path between [tank I, in I, concentration] and [tank I, out 1, concentration] is: 
fftank l, in l, concentration], [tank 1,1 iqd, concentration], [tank I, out l, concentration]] 
The effect of propagating an initial increase is: I 
The effect of propagating an initial decrease is: -I 
There is no path between [tank 1, in 1, concentration] and [tank I, out 1,1evel] ... etc. 
The shortest path between [tank I, in I, noFlow] and [tank I, out I, noFlow] is: 
fftank 1, in I, noFlow], [tank I, out l, noFlow] ] 
The effect of propagating an initial increase is: I 
The effect of propagating an initial decrease is: 0 
There is no path between [tank I, in I, noFlow] and [tank I, out l, reverseFlowl ... etc. 
The shortest path between [tank I, vin, concentrationj and [tank I, vout, concentrat ion) is: 
fftank I, vin, concentration], [tank l, vapr, concentration], [tank l, vout, concentration]] 
The effect of propagating an initial increase is: I 
The effect of propagating an initial decrease is: -1 
There is no path between [tank I, vin, concentrationj and [tank l, vout, level] ... etc. 
The shortest path between [tank l, vin, flow] and [tank 1, in I, flow] is: 
[[tank l, vin, flow], [tank 1, in l, flow]] 
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The effect of propagating an initial increase is: -I 
The effect of propagating an initial decrease is: I 
There is no path between [tank l, vin, flow] and [tank l, inl, noFlowj ... etc. 
The shortest path between [tank l, vin, noFlow] and [tank I, in l, flowl is: 
[[tank l, vin, noFlow], [tank l, in l, flow]] 
The effect of propagating an initial increase is: I 
The effect of propagating an initial decrease is: 0 
There is no path between [tank l, vin, noFlow] and [tank l, inl, noFlow] ... etc. 
The shortest path between [tank l, vout, flow] and [tank l, in I, flow] is: 
[[tank l, vout, flow], [tanki, in l, flow]] 
The effect of propagating an initial increase is: I 
The effect of propagating an initial decrease is: -I 
There is no path between [tank l, vout, flow] and [tank l, inl, noFlow] ... etc. 
The shortest path between [tank l, vout, noFlow] and [tank l, inl, flow] is: 
[[tank l, vout, noFlow], [tank l, in l, flow]] 
The effect of propagating an initial increase is: -I 
The effect of propagating an initial decrease is: 0 
There is no path between [tank l, vout, noFlowl and [tank I, in I, noFlow] ... etc. 
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Appendix B 
Verification Testing Examples 
These models were constructed to test if the propagation paths they contain would be 
correctly detected by Equipment Model Builder's verification techniques. These models 
are correct base models. They test that no spurious errors are detected by the verification 
techniques. To complete verification testing arcs are removed from these models to 
introduce errors into the models. Removing arcs leads to missing propagation paths. 
Errors are introduced in order to test that they are detected by the verification techniques. 
For example, removing the arc '([inl, flow], +, [liquid, level])' from model B. 2.1. would 
result in 'level liquid' being placed in the list of deviations without causes as no deviation 
will now be able to propagate to the unit port liquid. 
B. 1. Test Models for Verifying Propagation Paths 
B. 1.1. Model Testing Propagation of Deviations Between Different Process Variables 
frame(test I isa unit, 
[inports info [in1j, 
outports info [out I], 
unitports info [liquid], 
proplinks info 
%propagation 
arc([inl, flow], [liquid, level]), 
arc([liquid, level], +, [outl, flow]) 
B. 1.2. Models Testing Propagation when Conditional Arcs are Present 
frame(testl isa unit, 
[inports info [in I ], 
outports info [outl], 
unitports info [vapour], 
proplinks info [ ], 
conditionLinks info 
[status is spare, 
[propLinks include 
%propagation 
arc([out I pressure], 1, [vapour, pressure]), 
arc([vapour, pressure], Ijin l, pressure]) 
frame(testl isa unit, 
[inports info [infl, 
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outports info [out I ], 
unitports info [liquid], 
proplinks info [ 
% propagation 
arc ([out l, temperature], 1, [Iiquid, temperature]) 
conditionLinks info 
[status is spare, 
[propLinks include 
%propagation 
arc([Iiquid, temperature], I, [inl, temperature]) 
B. I. 3. Model Testing Propagation Under All the Influence (sign) types 
frame(test I isa unit, 
[inports info [in I], 
outports info [out I], 
unitports info [liquid], 
proplinks info [ 
%propagation 
arc([outl, flow), +, [liquid, level]), 
arc([Iiquid, level], - -, [inl, flow]) 
Arcs containing examples of all the sign types (i. e. were added to the 
model to test that Equipment Model Builder will detect a propagation path for all sign 
types. 
B. 2. Test Models for the Detection of Deviations without Causes 
As described in section 6.1.1. deviations without causes may be present in deviation linked 
to consequence arcs and deviation linked to deviation arcs. Two series of test models were 
developed, one for each of the arc types. To avoid repetition only the models developed to 
test propagation of deviations between different process variables are given. Models to 
test propagation when conditional arcs are present and propagation under all the influence 
(sign) types were also created. 
B. 2.1. Models Testing Detection in Deviation Linked to Consequence Arcs 
When a deviation linked to consequence arc is present in an arc series propagation paths 
may exist from boundary ports to consequences as shown in the model below. 
frame(test I isa unit, 
[inports info [infl, 
outports info [out I], 
unitports info [liquid], 
proplinks info [ 
%propagation 
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arc([int, flowl, +, [liquid, level]), 
%consequences resulting from deviations 
arc([deviation, [moreLevel, liquid]], +, [consequence, overflowing]) 
). 
Propagation paths may also exist from faults to consequences as the model below 
demonstrates. 
frame(test I isa unit, 
[inports info [in I], 
outports info [outl], 
unitports info [liquid, vapour], 
proplinks info 
%propagation 
arc([vapour, temperature], -, [liquid, level]), 
%faults 
arc([fault, extemat fire], +, [vapour, temperature]), 
%consequences resulting from deviations 
arc([deviation, [IcssLevcl, liquid]], +, [consequence, vessel emptying]) C, ]1 
). 
B. 2.2. Models Testing Detection in Deviation Linked to Deviation Arcs 
Deviations propagating to deviation linked to deviation arcs located in propagation paths 
may initiate at a boundary port within a deviation linked to deviation arc. 
frame(test I isa unit, 
[inports info [in I], 
outports info [outll, 
unitports info [liquid, vapour], 
proplinks info [ 
%propagation 
arc([inl, flow], +, [liquid, level]), 
arc([Iiquid, level], +, [vapour, pressure]) 
]1 
). 
The deviations may also initiate with a fault within a fault linked to deviation arc. 
frame(test I isa unit, 
[inports info [in I], 
outports info [out I], 
unitports info [liquid, vapour], 
proplinks info [ 
%propagation 
arc([vapour, temperature], +, [liquid, levell), 
%faults 
arc([fault, cold weather], +, [vapour temperature]) 
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B. 3. Test Models for the Detection of Deviations with no Effect 
Deviations with no effect may be present in fault linked to deviation arcs and deviation 
linked to deviation arcs as discussed in section 6.1.1. Again two test model series were 
developed, one for each of the arc types. Only the models developed to test propagation of 
deviations between different process variables are given. Models to test propagation when 
conditional arcs are present and propagation under all the influence (sign) types were also 
created. 
B. 3.1. Models Testing Detection in Fault Linked to Deviations Arcs 
Deviations initiating in fault to deviation arcs located within propagation paths may 
propagate into deviation linked to deviation arcs. 
frame(testl isa unit, 
[inports info [in I], 
outports info [out I 
unitports info [liquid, vapourl, 
proplinks info [ 
%propagation 
arc([Iiquid, temperature], -, [vapour, concentration]), 
arc([vapour, concentrat ion], +, [out l, concentration]), 
%faults 
arc([fault, extemal fire], +, [liquid, temperature]) 
Deviations initiating in fault to deviation arcs may also propagate into deviation linked to 
consequence arcs in propagation paths. 
frame(test I isa unit, 
[inports info [in I], 
outports info [out I], 
unitports info [liquid, vapour], 
proplinks info [ 
%propagation 
arc([vapour, temperature], +, [liquid, level]), 
%faults 
arc([fault, extemal fire], +, [vapour, temperature]), 
%consequences resulting from deviations 
arc([deviation, [moreLevel, liquid]], +, [consequence, overflowing]) 
B. 3.2. Models Testing Detection in Deviation Linked to Deviation Arcs 
Deviations may propagate from deviation linked to deviation arcs to other deviation linked 
to deviation arcs located in propagation paths. 
frame(testl isa unit, 
[inports info [infl, 
outports info [out I], 
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unitports info [liquid, vapour], 
proplinks info [ 
%propagation 
arc([inl, concentration], +, [vapour, concentration]), 
arc([vapour, concentrat ion], +, [liquid, temperature]), 
arc([Iiquid, temperature], +, [outl, temperature]) 
Deviations may also propagate from deviation linked to deviation to deviation linked to 
consequence arcs located on propagation paths. 
frame(test I isa unit, 
[inports info [infl, 
outports info [outl], 
unitports info [liquid, vapour], 
proplinks info [ 
%propagation 
arc([inl, flow], +, [liquid, flow]), 
arc([Iiquid, flow], +, [vapour, pressure]), 
%consequences resulting from deviations 
arc([deviation, [morePressure, vapour]], +, [consequence, risk of explosion]) 
]1 
). 
BA Test Models for Verifying the Shortest Path 
A series of four test models was developed to test the verification of different types of 
shortest path. See section 6.2.1.1. for an explanation of path types. These models were 
created to test: 
shortest paths occurring between boundary ports; 
shortest paths occurring in arc series between faults and consequences; 
shortest paths occurring in arc series between faults and boundary ports; 
shortest paths occurring in arc series between boundary ports and consequences. 
The following types of propagation path were tested: 
propagation of deviations between different process variables; 
propagation under all the influence (sign) types. 
To avoid repetition only the models developed to test propagation of deviations between 
different process variables are given. 
B. 4.1. Test Model for Paths Between Boundary Ports 
frame(testl isa unit, 
[inports info [in I J, 
outports info [out I], 
unitports info [liquid, vapour], 
proplinks info [ 
%propagation 
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arc([inl, temperature], +, [vapour, temperature]), 
arc([vapour, temperature], -, [Iiquid, concentration]), 
arc([ I iqu id, concentration], +, [out l, concentration]) 
1] 
). 
B. 4.2. Test Model for Paths Between Faults and Consequences 
frame(test I isa unit, 
[inports info [inll, 
outports info [outl], 
unitports [liquid, vapourl, 
proplinks info [ 
%propagation 
arc([Iiquid, temperature], +, [vapour, pressure]), 
%faults 
arc([fault, reactor coking], +[liquid, temperature]), 
% consequences resulting from deviations 
arc([deviation, [morePressure, vapour]], +, [consequence, possible rupture]) 
I] 
). 
B. 4.3. Test Model for Paths Between Faults and Boundary Ports 
frame(testl isa unit, 
[inports info [in l, in2], 
outports info [outl], 
unitports [liquid], 
proplinks info 
%propagation 
arc([vapour, temp], -, [Iiquid, conccntration]), 
arc([ I iqu id, concentration], +Jout l, concentration]), 
%faults 
arc([fault, extemal fire], +, [vapour, tcmp]) 
B. 4.4. Test Model for Paths between Boundary Ports and Consequences 
frame(testl isa unit, 
[inports info [int], 
outports info [outl], 
unitports (liquid], 
proplinks info 
%propagation 
arc([inl, flowl, +, [liquid, level]), 
% consequences resulting from deviations 
arc([deviation, [moreLevel, liquid]], +, [consequence, overfilling]) 
B. 5. Test Module Models 
The same techniques that are used to verify unit models are also applicable to module 
models. In order to ensure thorough checking some test modules were constructed. This 
sub-section describes the structure of the test modules built. The same types of 
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propagation paths used to test the verification techniques for unit models were also tested 
within module models. These propagation paths are: 
propagation of deviations between different process variables; 
propagation when conditional arcs are present; 
propagation under all the influence (sign) types. 
A unit may have one of three position-types within a module. The unit may be the 
initial, the intermediate or the terminal unit of the module. This holds true for all the 
module types (i. e. loop modules, divider-header combinations and user-defined modules). 
Therefore it is only necessary to test the verification techniques for one module type as the 
results will also apply to the other module types. The module type chosen to be tested was 
the user-defined module as this allowed very simple modules to built. 
The test modules built contained two types of units which shall be called complex 
units and simple units. Complex units possess all four arc types (see section 2.4.1. ). For 
simplicity only one complex unit was placed within a module. The simple unit contains 
only deviation linked to deviation arcs. Deviation linked to deviation arcs are needed so 
that arcs modelling boundary port deviations propagating to boundary port deviations can 
be placed into the unit. This is necessary to prevent unlinked boundary port deviations. 
Before being placed into a module both unit types were verified. 
Three modules were built to test the verification techniques, one for each of the 
positions a unit may occupy in a module. The modules were formed by amalgamating 
instances of the simple and complex units in the order shown below. 
Test Module 1. simple un i complex w ii simple ung 
Test Module 2.1 
Icomplex u; IF, . 
1simple uni II 
Test Module 3.1 
simple unit" compl. ex unfl 
Figure B. I Test Module Structures 
All the boundary ports of the initial and final units were chosen to be the new boundary 
ports of the modules. 
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Appendix C 
Benzene Purification System 
This appendix contains input data for the application QUEEN (Chung, 1993) prepared for 
a benzene purification system. Two sets of input data have been prepared: a standard set 
and a set to which the modular approach has been applied. Each set of input data consists 
of a modified plant description and a file of models occurring within the plant. Example 
HAZOP results created by QUEEN are given for both sets of data. 
C. 1. Modified Plant Description (Standard Approach) 
See section 7.1. for a plant diagram. 
instance(feedinlet isa source, [cdot is [tail2, in], htot is [tl0l, htr]] 
[outports info 
[out is [e103, htin]] 
instance(tail2 isa outlet, 
[outports info 
instance(e 103 isa heatex, 
[outports info 
[cdot is [taill, in], htot is [valvel, in]] 
instance(heatsource2 isa source, 
[outports info 
instance(tail I isa outlet, [out is [e106, cdin]] 
[outports info 
instance(valve2 isa valve, 
[outports info 
instance(heatsourcel isa source, [out is [tail3jnfl, 
[outports info aperture is open 
[out is [e103, cdin]] 
instance(tail3 isa outlet, 
instance(tlOl isa column, [outports info 
[outports info 
[hto is [e106, htin], topo is [e104, stin], boto is 
[valve2jn]] 
instance(e 104 isa cooler, 
[outports info 
instance(valve I isa valve, [wot is [tail4jn], stot is [d I 03, in I 
[outports info 
[out is [t I Ol, feed]], 
aperture is open 
instance(tail4 isa outlet, 
[outports info 
instance(e 106 isa heatex, 
[outports info 
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instance(watersource I isa source, 
[outports info 
[out is [e I 04, winl] 
I 
instance(d 103 isa closedvessel, 
[outports info 
[outl is [dividerl, in]] 
instance(p 10 1a isa pump, 
[outports info 
[out is [valve6jn]] 
instance(divider2 isa divider, 
[outports info 
[outl is [valve3, in], out2 is [valve4, in]], 
purpose is tosplit 
instance(valve3 isa valve, 
[outports info 
[out is [tl0l, topr]], 
aperture is open 
instance(valve4 isa valve, 
[outports info 
[out is [005, stinfl, 
aperture is open 
instance(e 105 isa cooler, 
[outports info 
[wot is [tail5jn], stot is [tail6, in]] 
instance(tail5 isa outlet, 
[outports info 
instancc(tail6 isa outlet, 
[outports info 
). 
instance(watersource2 isa source, 
[outports; info 
[out is [e 1 05, win]] 
instance(p 10 1b isa pump, 
[outports info 
[out is [valve8, in]], 
status is spare 
instance(valve5 isa valve, 
[outports info 
[out is [p 10 1 a, in]], 
aperture is open 
instance(valve7 isa valve, 
[outports info 
[out is [plOlb, infl, 
aperture is closed 
instance(valve6 isa valve, 
[outports info 
[out is [headerl, inl]], 
aperture is open 
instance(valveg isa valve, 
[outports info 
[out is [headerl, in2]], 
aperture is closed 
instance(header I isa header, 
[outports info 
[out is [divider2, infl, 
purpose is frombypass 
instance(dividerl isa divider, 
[outports info 
[outl is [valve5, inl, out2 is [valve7, in]], 
purpose is tobypass 
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C. 2. Plant Models (Standard Approach) 
/* ---------------------- - -------------------------- 
Dummy source of plant 
/* -------------------------------------------------- 
frame(source isa unit, 
outports info [out], 
propLinks info [ 
%faults 
arc([fault, 'inlet completely blocked'], +, [out, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'inlet partly blocked'], -, [out, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'inlet completely blocked'], -, [out, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'cold weather'], -, [out, tem perature]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environmenf], -, [out, flow]), 
%consequences resulting from faults 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment' ], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environment', toxic]]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['fire/explosion risk', flammablefl), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['Ioss of material', expensivefl) 
/* -------------------------------------------------- 
Basic heatexchanger model. 
This model is a heater. Cdin is actually a steam source. 
heated stream: htin = in port, Mot = out port 
heating stream: cdin = in port, cdot = out port 
/* -------------------------------------------------- */ 
frame(heatex isa unit, 
inports info [ htin, cdin 
outports info [ htot, cdot 
propLinks info [ 
%propagation 
arc([htot, flow], +, [htin, flow]), 
arc([htin, flow], +, [htot, flow]), 
arc([cdot, flow], +jcdin, flowj), 
arc([cdin, flow], +jcdot, flow]), 
arc([cd in, flow], +, [htot, temperaturel), 
arc([cdin, flow], +, [cdot, temperature]), 
arc([htin, flowl, -, [htot, temperature]), 
arc([htin, flow], -, [cdot, temperaturel), 
arc([htin, temperature], +, [htot, temperature]), 
arc([cdin, temperature], +, [cdot, temperature]), 
arc([cdin, temperature], +, [htot, temperature]), 
arc([htin, temperature], +, [cdot, tcmperature]), 
arc([htin, pressure], +, [htot, pressure]), 
arc([cd in, pressure], +, [cdot, pressure]), 
arc([htot, pressure], +, [htin, pressure]), 
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arc([cdot, pressure], +, [cdin, pressure]), 
arc([htot, reverseF low], ++, [ht in, reverseFlow]), 
arc([cdot, reverseFlow], ++, [cdin, reverseFlowl), 
arc([htot, noFlow], ++, [htin, noFiow]), 
arc([htin, noFlow], ++, [htot, noFlow]), 
arc([cdot, noFlowl, ++, [cdin, noFlow]), 
arc([cdin, noFlow], ++, [cdot, noFlow]), 
arc([cdin, noFlow], - -, [htot, temperature]), 
arc([htin, noFlowl, ++, [cdot, temperature]), 
arc([htin, concentration], +, [htot, concentration]), 
arc([cdin, concentration], +, [cdot, concentration]), 
%faults 
arc([fault, 'partly blocked (heating side)'], -, [cdot, flowj), 
arcffault, 'partly blocked (heated side)'], -jhtot, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'fouling'], -, [htot, temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'fouling'], +, [cdot, temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'blockage (heating side)'], +jcdot, noFlow1), 
arc([fault, 'blockage (heated side)'], +, [htot, noFlow]), 
arcffau It, 'b lockage (heating side)'], +jcdin, pressure1), 
arc([ fau lt, 'b lockage (heating side)], -, [cdot, pressure]), 
arc([ fau It, 'b lockage (heated side)'], +, [htin, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'blockage (heated side)'], -, [htot, pressure]), 
arc([fau It, 'b lockage (heating side)'], -, [htot, temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'blockage (heated side)'], +jcdot, temperature]), 
arcffault, 'holed heatexchanger'], -, [cdot, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'holed heatexchanger], +jcdin, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'holed heatexchangee], -, [cdot, temperaturel), 
arc([fault, 'holed heatexchanger'], +, [htot, temperature]), 
%consequences resulting from faults 
arc([fault, 'holed hcatexchanger], +, [consequence, contamination of product']), 
%consequences resulting from deviations 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, htot]], +, [consequence, 'boiling in heatexchanger]), 
arc([deviation, [IessTemperature, cdotll, +, [consequence, 'freezing in heatexchanger'l), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, htot]], +, [consequence, 'polymerisation']), 
arc([deviat ion, [more Pressure, cd in]], +, [consequ ence, 'poss ible rupture']), 
arc([deviation, [morePressure, htin]], +, [consequence, 'possible rupture']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, htot]], +, [consequence, 'mechanicaI failure due to overtemperature']) 
/* -------------------------------------------------- 
/* -------------------------------------------------- 
frame(outlet isa unit, 
inports info [in 
propLinks info 
%faults 
arc([fault, 'partly blocked'], -, [in, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'blocked'], +, [in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'blocked'], +, [in, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], +jin, flow]), 
arc([fault, ['Ieak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [in, prcssure]), 
%consequences resulting from faults 
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arc([fault, ['Ieak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [consequence, Possible explosive mixture']), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environmenf, toxic]]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['f ire/explosion risk', flarnmablefl), 
arc(ffaultjeak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['Ioss of material', expensivefl) 
/* -------------------------------------------------- 
Distillation column 
A column which connects to a heating loop 
feed = feed in port, 
heated stream: htr = heated return in port, hto = heated out port 
topr = top return in port, tpot = top out port 
btot = bottom out port, 
/* -------------------------------------------------- 
frame(column isa unit, 
inports info [ feed, topr, htr 
outports info [ topo, hto, boto 
unitports info [self], 
propLinks info [ 
%propagation 
arc([feed, fIow], +jseIf, Ievel]), 
arc([topr, flow], +, [self, level]), 
arc([htr, fIow], +jseIf, IeveI]), 
arc([topo, fIow], -, [seIf, Ievelj), 
arc([hto, flow], -, [seIf, IeveI]), 
arc([boto, flow], -jseIf, IeveI]), 
arc([feed, temperature], +, [self, temperature]), 
arc([topr, temperature], +, [self, temperature]), 
arc([htr, temperature], +, [self, temperature]), 
arc([self, temperature], +, [boto, temperaturel), 
arc([ sel ftemperaturel, +, [hto, tem perature]), 
arc([feed, noFlow], - -, [selflevel]), 
arc([topr, noFlow], - -, fselflevell), 
arc([htr, noFlow], - -, [selflevel]), 
arc([topo, noFlow], ++, [self, level]), 
arc([hto, noFlow], ++, [self, level]), 
arc([boto, noFlow], ++, [self, level]), 
arc([feed, concentration], +, [self, concentration]), 
arc([self, concentration], +, [topo, concentration]), 
arc([self, concentrationl, +, [boto, concentration]), 
arc([topr, concentration ], +, [se I fconcentrat ion]), 
arc([se I fconcentrat ion], +, [hto, concentration]), 
arc([htr, concentrat ion], +, [self, concentration]), 
arc([boto, reverseF low], ++, [se If, level]), 
arc([topo, reverseF low], ++, [se If, level]), 
arc([hto, reverseFlow], ++, [self, level]), 
%faults 
arc([fault, 'packing support collapses'], +, [boto, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'cxtemal fire'], +, [sel ftem perature]), 
%consequences resulting from deviations 
arc([deviation, [moreLevel, selfll, +, [consequence, 'column floods']) 
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/* -------------------------------------------------- 
The most general unit for a valve. 
/* -------------------------------------------------- 
frame(valve isa unit, 
inports info [in], 
outports info [out], 
aperture is unknown, 
propLinks info [ 
%faults 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], +, [in, flow]), 
arc([fault, ['Ieak into vacuum system, vacuum]], +, [in, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'thermal expansion of contents'], +, [in, pressure]), 
%consequences resulting from faults 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environmenV, toxic]]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], +, [consequence, [Ioss of material', expensivefl), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['fire/explos ion risk, flammablefl), 
arc([fault, 'thermal expansion of contents'], +, [consequence, 'flange leale]) 
conditionLinks info 
[aperture is open, 
[propLinks include 
%propagation 
arc([out, flowj, +, [in, flow]), 
arc([in, flow], +jout, flow]), 
arc([ in, temperature], +, [out, temperature]), 
arc([ in, pressure] +, [out, pressu re]), 
arc(fout, pressure], +, [in, pressure]), 
arc([out, reverseFlow], ++, [in, reverseFlow]), 
arc([in, noFlow], ++, [out, noFlow]), 
arc([out, noFlow], ++, [in, noFlowl), 
arc([in, concentration], +, [out, concentration]), 
%faults 
arc([fault, 'partly blocked'], -Jout, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'completely blocked'], +jout, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, ['blocked by frozen fluid', freezingfl, +, [out, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'leak to environment'], -, [out, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'closed in error], +, [ in, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'closed in error'], -, [out, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'thermal expansion of contents'], +, [out, pressurel) 
111, 
[aperture is floating, 
[propLinks include 
%propagation 
arc([out, flow], +jin, flow]), 
arc([in, flow], +jout, flow]), 
arc([ in, temperature] +, [out, tem perature]), 
arc([ in, pressure] +, [out, pressure]), 
arc([out, pressurel, +, [ in, pressure]), 
arc([out, reverseF low], ++, [ in, reverseF low]), 
arc([ in, noFlow], ++, [out, noFlow]), 
arc([out, noFlow], ++, [in, noFlow]), 
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arc([ in, concentration], +, [out, concentration]), 
%faults 
arc([fault, 'partly blocked'], -, [out, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'completely blocked'], +, fout, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, ['blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, [out, noFlow]), 
arc(ffault, 'leak to environment! ], -, [out, flow]), 
arcffault, 'fails at closed'], +, [out, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'fails at low aperture '], -Jout, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'fails at high aperture'], +, [out, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'passes when no flow is desired'], +, [out, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'closed in erroe], +, [in, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'closed in error], -, [out, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'thermal expansion of contents'], +, [out, pressure]) 
Ifl, 
[aperture is closed, 
[propLinks include 
%faults 
arc([fault, 'open or passing'], +, [out, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'leak to environmenfl, +, [out, reverseFlow]) 
1111 
/* -------------------------------------------------- 
A heatexchanger used for cooling, win is cooling water source. 
stin is stream source. Stream is being cooled. 
cooled stream: stin =stream in port, stot =stream out port 
cooling stream: win = water in port, wot = water out port 
/* ---- - -------------------------------------------- 
frame(cooler isa unit, 
inports info [ win, stin 
outports info [ wot, stot 
propLinks info [ 
%propagation 
arc([stot, flow], +, [stin, flow]), 
arc([stin, flow], +jstot, flow]), 
arc([wot, flow], +jwin, flow]), 
arc([win, flow], +, [wot, flow]), 
arc([win, flow], -, [stot, temperature]), 
arc([win, flow], -, [wot, temperature]), 
arc([stin, flow], +, [stot, temperature]), 
arc([stin, flow], +, [wot, temperature]), 
arc ([stin, temperature], +, [stot, temperaturel), 
arc([win, temperaturel, +, [wot, temperature]), 
arc([win, temperature], +, [stot, temperature]), 
arc([stin, temperature], +, [wot, temperature]), 
arc([stin, pressure], +, [stot, pressure]), 
arc([win, pressurel, +, [wot, pressure]), 
arc([stot, pressure], +, [stin, pressure]), 
arc([wot, pressure], +, [w in, pressure]), 
arc([wot, reverseFlow], ++, [win, reverseFlow]), 
arc([stot, reverse Flow], ++, [stin, reverseF low]), 
arc([stot, noFlowl, ++, [stin, noFlow]), 
arc([stin, noFlow], ++, [stot, noFlow]), 
arc([wot, noFlow], ++, [win, noFlow]), 
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arc([win, noFlow], ++, [wot, noFlow]), 
arc([win, noFlow], ++, [stot, temperature]), 
arc([stin, noFlowl, - -, [wot, temperature]), 
arc([w in, concentrat ion], +, [wot, concentrat ion]), 
arc([st in, concentration], +, [stot, concentrat ion]), 
%faults 
arc([fault, 'partly blocked (cooling side)'], -jwot:, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'partly blocked (cooled side)'], -jstot, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'fouling'], +, [stot, temperaturel), 
arc([fault, 'fouling'], -, [wot, temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'blockage (cooling side)'], +, [wot, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'blockage (cooled side)'], +, [stot, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'blockage (cooling side)'], +, [win, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'blockage (cooling side)'], -, [wot, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'blockage (cooled side)'], +, [stin, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'blockage (cooled side)'], -, [stot, pressure]), 
arcffault, 'blockage (cooling side)'], +, [stot, temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'blockage (cooled side)'], -, [wot, temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'holed heatexchangee], -, [wot, flowl), 
arc([fault, 'holed heatexchanger'], +, [win, flowl), 
arcffault, 'holed heatexchanger'], +, [wot, temperature]), 
arcffault, 'holed heatexchangee], -, [stot, temperaturel), 
%consequences resulting from'faults 
arc([fault, 'holed heatexchangee], +, [consequence, 'contamination of product']), 
%consequences resulting from deviations 
arc([deviation, [IessTemperature, wot]], +, [consequence, 'freezing in heatexchangee]), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, stotll, +, [consequence, 'boiling in heatexchanger']), 
arc([deviation, [morePressure, win]], +, fconsequence, 'possible rupture']), 
arc([deviat ion, [more Pressure, stin] ], +, [consequence, 'poss ible rupture']) 
/* -------------------------------------------------- 
Reactor for lawley plant 
With one inlet and one outlet 
liqd = liquid, vapr = vapour 
/* -------------------------------------------------- 
frame(closedvessel isa vessel, 
inports info [ in 11, 
outports info [out I 
unitports info liqd, vapr 
propLinks info 
%propagation 
arc([in l, temperature], +, [Iiqd, temperature]), 
arc([Iiqd, temperature], +, [out l, temperature]), 
arc([in l, flow], +, [liqd, levelj), 
arc([out l, flowl, -, [liqd, level]), 
arc([in l, noFlow], - -, [Iiqd, level]), 
arc([out l, noFlow], ++, [liqd, level]), 
arc([in l, noFlow], ++, [out I, noFlow]), 
arc([out l, reverseFlow], ++, [Iiqd, level]), 
arc([in l, pressure], +, [vapr, pressure]), 
arc([in l, pressure], +, [liqd, level]), 
arc([out l, pressure], +, [liqd, level]), 
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arc([out l, pressure] +, [vapr, pressure]), 
arc([in 1, concentrat ion], +, [ I iqd, concentration]), 
arc([ I iqd, concentrationl, +, [out 1, concentrat ion]), 
arc([Iiqd, concentrationl, +, [in l, concentration]), 
%faults 
arc([fault, 'outletl partly blocked'], -, [out l, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'outietl completely blocked'j, +joutl, noFlow]), 
arc(ffault, 'leak to environment'], -jliqd, level]), 
arcffault, 'external fire'], +jliqd, temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'cold weatheei, -, [Iiqd, temperaturel), 
arc([fault, 'inletl siphon breaker blockage'], +, [in l, reverseFlow]), 
arc([fault, ['Ieak into vacuum system', vacuumfl, +jinl, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], -, [out l, flowl), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environmenfj, +jinl, flow]), 
%consequences resulting from faults 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environmenV], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environment', toxic]]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['fire/explosion risk', flarnmablefl), 
arc([fault, 'leak to environment'], +, [consequence, [Ioss of material', expensivefl), 
arc(ffault, 'external fire'], +, [consequence, 'structuraI weakening']), 
arc([fault, ['leak into vacuum system, vacuum]], +, [consequence, 'Possible explosive mixture']), 
arc(ffault, 'external flre'], +, [consequence, 'possible rupture']), 
%consequences resulting from deviations 
arc([deviation, [moreLevel, liqd]], +, [consequence, 'overfilling']), 
arc([deviation, [moreConcentration, liqd]], +, [consequence, 'rubber lining corrosion in hot caustic']), 
arc([deviation, [moreConcentration, liqd]], +, [consequence, 'emulsification of contents']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, liqd]], +, [consequence, 'increased evaporation']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, liqd]], +, [consequence, 'flammable or toxic vapour release']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, liqd]], +, [consequence, 'crystallisation']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, liqd]], +, [consequence, 'viscosity increase']), 
arc([deviation, [IessTemperature, liqd]], +, [consequence, 'viscosity decrease']), 
arc([deviation, [IessLevel, liqd]], +, [consequence, 'vesseI emptyine]), 
arc([dev iation, [more Pressure, vapr] ], +, [consequence, 'poss ib le rupture']), 
arc([deviation, [moreFlow, in I ]], +, [consequence, incomplete separation of water']) 
/* -------------------------------------------------- 
Status = spare or running 
/* -------------------------------------------------- 
frame(pump isa pressureraiser, 
inports info [in], 
outports info [out], 
status is unknown, 
propLinks info [ 
%propagation 
arc([in, pressure], +jout, flow]), 
arc([ in, pressure] +, [out, pressure]), 
arc([out, pressurej, -, [out, flow]), 
arc([ in, tem perature] +, [out, temperature]), 
arc([out, noFlow], ++, [in, noFlow]), 
arc(fin, noFlow], ++, [out, noFlow]), 
arc([ in, concentrat ion], +, [out, concentration]), 
%faults 
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arc([fault, 'partly blocked'], -Jout, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'completely blocked'], +jout, noFlow]), 
arc(ffault, 'leak to environment'], +, [in, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'leak to environmenf], -Jout, flowl), 
arc([fault, 'air lock'], -, [out, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'air lock'], -, [out, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'power supply fails'], +, [out, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'power supply fails'], -, [out, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'impellor failure'], -Jout, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'impellor failure], -, [out, pressure]), 
arcffault, ['leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [in, pressure]), 
arc(ffault, 'pump fails'], +, [in, reverseFlowj), 
%consequences resulting from faults 
arc(ffault, 'leak to environmenf], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environment', toxic]]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['fire/explosion risk, flammable]]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], +, fconsequence, ['Ioss of material', expensivefl), 
arc([fault, ['leak into vacuum system', vacuuml], +, [consequence, 'Possible explosive mixture']), 
%consequences resulting from deviations 
arc(fdeviation, [morePressure, out]], +, [consequence, 'possible rupture']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, outll, +, [consequence, 'overheatine]), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, out]], +, [consequence, 'gland failure']), 
arc([deviation, [reverseFlow, out]], +, [consequence, 'pump driven backwards']), 
arc([deviation, [noFlow, in]], +, [consequence, 'overheatine]), 
arc([deviation, [noFlow, in]], +, [consequence, 'gland failure']) 
conditionLinks info 
[status is spare, 
[propLinks include 
%faults 
arc([fault, 'spare unit turned on'], +, [out, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'spare unit turned on], +, [out, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], +, [out, reverseFlow]) 
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/* -------------------------------------------------- 
A unit to split a stream into two output streams 
/* -------------------------------------------------- 
frame(divider isa pipe, 
inports info [in], 
outports info [ out I, out2 
purpose is toBypass, 
propLinks info [ 
%propagation 
arc([out l, flow], +, [in, flow]), 
arc([out2, flow], +jin, flow]), 
arc([in, flow], +, [out I, flow]), 
arc([in, flow], +, (out2, flow]), 
arc([out l, flow], -, [out2, flow]), 
arc([out2, flow], -, [out I, flow]), 
arc([ in, temperature], +, [out l, temperature]), 
arc([ in, temperaturej, +, [out2, temperature]), 
arc([in, pressu re], +, [out I, pressurej), 
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arc([ in, pressurel, +, [out2, pressurel), 
arc([out l, pressure], +, [in, pressure]), 
arc([out2, pressure], +, [in, pressure]), 
arc([out2, pressure], +, [out l, pressurel), 
arc([out l, pressure], +jout2, pressure]), 
arc([in, noFlow], ++, [out I, noFlow]), 
arc([in, noFlow], ++, [out2, noFlow]), 
arc([ in, concentration], +, [out l, concentration]), 
arc([ in, concentration], +, [out2, concentrat ion]), 
%faults 
arc([fault, 'leak to environment'], +, [in, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'leak to environment'], -, [outl, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], -, [out2, flow]), 
arc([fault, ['blocked by frozen fluid, freezing]], +j in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'inlet completely blocked'], +, [in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'branch I completely blocked'], +, [outl, noFlow]), 
arcffault, 'branch 2 completely blocked'], +jout2, noFlow]), 
arcffault, 'branch I completely blocked'], +, [out2, flow]), 
arcffault, 'branch 2 completely blocked'], +joutl, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'inlet partly blocked'], -jin, flow]), 
arcffault, 'branch I partly blocked'], -, [out I, flowl), 
arcffault, 'branch 2 partly blocked'], -jout2, flow]), 
arc([fault, ['Ieak into vacuum system, vacuum]], +, [in, pressure]), 
%consequences resulting from faults 
arcffault, 'leak to environment'], +, [consequence, 'contaminate environment']), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment], +, [consequence, ['fire/explosion risk', flammablefl), 
arcffault, 'leak to environmenf], +, [consequence, ['Ioss of material', expensivefl), 
arc([fault, ['Ieak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [consequence, 'Possible explosive mixture']), 
%consequences resulting from deviations 
arc([dev iation, [more Pressure, in]], +, [consequence, 'poss ib le rupture']) 
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conditionLinks info 
[purpose is tosplit, 
[propLinks include 
%propagation 
arc: ([outl, noFlow], -jin, flow]), 
arc([out2, noFlow], -, [in, flow]) 
1; --------------------------------------------------- 
To combine two unit streams 
/* -------------------------------------------------- 
frame(header isa pipe, 
inports info [in 1, in2 
outports info [out], 
purpose is fromBypass, 
propLinks info 
%propagation 
arc: ([out, flow], +jinl, flow]), 
arc: ([out, flowj, +jin2, flow]), 
arc([ in I, tem perature], +, [out, temperature]), 
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arc([ in2, tem perature], +, [out, temperature]), 
arc([out, pressure], +, [in l, pressure]), 
arc([out, pressurel, +, [in2, pressure]), 
arc([out, reverscFlow], ++jin l, reverseFlow]), 
arc([out, reverseFlow], ++, [in2, reverseFlow]), 
arc([out, noFlow], ++, [in l, noFlow]), 
arc([out, noFlow], ++, [in2, noFlow]), 
arc([in l, concentration], +, [outconcentration]), 
arc([ in2, concentration], +, [out, concentration]), 
%faults 
arc([fault, 'branch I partly blocked'], -Jinl, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'branch 2 partly blocked'], -, [in2, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'outlet partly blocked'], -, [out, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'branch I completely blocked'], +jin l, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'branch 2 completely blocked'], +, [in2, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'outlet completely blocked'], +, [out, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, ['blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, [out, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, ['leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +jinl, pressure]), 
arc(ffault, ['leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [ in2, pressure]), 
arcffault, 'leak to environment'], +, [in I, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], +, [in2, flow]), 
arc(ffault, 'leak to environment'], -, [out, flowl), 
%consequences resulting from faults 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environment', toxic]]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], +, [consequence, [Ioss of material', expensive]]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['fire/explosion risk', flammable]]), 
arc([fault, ['Ieak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [consequence, 'Possible explosive mixture']) 
). 
C. 3. HAZOP Results (Standard Approach) 
Examples from the HAZOP emulation results created by QUEEN are shown. For brevity 
the full set of results is not given. The examples include the errors in the HAZOP analysis 
identified in section 7.4.2.1. 
feedinlet no flow out 
feedinlet less flow 
out 
valvel: completely 
blocked, feedinlet: 
inlet completely 
blocked, e103: 
blockage (heated 
side) 
valvel: partly 
blocked, feedinlet: 
inlet partly blocked, 
e103: partly blocked 
(heated side) 
feedinlet: leak to 
environment 
contaminate 
environment, 
fire/explosion 
risk, loss of 
material 
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feedinlet more flow valvel: leak to contaminate 
out environment environment, loss 
of material, 
fire/explosion risk 
feedinlet less feedinlet: cold 
temperature out weather 
feedinlet more valvel: thermal flange leak 
pressure out expansion of contents 
valvel: closed in 
error 
e103 no flow cdin taill: blocked, 
heatsourcel: inlet 
completely blocked, 
e103: blockage 
(heating side) 
e103 less flow cdin taill: partly 
blocked, heatsourcel: 
inlet partly blocked, 
e103: partly blocked 
(heating side) 
heatsourcel: leak to contaminate 
environment environment, 
fire/explosion 
risk, loss of 
material 
- etc. - 
d103 less flow outi valve5: partly 
blocked, dividerl: 
inlet partly blocked, 
branch 2 partly 
blocked, branch 1 
partly blocked, d103: 
outleti partly 
blocked 
- etc. - 
d103 more level liqd valve7: thermal overfilling, flange 
expansion of contents leak 
valve5: partly overfilling 
blocked, closed in 
error, divideri: 
inlet partly blocked, 
inlet completely 
blocked, branch 2 
partly blocked, 
branch 1 partly 
blocked, d103: 
outleti partly 
blocked, outleti 
completely blocked 
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- etc. - 
I piolb less flow out 
I piolb more flow out 
p101b more pressure 
out 
valve7 no flow in 
valve8 no flow out 
valve8 less flow out 
valve8 more flow out 
valve8: thermal I flange leak 
expansion of contents I 
valveB: leak to 
environment 
p101b: spare unit 
turned on 
valve8: thermal 
expansion of contents 
p101b: spare unit 
turned on 
dividerl: branch 2 
completely blocked 
headeri: branch 2 
completely blocked 
headeri: branch 2 
partly blocked 
valve8: open or 
passing 
contaminate 
environment, loss 
of material, 
fire/explosion risk 
possible rupture, 
flange leak 
possible rupture 
CA. Modified Plant Description (Modular Approach) 
See section 7.1. for a plant diagram. 
instance(feed inlet isa source, 
[outports info 
[out is [e103, htin]] 
). 
instance(e 103 isa heatex, 
foutports info 
[cdot is [taill, in], htot is [valvel, in]] 
instance(tail I isa outlet, 
[outports info 
instance(heatsource I isa source, 
[outports info 
[out is [e103, cdin]] 
instance(valve I isa valve, 
[outports info 
[out is [distilsystem3, t 10 1 
-feedfl, aperture is open 
instance(tail2 isa outIct, 
[outports info 
instance(heatsource2 isa source, 
[outports info 
[out is [distilsystem3_, e 1 06_cdin]) 
instance(valve2 isa valve, 
[outports info 
[out is [tail3jn1j, 
aperture is open 
I 
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instance(tail3 isa outlet, 
[outports info 
instance(tail4 isa outlet, 
[outports info 
instance(watersource I isa source, 
[outports info 
[out is [distilsystem3_, eIO4_win]] 
instance(valve4 isa valve, 
[outports info 
[out is [005, stinfl, 
aperture is open 
instance(e 105 isa cooler, 
[outports info 
[wot is [tail5jn], stot is [tail6jn]] 
instance(tail5 isa outlet, 
[outports info 
instance(tail6 isa outlet, 
[outports info 
instance(watersource2 isa source, 
[outports info 
[out is [e 1 05, win]] 
). 
instance(distilsystem3_ isa module_3, 
[outports info 
[tlOI 
- 
boto is [valve2jn], 
e106 
- 
cdot is [tail2jn], 
e 104 
- 
wot is [tail4, in], 
divider2__put2 is [valve4jn]], 
divider I 
_purpose 
is tobypass, 
valve5-aperture is open, 
valve6_aperture is open, 
valve7_aperture is closed, 
p 10 1 b_status is spare, 
valve8_aperture is closed, 
headerl_purpose is frombypass, 
divider2_purpose is tosplit, 
valve3_aperture is open 
). 
C. 5. Plant Models (Modular Approach) 
Models 'source', 'heatex', 'outlet', 'valve' and 'cooler' are duplicates of the same models 
given for the standard approach (section C. 2) and have been removed to avoid repetition. 
/* -------------------------------------------------- */ 
The module is composed of the following units: 
columnheatingloop2_ t 10 1- topo connected to e 104 stin, 
e 104 stot connected to d 103 in 1, 
d 103 out I connected to byps I- dividerl 
- 
in, 
byps I_ header I- out connected to divider2 in, 
divider2 outl connected to valve3 in, 
valve3 out connected to columnheatingloop2_ tIOI-topr. 
Conditions of module are: 
divider I_purpose is tobypass, 
valve5_aperture is open, 
valve6_aperture is open, 
valve7_aperture is closed, 
p 10 1 b_status is spare, 
valve8_aperture is closed, 
headerl_purpose is frombypass, 
divider2_purpose is tosplit, 
valve3_aperture is open 
and this completes the module. 
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/* -------------------------------------------------- 
frame(module_3 isa module, 
inports info [ UOI feed, e106_cdin, e104_win 
outports info [tI Of boto, e 106 - 
cdot, e104_wot, divider2_out2 
unitports info [t 10 1- self, eI 06_htin, e 106_htot, eI 04_stin, eI 04_stot, dI 03_liqd, dI 03_vapr, 
dividerl-in, plOla - 
in, p 10 1 a_out, divider2_in 
divider I 
_purpose 
is toBypass, 
valve5_aperture is unknown, 
p 10 1 a_status is unknown, 
valve6_aperture is unknown, 
valve7_aperture is unknown, 
p 10 1 b_status is unknown, 
valve8_aperture is unknown, 
headerl_purpose is fromBypass, 
divider2_purpose is toBypass, 
valve3_aperture is unknown, 
propLinks info [ 
%propagation 
arc([t 10 I_feed, flow], +, [tl 0 1-selflevel]), 
arc([t 10 1-boto, noFlow], ++ , [tlOl - 
selflevel]), 
arc([tlOl boto, reverseFlow], ++, [tiOl-selflevel]), 
arc([el0j-cdot, flow], +, [e106 cdin, flow]), 
arc([e I OCcdin, flow], +, [e I OCcdot, flow]), 
arc([e I OCcdin, flow], +, [e I 06-cdot, temperature]), 
arc([e106 cdin, flow], +, [tlOl boto, temperature]), 
arc([elOCcdin, flow], +, [elOChtot, temperature]), 
arc([e106_cdin, temperature], +, [e106_cdot, temperature]), 
arc([tlOl feed, temperature], +, [tlOl boto, temperaturel), 
arc([elOCcdin, temperature], +, [elOý htot, temperaturel), 
arc([e I OCcdin, temperature], +jtl 01 -boto, temperaturel), 
arc([eIO6 cdin, pressure], +, [e106_cdot, pressure]), 
arc([e I 06-cdot, pressure], +, [e I 06_cdin, pressure]), 
arc([e I 06_cdot, reverseFlow], ++je 106 
- 
cdin, reverseFlow]), 
arc([e 106_cdot, noFlow], ++, [e I 06_cdin, noFlow]), 
arc([e 106_cdin, noFlow], ++, [e I 06_cdot, noFlow]), 
arc([e I 06_cdin, noFlow], - -, [t 10 1-boto, temperaturel), 
arc([e 106_cd in, concentrat ion], +, [e I 06_cdot, concentration]), 
arc([t 10 1-feed, concentration], +, [t 10 1-boto, concentration]), 
arc([e I 04_wot, flow], +, [e I 04_win, flow]), 
arc([e 104_win, flow], +, [e I 04-wot, flow]), 
arc([e 104_win, flow], -, [e 104 - 
stot, temperaturel), 
arc([e I 04_win, flow], -, [e I 04_. ývotjemperature]), 
arc([e I 04_win, temperature], +, [e 104_wot, temperature]), 
arc([e I 04_win, temperature], +, [e 104 
- 
stot, temperature]), 
arc([e I 04_win, pressure], +, [e I 04_wot, pressure]), 
arc([e I 04_wot, pressure], +, [e I 04_win, pressure]), 
arc([e I 04_wot, reverseFlow], ++, [e 104_win, rcverseFlow]), 
arc([e 104_wot, noFlow], ++, [e I 04_win, noFlow]), 
arc([e I 04_win, noFlow], ++, [e I 04_wot, noFlow]), 
arc([e I 04_win, noFlowl, ++, [e I 04_stot, temperature]), 
arc([e I 04_win, concentration], +, [e I 04_wot, concentration]), 
arc([e I 04_win, temperature], +jp 10 1 a_out, temperature]), 
arc([divider2_out2, pressure], +, [divider2_in, pressure]), 
%faults 
arc([fault, 'tlOl packing support collapses'], +, [tl0l-boto, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 't 10 1 external fire'], +, [e I 06_htot, temperaturel), 
C-16 
arcffault, 1101 external fire'], +, [t 10 1 -boto, 
temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'e 106 partly blocked (heating side)'], -, [e 106 - cdot, 
flow]), 
arcffault, '006 foul ing'], +, [e I 06_cdot, temperature]), 
arcffault, '006 fouling'], -, [t 10 1 -boto, 
temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'e 106 blockage (heating side)'], +, [e I 06_cdot, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'e 106 blockage (heating side)'], +jel06 
- 
cdin, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'e 106 blockage (heating side)'], -je I 06_cdot, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'e 106 blockage (heated side)'], +, [e 106_htin, pressure]), 
arcffault, 'e 106 blockage (heating side)'], -, [t 10 1-boto, temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'e 106 blockage (heated side)'], +, [e I 06_cdot, temperature]), 
arcffault, '006 blockage (heated side)'], -, [tlOI boto, temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'e 106 holed heatexchanger], -, [e106_ýdot, flow]), 
arcffault, '006 holed heatexchangeel, +, [e 106 - cdin, 
flow]), 
arc([fault, 'e 106 holed heatexchanger], -, [e I 06_cdot, temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'e 106 holed heatexchanger'], +, [e 106_htot, temperature]), 
arcffault, '006 holed heatexchanger'], +, [tl0l-boto, temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'e106 partly blocked (heated side)'], -, [tl0l-boto, temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'e 104 partly blocked (cooling side)'], -jel04 - 
wot, flow]), 
arcffault, '004 partly blocked (cooled side)'], -, [divider2 - out2, 
flow]), 
arcffault, '004 fbuling'j, +jel04 - 
stot, temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'e 104 fouling'], -, [e104_yot, temperature]), 
arcffault, '004 fouling'], +, [divider2_out2jemperature]), 
arc([fault, 'e 104 blockage (cooling side)'], +, [e I 04_wot, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'e104 blockage (cooled side)'], +, fdivider2_out2, noFlow]), 
arcffault, '004 blockage (cooling side)'], +jel04_win, pressure]), 
arcffault, '004 blockage (cooling side)'], -, [e I 04_wot, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'e 104 blockage (cooled side)'], +, [e I 04_stin, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'e 104 blockage (cooling side)'], +, [e 104 - 
stot, temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'e 104 blockage (cooling side)'], +, [divider2_out2, temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'e104 blockage (cooled side)'], -, [e 1 04_wot, temperature]), 
arcffault, '004 holed heatexchanger'], -, [e104-wot, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'e 104 holed heatexchangee], +, [e I 04_win, flow]), 
arcffault, '004 holed heatexchangee], <004 wot, temperature]), 
arcffault, '004 holed heatexchanger'], -, [dividýr2 - out2, 
temperature]), 
arcffault, 'd 103 leak to environmenf], -, [d I 03_liqd, levell), 
arc([fault, 'd103 external fire'], +, [dIO3_liqd, temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'd103 external fire'], <divider2 oUt2, temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'd 103 cold weather], -jd I 03_liýdjemperature]), 
arc([fault, 'd103 cold weather'], -, [divider2 - 
out2, temperature]), 
arcffault, 'd 103 leak to environmenf], -, [divider2_out2, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'divider I leak to environment' ], -, [divider2 - 
out2, flow]), 
arc([fault, ['dividerl blocked by frozen fluid', freezing1j, +, [plOla 
- 
in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, ['dividerl blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, [divider2_out2, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'dividerl inlet completely blocked'], +jpIOla 
- 
in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'dividerl inlet completely blocked'], +, [divider2_out2, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'dividerl inlet partly blocked'], -, [divider2 - 
out2, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'p 10 1a partly blocked'], -, [d ivider2_out2, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'p 10 1a completely blocked'], +, [divider2 
- out2, noFlow]), arc([fault, 'p 10 1a leak to environmenf], -, [divider2_put2, flow]), 
arcffault, 'plOla air lock'], -, [divider2_out2, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'plOla air lock'], +, [divider I 
_in, pressure]), arcffault, 'plOla power supply fails'], <divideO 
- out2, noFlow]), arc([fault, 'p 10 1a power supply fails'], +, [divider I_in, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'p 10 1a impellor failure'], -, [divider2_out2, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'p 10 1a impellor failure'], +, [d iv ider I 
_in, pressu re]), arcffaultj'plOla leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [divider I_in, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'headerl outlet partly blocked'], -, [divider2-out2, flow]), 
arcffault, 'header I outlet completely blocked'], +jp 10 1a in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'headerl outlet completely blocked'], +, (divide_r2 out2, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, ['header I blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, 
FplOla 
- 
in, noFlowl), 
arc([fault, ['headerl blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, [divider2_out2, noFlow]), 
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arc([fault, 'dividerl branch I completely blocked'], +, [plOla - 
in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'dividerl branch I completely blocked'], +, [divider2 - 
out2, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'dividerl branch I partly blocked'], -, [divider2 - 
out2, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 partly blocked'], -, [d ivider2_out2, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve6 partly blocked'], -, [divider2_out2, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 completely blocked'], +jp 10 1a- in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve6 completely blocked'], +, [divider2_out2, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve6 completely blocked'], +jp 10 1a- in, noFlow]), 
arc(ffault, 'valve6 completely blocked'], +, [divider2_out2, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, ['valveS blocked by frozen fluid', freezing1j, +jp 10 1a- in, noFlow]), 
arc([faulQ'valve5 blocked by frozen fluid!, freezing]], +, [divider2_out2, noFlow]), 
arcffault, ['valve6 blocked by frozen fluid', freezing1j, +jp 10 1a- in, noFlow]), 
arc([faulQ'valve6 blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, [divider2_out2, noFlow]), 
arcffaulQ'valve5 leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [dividerl_in, pressure]), 
arcffaultj'valve6 leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [dividerl_in, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 closed in error'], +, [d iv ider I _in, 
pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 closed in error], +, [plOla in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 closed in error], +, [d iv ideý_r2 - 
out2, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve6 closed in erroj'], +, [p 10 1 a, _out, 
pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'valve6 closed in error'], +, [divider I _in, 
pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'valve6 closed in erroel, +, [p 10 1a- in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve6 closed in error'], +, [d iv ider2 - 
out2, noFlow]), 
arcffaulQ'valve5 leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [dividerl_in, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'headerl branch I partly blocked'], -, [divider2 - 
out2, flow]), 
arcffault, 'headerl branch I completely blocked'], +jpIOla - 
in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'headerl branch I completely blocked'], +, [divider2_out2, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'headerl outlet completely blocked'], +jp 10 1a- out, pressure]), 
arc([fault, ['headerl blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +jp 10 1 a_out, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'headerl branch I completely blocked'], +, [plOla_out, pressure]), 
arcffault, 'valve6 completely blocked'], +jp 10 1 a_out, pressurel), 
arc([faulQ'valve6 blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, [p 10 1 a_out, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 leak to environment'], -, [divider2-out2, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 leak to environment'], -, [divider2_out2, flowl), 
arc([fault, 'valve6 leak to environment! ], -jdivider2-out2, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 thermal expansion'], +, [divider I -in, pressure]), 
arc(Ifault, 'valve6 thermal expansion'], +, [d iv ider I _in, 
pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'headerl leak to environment'], -, [divider2 - 
out2, flow]), 
arcffault, ['headerl. leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [dividerl-in, pressurel), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 thermal expansion'], +, [dividert - 
in, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'divider2 leak to environment! ], -jdivider2-out2, flow]), 
arcffault, ['divider2 blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, [divider2_out2, noFlow]), 
arcffault, 'divider2 inlet completely blocked'], +, fdivider2 - 
out2, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'divider2 branch 2 completely blocked'], +, [divider2 - 
out2, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'divider2 inlet partly blocked'], -, [d iv ider2 - 
out2, flow]), 
arcffault, 'divider2 branch 2 partly blocked'], -, [divider2_out2, flow]), 
arcffaulQ'divider2 leak into vacuum system, vacuuml], +, [divider2_in, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'e 104 partly blocked (cooled side)'], -, [d I 03_liqd, level]), 
arcffault, '004 blockage (cooled side)'], -, [d 1 03_1 iqd, level]), 
arc([fault, 'dividerl leak to environment! ], -, [d 103_liqd, level]), 
arc([fault, 'plOla leak to environment'], -, [d103_liqd, level]), 
arc([fault, 'headerl leak to environmenV], -jdl03 liqd, level]), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 leak to environment], -, [d103 - 
Tiqd, level]), 
arc([fault, 'valve6 leak to environment'], -, [d 103 - 
liqd, level]), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 leak to environment'], -, [d I 03_liqd, level]), 
arcffault, 'plOla pump fails'], +, [dl03_liqd, level]), 
arcffault, 'divider I inlet partly blocked'], +jd 103_liqd, level]), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 partly blocked'], +, [d 1 03_liqd, level]), 
arcffaultj'valve5 blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, [d I 03_liqd, level]), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 completely blocked'], +jd 1 03_liqd, level]), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 closed in erroe], +, [d 103 - 
liqd, level]), 
arc([fault, 'headert branch I completely blocked'], +, [d] 03_liqd, level]), 
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arc([fault, 'd103 outletl partly blocked'], -, [divider2-out2, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'd 103 outlet]. completely blocked'], +, [divider2_out2, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'd 103 outlet I partly blocked'], +, [d I 03_liqd, levell), 
arc([fault, 'd103 outlett completely blocked'], +, [d103_liqd, level]), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 open or passing'], -, [d I 03_liqd, level]), 
arc([fault, 'valve3 thermal expansion of contents'], +, [divider2_in, pressure]), 
%consequences resulting from faults 
arc([fault, 'e106 holed heatexchangeel, +, [consequence, 'contamination of product']), 
arc([fault, 'e104 holed heatexchanger], +, [consequence, 'contamination of product']), 
arc([fault, 'd 103 leak to enviromnent'], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environmenf, toxic]]), 
arc([fault, 'd103 leak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['fire/explosion risk', flairimablefl), 
arc([fault, 'd103 leak to rnvironmenf], +, [consequence, [Ioss of material', expensive]]), 
arc([fault, 'd 103 external fire'], +, [consequence, 'structuraI weakening']), 
arc([fault, ['d103 leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [consequence, 'Possible explosive mixture']), 
arc([fault, 'd103 external fire'], +, [consequence, 'possible rupture']), 
arc([fault, 'dividerl leak to environmenV], +, [consequence, 'contaminate environment']), 
arc([fault, 'dividerl leak to environmenf], +, [consequence, ['fire/explosion risk, flarnmablefl), 
arc([fault, 'dividerl leak to environment'], +, [consequence, [Ioss of material', expensivefl), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 leak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environment', toxic]]), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 leak to environmenf], +, [consequence, [Ioss of material', expensivefl), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 leak to environment! ], +, [consequence, ['fire/explosion risle, flarnmablefl), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 thermal expansion'], +, [consequence, 'flange leaw]), 
arc([fault, 'p 10 1a leak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environment', toxic]]), 
arc([fault, 'p 10 1a leak to environmenf], +, [consequence, ['fire/explosion risk', flammablefl), 
arc([fault, 'p 10 1a leak to environment' ], +, fconsequence, ['Ioss of material', expensivefl), 
arc([faultj'plOla leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [consequence, 'Possible explosive mixture']), 
arc([fault, 'valve6 leak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environment', toxic]]), 
arc([fault, 'valve6 leak to environmenf], +, [consequence, [Ioss of material', expensivefl), 
arc([fault, 'valve6 leak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['fire/explosion risk', flammablefl), 
arc([fault, 'valve6 thermal expansion'], +, [consequence, 'flange leale]), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 leak to environment' ], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environmenf, toxic]]), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 leak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['Ioss of material', expensivefl), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 leak to environment! ], +, [consequence, [I ire/explosion risk', flarnmablefl), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 thermal expansion'], +, [consequence, 'flange leale]), 
arc([fault, 'headerl leak to environmenf], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environmenf, toxic]]), 
arc([fault, 'headerl leak to environmenf], +, [consequence, ['Ioss of material', expensivefl), 
arc([fault, 'headerl leak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['fire/explosion risk', flammablefl), 
arc(ffaultj'headerl leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [consequence, 'Possible explosive mixture']), 
arc([fault, 'valve7 open or passing'], +, [consequence, 'spare pump possible rupture']), 
arc([fault, 'divider2 leak to environment'], +, [consequence, 'contaminate environment']), 
arc([fault, 'divider2 leak to environmenf], +, [consequence, ['fire/explosion risk', flairimablefl), 
arc([fault, 'divider2 leak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['Ioss of material', expensivefl), 
arc([fault, ['divider2 leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [consequence, 'Possible explosive mixture']), 
arc([fault, 'valve3 thermal expansion of contents'], +, [conscquence, flange leale]), 
%consequences resulting from deviations 
arc([deviation, [moreLevel, tl0l-selfl], +, [consequence, 'column floods']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, e106 htot]], +, [consequence, 'boiling in heatexchanger]), 
arc([deviation, [IessTemperature, e 106 ýdotfl, +Jconsequencejreezing in heatexchangee]), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, eIC6 - 
htot]], +, [consequence, 'polymerisation']), 
arc([deviation, [morePressure, e I 06_cdin]], +, [consequence, 'possible rupture']), 
arc([deviation, [morePressure, e106_htin]], +, [consequence, 'possible rupture']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, e106_htot]], +, [consequence, 'mechanicaI failure due to 
overtemperature']), 
arc([deviation, [IessTemperature, eIO4-wot]], +, [consequence, 'freezing in heatexchangee]), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, e104 - stot]], 
+, [consequence, 'boiling in heatexchangee]), 
arc([deviation, [morePressure, e104_win]], +, [consequence, 'possible rupture']), 
arc([deviation, [morePressure, e 104 - stin]], 
+, [consequence, 'possible rupture']), 
arc([deviation, [moreLevel, d103_liqdl], +, [consequence, 'overfilling'j), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, d103-liqdll, +, [consequence, 'increased evaporation']), 
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arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, d103_liqd]], +, [consequence, 'flammable or toxic vapour release']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, d I 03_liqd]], +, [consequence, 'crystallisation']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, d103_liqd]], +, [consequence, 'viscosity increase']), 
arc([dev iat ion, [ lessTem perature, d 1 03_1 iqd] ], +, [consequence, 'v iscosity decrease']), 
arc([deviation, [IessLevel, dIO3_liqd]], +, [consequence, 'vesseI emptying']), 
arc([deviation, [morePressure, dividerl_in]], +, [consequence, 'possible rupture']), 
arc([deviation, [morePressure, plOla_out]], +, fconsequence, 'possible rupture']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, plOla_out]], +, [consequence, 'overheatine]), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, p 10 1 a_out]], +, [consequence, 'gland failure']), 
arc([deviation, [noFlow, p 10 1a- in]], +, [consequence, 'overheating']), 
arc([deviation, [noFlow, plOlý_in]], +, [consequence, 'gland failure']), 
arc([deviation, [morePressure, divider2_in]], +, [consequence, 'possible rupture']) 
). 
C. 6. HAZOP Results (Modular Approach) 
Examples from the HAZOP emulation results created by QUEEN are shown. For brevity 
the full set of results is not given. 
feedinlet no flow out 
feedinlet less flow 
out 
feedinlet more flow 
out 
feedinlet less 
temperature out 
feedinlet more 
pressure out 
valvel: completely 
blocked, feedinlet: 
inlet completely 
blocked, e103: 
blockage (heated 
side) 
valvel: partly 
blocked, feedinlet: 
inlet partly blocked, 
e103: partly blocked 
(heated side) 
feedinlet: leak to contaminate 
environment environment, 
fire/explosion 
risk, loss of 
material 
valvel: leak to 
environment 
contaminate 
environment, loss 
of material, 
fire/explosion risk 
feedinlet: cold 
weather 
valvel: thermal 
expansion of contents 
flange leak 
valvel: closed in 
error 
e103 no flow cdin taill: blocked, 
heatsourcel: inlet 
completely blocked, 
e103: blockage 
(heating side) 
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I e103 less flow cdin taill: partly 
blocked, heatsourcel: 
inlet partly blocked, 
e103: partly blocked 
(heating side) 
heatsourcel: leak to 
environment 
contaminate 
environment, 
fire/explosion 
risk, loss of 
material 
- etc. - 
elos more temperature 
stot 
watersource2: leak to boiling in 
environment, tail6: heatexchanger, 
leak to environment contaminate 
environment, 
fire/explosion 
risk, loss of 
material 
watersource2: inlet 
partly blocked, inlet 
completely blocked, 
tail5: partly 
blocked, blocked, 
e105: partly blocked 
(cooling side), 
fouling, blockage 
(cooling side), 
distilsystem3 e104 
fouling, e104 
blockage (cooling 
side) 
boiling in 
heatexchanger 
distilsystem3_: d103 boiling in 
external fire heatexchanger, 
structural 
weakening, possible 
rupture 
tailS less e105: fouling 
temperature in 
distilsystem3_ more tail4: blocked, possible rupture 
pressure e104_win distilsystem3_: e104 
blockage (cooling 
side) 
distilsystem3_ more tail2: blocked, possible rupture 
pressure e106_cdin distilsystem3_: e106 
blockage (heating 
side) 
distilsystem3_ less tail2: partly freezing in 
temperature e106_cdot blocked, heatsource2: heatexchanger 
inlet partly blocked, 
cold weather, 
distilsystem3_: e106 
partly blocked 
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distilsystem3_ less 
temperature el04_wot 
distilsystem3_ more 
level tiol-self 
(heating side) 
heatsource2: leak to 
environment 
distilsystem3_: e106 
holed heatexchanger 
watersourcel: cold 
weather, 
distilsystem3_: e104 
fouling 
tail4: leak to 
environment 
valve2: completely 
blocked, tail3: 
blocked, 
distilsystem3_: t101 
packing support 
collapses 
distilsystem3_: e106 
blockage (heated 
side) 
distilsystem3 
- more pressure el06_htin 
distilsystem3 
I more 
tail2: leak to 
temperature e106_htot environment 
distilsystem3 tiol 
external fire 
distilsystem3 e106 
holed heatexchanger 
freezing in 
heatexchanger, 
contaminate 
environment, 
fire/explosion 
risk, loss of 
material 
freezing in 
heatexchanger, 
contamination of 
product 
freezing in 
heatexchanger 
freezing in 
heatexchanger, 
contaminate 
environment, 
fire/explosion 
risk, loss of 
material 
column floods 
possible rupture 
boiling in 
heatexchanger, 
polymerisation, 
mechanical failure 
due to 
overtemperature, 
contaminate 
environment, 
fire/explosion 
risk, loss of 
material 
boiling in 
heatexchanger, 
polymerisation, 
mechanical failure 
due to 
overtemperature 
boiling in 
heatexchanger, 
polymerisation, 
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mechanical failure 
due to 
overtemperature, 
contamination of 
product I 
distilsystem3 
- 
more 
pressure el04_stin 
distilsystem3_: e104 
blockage (cooled 
side) 
possible rupture 
distilsystem3 
I 
more 
temperature e104-stot 
watersourcel: leak to 
environment 
watersourcel: inlet 
partly blocked, inlet 
completely blocked, 
tail4: partly 
blocked, blocked, 
distilsystem3_: e104 
partly blocked 
(cooling side) 
distilsystem3 
I 
more distilsystem3_: d103 
temperature dl03_liqd external fire 
distilsystem3 
I 
less distilsystem3_: d103 
temperature dl03_liqd cold weather 
distilsystem3 
- 
more 
level dl03_liqd 
distilsystem3_: 
valveS partly 
blocked, valveS 
completely blocked, 
valve5 closed in 
error, plOla pump 
fails, headerl branch 
1 completely blocked, 
dividerl inlet partly 
blocked, d103 outleti 
partly blocked, d103 
outletl completely 
blocked 
boiling in 
heatexchanger, 
contaminate 
environment, 
fire/explosion 
risk, loss of 
material 
boiling in 
heatexchanger 
increased 
evaporation, 
flammable or toxic 
vapour release, 
crystallisation, 
viscosity increase, 
structural 
weakening, possible 
rupture 
viscosity decrease 
overfilling 
distilsystem3_ less distilsystem3_: vessel emptying, 
level dl03_liqd valve6 leak to contaminate 
environment, headerl environment, loss 
leak to environment of material, 
fire/explosion risk 
distilsystem3_: vessel emptying, 
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valve7 open or 
passing 
distilsystem3_ 
valveS leak to 
environment 
distilsystem3_: piOla 
leak to environment, 
dividerl leak to 
environment, d103 
leak to environment 
spare pump possible 
rupture 
vessel emptying, 
contaminate 
environment, loss 
of material, 
fire/explosion 
risk, contaminate 
environment, loss 
of material, 
fire/explosion risk 
vessel emptying, 
contaminate 
environment, 
fire/explosion 
risk, loss of 
material 
distilsystem3_: e104 vessel emptying 
partly blocked 
(cooled side), e104 
blockage (cooled 
side) 
distilsystem3_ more distilsystem3_: possible rupture, 
pressure divideri-in valve6 thermal flange leak 
expansion 
distilsystem3_: possible rupture 
valve6 closed in 
error, valve5 closed 
in error, ploia power 
supply fails, piola 
impellor failure, 
piola air lock 
distilsystem3_ 
valve7 thermal 
expansion 
distilsystem3_ no 
flow piola_in 
distilsystem3 
-: 
valve6 completely 
blocked, valve6 
closed in error, 
valve5 completely 
blocked, valveS 
closed in error, 
headerl outlet 
completely blocked, 
headerl branch 1 
completely blocked, 
dividerl inlet 
completely blocked, 
dividerl branch 1 
completely blocked 
distilsystem3_ more 
pressure ploia_out 
distilsystem3 
-: 
valve6 completely 
blocked, headeri 
possible rupture, 
flange leak, flange 
leak 
overheating, gland 
failure 
possible rupture 
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distilsystem3 
- 
more 
pressure divider2_in 
outlet completely 
blocked, headerl 
branch 1 completely 
blocked 
valve4: closed in 
error 
distilsystem3_: 
valve3 thermal 
expansion of contents 
possible rupture 
possible rupture, 
flange leak 
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Appendix D 
Olefin Dimerisation Plant 
This appendix contains input data for the application QUEEN (Chung, 1993) prepared for 
an olefin dimerisation plant. Two sets of input data have been prepared: a standard set and 
a set to which the modular approach has been applied. Each set of input data consists of a 
modified plant description and a file of models occurring within the plant. Example 
HAZOP results created by QUEEN are given for both sets of data. 
D. 1. Modified Plant Description (Standard Approach) 
See section 7.1. for a plant diagram. 
instance(feedinlet isa source, [outports info 
[outports info [out is [purnpj I a, in]], 
[out is [valvel, in]] aperture is open 
instance(valve I isa valve, instance(valve5 isa valve, 
[outports info [outports info 
[out is [feedpipe, in]], [out is [pumpj I b, in]], 
aperture is open aperture is closed 
instance(feedpipe isa pipe, instance(purnpj Ia isa pump, 
[outports info [outports info 
[out is [storagetank, inl]] [out is [valve4, in]] 
instance(storagetank isa blanketedvessel, instance(pumpj Ib isa pump, 
[outports info [outports info 
[outl is [valve2jn], vout is [valvel8, in]] [out is [valve6, in]], 
status is spare 
instance(valve2 isa valve, 
[outports info instance(valve4 isa valve, 
[out is [dividerl, in]], [outports info 
aperture is open [out is [headerl, inl]], 
aperture is open 
instance(dividerl isa divider, 
[outports info instance(valve6 isa valve, 
[outl is [valve3, inl, out2 is [valve5, in]], [outports info 
purpose is tobypass [out is [headerl, in2]], 
aperture is closed 
instance(valve3 isa valve, 
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instance(header I isa header, instance(valve II isa valve, 
[outports info [outports info 
[out is [valve7, in]], [out is [pumpj2a, in]], 
purpose is frombypass aperture is open 
instance(valve7 isa valve, instance(valvel3 isa valve, 
[outports info [outports info 
[out is [halfmileline, in]], [out is [pumpj2b, in]], 
aperture is open aperture is closed 
instance(halfmileline isa pipeline, instance(pumpj2a isa pump, 
[outports info [outports info 
[out is [valve8, in]] [out is [valve 12, in]] 
instance(valve8 isa valve, instance(pumpj2b isa pump, 
[outports info [outports info 
[out is [buffertank, inl]], [out is [valve 14, in]], 
aperture is open status is spare 
instance(buffertank isa decantingvessel, instance(valvel2 isa valve, 
[outports info [outports info 
[outl is [valve I O, in], out2 is [valve9jn], [out is [header2, inl]], 
vout is [valve20, in]] aperture is open 
instance(valve9 isa valve, instance(valvel4 isa valve, 
[outports info [outports info 
[out is [taill, in]], [out is [header2jn2]], 
aperture is closed aperture is closed 
instance(tail I isa outlet, instance(header2 isa header, 
[outports info [outports info 
0 [out is [valve I 5, in]], 
purpose is frombypass 
instance(valve 10 isa valve, 
[outports info instance(valve 15 isa valve, 
[out is [divicler2, infl, [outports info 
aperture is open [out is [heatexl, htin]], 
aperture is open 
instance(divider2 isa divider, 
[outports info instance(heatex I isa heatex, 
[outl is [valvel l, in], out2 is [valvel3jn]], [outports info 
purpose is tobypass [cdot is [tail2, in], htot is [heatex2, htin]] 
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instance(tail2 isa outlet, 
[outports info 
instance(heatex2 isa heatex, 
[outports info 
[cdot is [tail3, in], htot is [reactorl, inl]] 
instance(tail3 isa outlet, 
[outports info 
D 
instance(reactorl isa closedvessel, 
[outports info 
[outl is [valvel6, in]] 
instance(valve 16 isa valve, 
[outports info 
[out is [heatexl, cdin]], 
aperture is open 
instance(head2 isa stearnsupply, 
[outports info 
[out is [heatex2, cdin]] 
instance(nitogeninletl isa nitrogensupply, 
[outports info 
[out is [valvel7, in]] 
instance(valve 17 isa valve, 
[outports info 
[out is [storagetank, vin]], 
aperture is open 
instancc(valve 18 isa valve, 
[outports info 
[out is [flaresysteml, in]], 
aperture is open 
instance(flaresystern I isa outlet, 
[outports info 
instance(nitrogeninlet2 isa nitrogensupply, 
[outports info 
[out is [valvel9, in]] 
instance(valve19 isa valve, 
[outports info 
[out is [buffertank, vin]], 
aperture is open 
instance(valve20 isa valve, 
[outports info 
[out is [flaresystem2, in]], 
aperture is open 
instance(flaresystem2 isa outlet, 
[outports info 
D. 2. Plant Models (Standard Approach) 
Models 'source', 'valve', 'divider', 'pump', 'header', 'closedvessel', 'outlet' and 'heatex' 
are duplicates of the same models given for the standard approach for the benzene 
purification system (section C. 2) and have been removed to avoid repetition. 
/* -------------------------------------------------- 
Short length of pipe 
/* -------------------------------------------------- 
frame(pipe isa unit, 
[ inports info [in], 
D-3 
outports info [out], 
construction is unknown, 
lagged is unknown, 
propLinks info 
%propagation 
arc([out, pressure], +, [in, pressure]), 
arc([ in, pressure], +, [out, pressurej), 
arc([ in, temperaturel, +, [out, temperature]), 
arc([out:, flow], +jin, flow]), 
arc([in, flow], +jout, flow]), 
arc([out, reverseFlow], ++, [in, reverseFlow]), 
arc([out, noFlow], ++, [in, noFlow]), 
arc([in, noFlow], ++, [out, noFlow]), 
arc([ in, concentration], +, [out, concentration]), 
%faults 
arcffault, 'partly blocked'], -jout, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'completely blocked'], +, [out, noFlow]), 
arcffaultj'blocked by frozen fluid', freezingj], +jout, noFlow]), 
arcffault, 'leak to environment! ], -Jout, flow]), 
arcffault, 'leak to environment'], +, [in, flow]), 
arcffault, 'pipe fracture'], +, [in, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'pipe fracture'], -, [out, flow]), 
arcffaultj'leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, fin, pressure]), 
%consequences resulting from faults 
arcffaultjeak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environment', toxic]]), 
arcffault, 'leak to environmenf], +, [consequence, ['Ioss of material', expensivefl), 
arcffault, 'pipe fracture], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environmenf, toxic]]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['fire/explosion risk!, flammablefl), 
arc([fault, ['Ieak into vacuum system', vacuum] ], +, [consequence, 'Possible explosive mixture']), 
%consequences resulting from deviations 
arc([deviation, [morePressure, in]], +, [consequence, 'possible rupture']) 
/* -------------------------------------------------- 
Blanketed vessel for lawley plant 
vin and vout are input and output for nitrogen 
liqd = liquid, vapr = vapr 
/* -------------------------------------------------- 
frame(blanketedvesset isa closedvessel, 
inports info [in 1, vin ], 
outports info out I, vout 
unitports info liqd, vapr 
propLinks info [ 
%propagation 
arc([in l, temperature], +, [Iiqd, temperature]), 
arc([ I iqd, tem perature], +, [out l, temperature]), 
arc([in l, flowl, +, [Iiqd, level]), 
arc([out l, flow], -, [Iiqd, level]), 
arc([vin, flow], +, [vapr, pressure]), 
arc([vout, flow], -, [vapr, pressure]), 
arc([vout, flow], +, [in I, flowl), 
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arc: ([vin, flow], -jin I, flowl), 
arc([in l, noFlow], - -jliqd, level]), 
arc([out I, noFlow], ++, [liqd, level1), 
arc([vout, noFlowj, ++, [vapr, pressure]), 
arc([in l, noFlow], ++, [out I, noFlow]), 
arc([vin, noFlow], ++jin l, flow]), 
arc([vout, noFlowl, - -jinl, flow]), 
arc([outl, reverseFlow], ++, [Iiqd, level]), 
arc([in l, pressure], +, [vapr, pressure]), 
arc([vin, pressure], +, [vapr, pressure]), 
arc([vout, pressurel, +, [vapr, pressure]), 
arc([in l, pressure], +jliqd, level]), 
arc([out I, pressurej, +, [liqd, level]), 
arc([out I, pressure]I+jvapr, pressure]), 
arc([in l, concentration], +, [Iiqd, concentration]), 
arc([ I iqd, concentration], +, [out l, concentration]), 
arc([vin, concentration], +, [vapr, concentration]), 
arc([vapr, concentration], +, [vout, concentration]), 
%faults 
arc([fault, 'outletl partly blocked'], -, [out l, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'outietl completely blocked'], +joutl, noFlow]), 
arcffault, 'leak to environment`], -, [liqd, levelj), 
arc([fault, 'extemal fire'], +, [liqd, temperature]), 
arcffault, 'cold weathee], -jliqd, temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'inlett siphon breaker blockage'], +, [in l, reverseFlow]), 
arc([faulQ'leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [inl, pressure]), 
arcffault, 'leak to environmenf], -, [outl, flowl), 
arc([fault, 'leak to environmenVj, +jinl, flow]), 
arcffault, 'outletl partly blocked'], +, [vapr, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'outletl completely blocked'], +, [vapr, pressure]), 
%consequences resulting from faults 
arcffault, 'leak to environmenV], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environment', toxic]]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environmenf], +, [consequence, ['fire/explosion risw, flammablefl), 
arc([fault, 'leak to environment' ], +, [consequence, ['Ioss of material', expensive]]), 
arcffault, 'extemal fire'], +, [consequence, 'structuraI weakeninfl), 
arc([fault, ['leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [consequence, 'Possible explosive mixture']), 
%consequences resulting from deviations 
arc([deviation, [moreLevel, liqdl], +, [consequence, 'overfilling! ]), 
arc([deviation, [moreConcentration, liqd]], +, [consequence, 'rubber lining corrosion in hot caustic']), 
arc([deviation, [moreConcentration, liqd]], +, [consequence, 'emulsification of contents']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, liqd]], +, [consequence, 'increased evaporation']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, liqd]], +, [consequence, 'flammable or toxic vapour release']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, liqdlj, +, [consequence, 'crystallisation']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, liqd]], +, [consequence, 'viscosity increase']), 
arc([dev iat ion, [lessTem perature, I iqd] ], +, [consequ ence, 'viscos ity decrease']), 
arc([deviation, [IessLevel, liqd]], +, [consequence, 'vesseI emptying! ]), 
arcQdev iat ion, [m orePressure, vapr]], +, [consequence, 'possib le rupture']), 
arc([deviation, [noFlow, vin]], +, [consequence, ['Ioss of blanket and explosion risk', flammable]]), 
arc([deviation, [IessFIow, vin]], +, [consequence, 'vacuum collapse']), 
arc([deviation, [moreFlow, vout]], +, [consequence, [Ioss of material', expensivefl), 
arc([deviation, [moreFlow, in I ]], +, [consequence, 'incomplete separation of water]) 
/* -------------------------------------------------- 
The pipeline model is to represent the fact that pipelines can be subject to hydraulic hammer because of their 
length. 
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/* - ------------------------------------ - ---------- 
frame(pipeline isa pipe, 
inports info [in], 
outports info [out], 
construction is unknown, 
lagged is unknown, 
propLinks info [ 
%propagation 
arc([out, pressure], +, [in, pressure]), 
arc([ in, pressure] +, [out, pressure]), 
arc([ in, temperature] +, [out, temperature]), 
arc([out, flow], +, [in, flow]), 
arc([in, flow], +, [out, flow]), 
arc([out, reverseFlow], ++, [in, reverseFlow]), 
arc([out, noFlow], ++, [in, noFlow]), 
arc([in, noFlow], ++, [out, noFlow]), 
arc([ in, concentration], +, [out, concentration]), 
%faults 
arc([fault, 'partly blocked'], -jout, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'completely blocked'], +, [out, noFlow]), 
arc(ffault, ['blocked by frozen fluid', freezingj], +jout, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], -, [out, flow]), 
arc(ffaultjeak to environmenf], +, [in, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'pipe firacture'], +j in, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'pipe firacture'], -Jout, flowl), 
arc(ffault, ['leak into vacuum system', vacuum] ], +, [in, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'Iiquid hammee], +jout, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'extemal heaf], +, [out, temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'extemal cold'], -, [out, temperature]), 
arc(ffault, 'thermal expansion'], +j in, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'thennal expansion'], +, [out, pressure]), 
%consequences resulting from faults 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environmene, toxic]]), 
arc(ffaultjeak to environmenf], +, [consequence, [Ioss of material', expensivefl), 
arc([fault, 'pipe fracture'], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environmenf, toxic]]), 
arc(ffaultjeak to environmenfl, +, [consequence, ['f ire/explosion risk!, flammablefl), 
arc(ffault, ['leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, fconsequence, 'Possible explosive mixture']), 
arc([fault, 'Iiquid hammer'], +, [consequence, 'pipeline supports broken']), 
arc([fault, 'extemal cold'], +, [consequence, 'freeze up]), 
arc([fault, 'thermal expansion'], +, [consequence, 'poss ible rupture']), 
%consequences resulting from deviations 
arc([deviation, [morePressure, in]], +, [consequence, 'possible rupture']) 
/* -------------------------------------------------- 
decanting vessel for lawley plant 
vin and vout are input and output for nitrogen 
outl is main outlet 
liqd = liquid, vapr = vapour 
/* -------------------------------------------------- 
frame(decantingvessel isa closedvessel, 
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inports info [in 1, vin ], 
outports info [out 1, vout, out2 
unitports info liqd, vapr 
propLinks info 
%propagation 
arc([in l, temperature], +, [Iiqd, temperature]), 
arc([ I iqd, tem perature], +, [out l, temperature]), 
arc([Iiqd, temperature], +, [out2, temperature]), 
arc([in l, flow], +, [liqd, level]), 
arc([outl, flow], -, [liqd, level]), 
arc([out2, flow], -, [liqd, level]), 
arc([vin, flowl, +, [vapr, pressure]), 
arc([vout, flow], -, [vapr, pressure]), 
arc([vin, flow], -jin I, flow]), 
arc([vout, flow], +, [in ljlow]), 
arc([inl, noFlowl, - -, [Iiqd, levell), 
arc([outl, noFlow], ++, [Iiqd, level]), 
arc([in l, noFlow], ++, [out I, noFlow]), 
arc([out2, noFlow], ++, [Iiqd, level]), 
arc([vout, noFlow], ++, [vapr, pressure]), 
arc([ in l, noFlow], ++, [out2, noFlow]), 
arc([vin, noFlow], ++, [ini, flow]), 
arc([vout, noFlow], - -jin l, flowl), 
arc([outl, reverseFlow], ++, [Iiqd, level]), 
arc([out2, reverseFlow], ++, [Iiqd, level]), 
arc([in l, pressure], +, [vapr, pressure]), 
arc([vin, pressure], +, [vapr, pressure]), 
arc([vout, pressure], +, [vapr, pressure]), 
arc([in l, pressure], +jliqd, level]), 
arc([out l, pressure], +, [Iiqd, level]), 
arc([out2, pressure], +, [I iqd, level]), 
arc([out l, pressure], +, [vapr, pressure]), 
arc([out2, pressure], +, [vapr, pressure]), 
arc([in l, concentration], +, [Iiqd, concentration]), 
arc([ I iqd, concentration], +, [out l, concentration]), 
arc([vin, concentration], +, [vapr, concentration]), 
arc([vapr, concentration], +, [vout, concentration]), 
arc([ I iqd, concentration], +, [out2, concentration]), 
%faults 
arc([fault, 'outietl partly blocked'], -, [out l, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'outletl completely blocked'], +, [outl, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], -, [liqd, level]), 
arc([fault, 'extemal fire'], +j I iqd, temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'cold weather], -, [Iiqd, temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'inlet I siphon breaker blockage'], +, [in l, revcrseFlow]), 
arc(ffault, ['leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [inl, pressure]), 
arc(ffault, 'outlet: 2 completely blocked'], +, [out2, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'outlet2 partly blocked'], -, [out2, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], -, [outl, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], -jout2, flow]), 
arc(ffault, 'leak to environment'j, +jinl, flow]), 
%consequences resulting from faults 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environment', toxic]]), 
arc(ffaultjeak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['fire/explosion risk', flammablefl), 
arc(ffaultjeak to environment'], +, [consequence, [Ioss of material', expensive]]), 
arc([fault, 'extemal fire'], +, [con sequence, 'structural weakening']), 
arc([fault, ['Ieak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, fconsequence, 'Possible explosive mixture']), 
arc([fault, 'extemal fire'], +, [consequence, 'possible rupture']), 
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%consequences resulting from deviations 
arc([deviation, fmoreLevel, l iqd]], +, [consequence, 'overfil ling']), 
arc([deviation, [moreConcentration, liqdl], +, [consequence, 'rubber lining corrosion in hot caustic']), 
arc([deviation, [moreConcentration, liqd]], +, [consequence, 'emulsification of contents']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, liqd]], +, [consequence, 'increased evaporation']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, liqd]], +, [consequence, 'flammable or toxic vapour release']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, liqd]], +, [consequence, 'crystallisation']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, liqd]], +, [consequence, 'viscosity increase']), 
arc([deviation, [IessTemperature, liqd]], +, [consequence, 'viscosity decrease']), 
arc([deviation, [IessLevel, liqd]], +, [consequence, 'vesseI emptying! ]), 
arc([deviation, [morePressure, vapr]], +, [consequence, 'possible rupture']), 
arc([deviation, [noFlow, vin]], +, [consequence, ['Ioss of blanket and explosion risk!, flarnmablefl), 
arc([deviation, [IessFIow, vin]], +, [consequence, 'vacuum collapse']), 
arc([deviation, [moreFlow, vout]], +, [consequence, [Ioss of material', expensive]]), 
arc([deviation, [moreFlow, inl]], +, [consequence, 'incomplete separation of water']) 
/* -------------------------------------------- - ---- 
Dummy source of plant 
/* -------------------------------------------------- */ 
frame(nitrogensupply isa unit, 
outports info [out], 
propLinks info [ 
%faults 
arc([fault, 'inlet completely blocked'], +jout, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'iniet partly blocked! ], -, [out, flowl), 
arc([fault, 'iniet completely blocked'], -, [out, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environment'], -, [out, flow]), 
%consequences resulting from faults 
arc([fault, 'Ieak to environmenf], +, [consequence, ['Ioss of material', expensivefl) 
). 
D. 3. HAZOP Results (Standard Approach) 
Examples from the HAZOP emulation results created by QUEEN are shown. For brevity 
the full set of results is not given. The examples include the errors in the HAZOP analysis 
identified in section 7.4.2.2. 
feedinlet no flow out valvel: completely 
blocked, feedpipe: 
completely blocked, 
feedinlet: inlet 
completely blocked 
feedinlet less flow valvels: partly 
out blocked, completely 
blocked, 
flaresystemi: partly 
blocked, blocked, 
feedpipe: partly. 
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blocked, feedinlet: 
inlet partly blocked 
feedinlet: leak to contaminate 
environment environment, 
fire/explosion 
risk, loss of 
material 
feedinlet more flow valve18: leak to contaminate 
out environment, environment, loss 
feedpipe: leak to of material, 
environment fire/explosion risk 
valve17: partly 
blocked, completely 
blocked, 
nitogeninleti: inlet 
partly blocked, inlet 
completely blocked 
storagetank: leak to contaminate 
environment, environment, 
flaresystemi: leak to fire/explosion 
environment risk, loss of 
material 
nitogeninleti: leak loss of material 
to environment 
feedpipe: pipe contaminate 
fracture environment 
feedinlet less feedinlet: cold 
temperature out weather 
feedinlet more valvel: thermal flange leak 
pressure out expansion of contents 
valvel: closed in 
error 
feedinlet reverse storagetank: inleti 
flow out siphon breaker 
blockage 
feedpipe more valvel: thermal possible rupture, 
pressure in expansion of contents flange leak 
storagetank no flow valve17: completely loss of blanket and 
vin blocked, explosion risk 
nitogeninleti: inlet 
completely blocked 
- etc. - 
storagetank less flow valve3: partly 
outl blocked, storagetank: 
outleti partly 
blocked, divideri: 
inlet-partly blocked, 
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branch 2 partly 
blocked, branch 
partly blocked 
- etc. - 
storagetank more 
level liqd 
valveS: thermal overfilling, flange 
expansion of contents leak 
valve3: partly overfilling 
blocked, closed in 
error, valve2: 
completely blocked, 
storagetank: outleti 
partly blocked, 
outletl completely 
blocked, 
nitogeninleti: inlet 
partly blocked, inlet 
completely blocked, 
divideri: inlet 
partly blocked, inlet 
completely blocked, 
branch 2 partly 
blocked, branch 1 
partly blocked 
valve18: leak to overfilling, 
environment contaminate 
environment, loss 
of material, 
fire/explosion risk 
nitogeninleti: leak overfilling, loss 
to environment of material 
flaresystemi: leak to overfilling, 
environment contaminate 
environment, 
fire/explosion 
risk, loss of 
material 
- etc. - 
dividerl no flow out2 divideri: branch 2 
completely blocked 
valveS more flow out valve5: open or 
passing 
pumpilb: leak to contaminate 
environment environment, 
fire/explosion 
risk, loss of 
material 
- etc. - 
I pumpjib less flow out I valve6: thermal ,I flange leak .1 
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expansion of contents 
I pumpjlb more flow out valveG: leak to contaminate 
environment environment, loss 
of material, 
fire/explosion risk 
pumpilb: spare unit 
turned on 
pumpjlb more pressure valve6: thermal possible rupture, 
out expansion of contents flange leak 
pumpjlb: spare unit possible rupture 
turned on 
valve6 no flow out headeri: branch 2 
completely blocked 
valve6 less flow out headeri: branch 2 
partly blocked 
valve6 more flow out valve6: open or 
passing 
- etc. - 
buffertank less flow 
outi 
valvell: partly 
blocked, divider2: 
inlet partly blocked, 
branch 2 partly 
blocked, branch 1 
partly blocked, 
buffertank: outleti 
partly blocked 
- etc. - 
buffertank more level valve9: thermal overfilling, flange 
liqd expansion of contents leak 
valve20: leak to overfilling, 
environment contaminate 
environment, loss 
of material, 
fire/explosion risk 
valve19: partly overfilling 
blocked, completely 
blocked, valvell: 
closed in error, 
nitrogeninlet2: inlet 
partly blocked, inlet 
completely blocked, 
divider2: inlet 
partly blocked, inlet 
completely blocked, 
branch 2 partly 
blocked, branch I 
partly blocked, 
buffertank: outlet2 
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partly blocked, 
outlet2 completely 
blocked, outleti 
partly blocked, 
outletl completely 
blocked 
nitrogeninlet2: leak overfilling, loss 
to environment of material 
halfmileline: thermal overfilling, 
expansion possible rupture 
halfmileline: liquid overfilling, 
hammer pipeline supports 
broken 
flaresystem2: leak to overfilling, 
environment contaminate 
environment, 
fire/explosion 
risk, loss of 
material 
- etc. - 
divider2 no flow out2 divider2: branch 2 
completely blocked 
valve13 more flow out valve13: open or 
passing 
pumpj2b: leak to contaminate 
environment environment, 
fire/explosion 
risk, loss of 
material 
- etc. - 
pumpj2b less flow out valve14: thermal flange leak 
expansion of contents 
pumpj2b more flow out valve14: leak to contaminate 
environment environment, loss 
of material, 
fire/explosion risk 
pumpj2b: spare unit 
turned on 
pumpj2b more pressure valve14: thermal possible rupture, 
out expansion of contents flange leak 
pumpj2b: spare unit possible rupture 
turned on 
valve14 no flow out header2: branch 2 
completely blocked 
valve14 less flow out header2: branch 2 
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II partly blocked 
valve14 more flow out valve14: open or 
passing 
- etc. - 
reactorl more level 
liqd 
valve16: thermal overfilling, flange 
expansion of contents leak 
valve16: partly overfilling 
blocked, completely 
blocked, closed in 
error, tail2: partly 
blocked, blocked, 
reactorl: outleti 
partly blocked, 
outletl completely 
blocked, heatexi: 
partly blocked 
(heating side), 
blockage (heating 
side) 
-etc. - 
reactorl less level valve16: leak to vessel emptying, 
liqd environment, header2: contaminate 
leak to environment environment, loss 
of material, 
fire/explosion risk 
valve15: partly 
blocked, completely 
blocked, closed in 
error, heatex2: 
partly blocked 
(heated side), 
blockage (heated 
side), header2: 
outlet partly 
blocked, outlet 
completely blocked 
tail2: leak to 
environment, 
reactorl: leak to 
environment 
heatexi: holed 
heatexchanger 
reactorl more valve16: closed in 
pressure vapr error 
vessel emptying 
vessel emptying, 
contaminate 
environment, 
fire/explosion 
risk, loss of 
material 
vessel emptying, 
contamination of 
product 
possible rupture 
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D. 4. Modified Plant Description (Mod ula r. Approach) 
See section 7.1. for a plant diagram. 
instanceffeed inlet isa source, 
[outports info 
[out is [valve l, in]] 
instance(valve I isa valve, 
[outports info 
[out is [feedpipe, in]], 
aperture is open 
instance(feedpipe isa pipe, 
[outports info 
[out is [storagetank, inll] 
I 
instance(storagetank isa blanketedvessel, 
[outports info 
[out I is [valve2jn], vout is [valve I 8, in]] 
instance(valve2 isa valve, 
[outports info 
[out is [byps I 
_, 
divider I_in]], 
aperture is open 
instance(valve7 isa valve, 
[outports info 
[out is [halfmileline, in]], 
aperture is open 
instance(halfmilcline isa pipeline, 
[outports info 
[out is [valve8jnj] 
instance(valveg isa valve, 
[outports info 
[out is [buffertank, inl]], 
aperture is open 
instance(buffertank isa decantingvessel, 
[outports info 
[outl is [valve I O, in], out2 is [valve9jn], 
vout is [valve20, in]] 
I 
instance(valve9 isa valve, 
[outports info 
[out is [taill, in]], 
aperture is closed 
instance(tail I isa outlet, 
[outports info 
instance(valve 10 isa valve, 
[outports info 
[out is [byps2_, divider2_in]], 
aperture is open 
instance(valve 15 isa valve, 
[outports info 
[out is [heatingloop3_, heatext-htin]], 
aperture is open 
instance(tail2 isa outlet, 
[outports info 
instancc(tail3 isa outlet, 
[outports info 
instance(head2 isa stearnsupply, 
[outports info 
[out is [heatingloop3, heatex2_cdin]] 
instancc(n itogen inlet I isa nitrogensupply, 
[outports info 
[out is [valvel7, in]] 
instance(valve 17 isa valve, 
[outports info 
[out is [storagetank, vin]], 
aperture is open 
D-14 
] 
). 
instance(valve 18 isa valve, 
[outports info 
[out is [flaresysteml, in]), 
aperture is open 
instance(flaresystern I isa outlet, 
[outports info 
instance(nitrogeninlet2 isa nitrogensupply, 
[outports info 
[out is [valvel9, in]] 
instance(valve 19 isa valve, 
[outports info 
[out is [buffertank, vin]], 
aperture is open 
instance(byps I_ isa module-1, 
[outports info 
[headerl-out is [valve7, in]], 
divider I 
_purpose 
is tobypass, 
valve3_aperture is open, 
valve4_aperture is open, 
valve5_aperture is closed, 
pumpj I b_status is spare, 
valve6_aperture is closed, 
headerl_purpose is frombypass 
). 
instance(byps2_ isa module_2, 
[outports info 
[header2_out is [valve I 5, in]], 
divider2_purpose is tobypass, 
valve I I-aperture is open, 
valve 12_aperture is open, 
valve I 3_aperture is closed, 
pumpj2b_status is spare, 
valve 14_aperture is closed, 
header2_purpose is frombypass 
instance(valve20 isa valve, 
[outports info 
[out is [flaresystem2, in]], 
aperture is open 
instance(flaresystem2 isa outlet, 
[outports info 
). 
instance(heatingloop3_ isa module_3, 
[outports info 
[heatexi-cdot is [tail2, in], 
heatex2_dot is [tail3, in]], 
valve I 6_aperture is open 
). 
D. 5. Plant Models (Modular Approach) 
Models 'pipe', 'blanketedvessel', 'pipeline', 'decantingvessel', 'steamsupply' and 
4nitrogensupply' are duplicates of models given for the standard approach (section D. 2). 
Models 'source', 'valve' and 'outlet' are duplicates of the same models given for the 
standard approach for the benzene purification system (section C. 2). These models have 
been removed to avoid repetition. 
/* -------------------------------------------------- 
The module is composed of the following units: 
heatex I htot connected to heatex2 htin, 
heatex2 Mot connected to reactor I in 1, 
reactor I out I connected to valve 16 in, 
valve 16 out connected to heatex I cdin. 
Conditions of module are: 
valve I 6_aperture is open 
and this completes the module. 
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/* -------------------------------------------------- 
frame(module_3 isa module, 
inports, info [ heatex I- htin, heatex2 
- 
cdin 
outports; info heatexI 
- 
cdot, heatex2 cdot 
unitportsinfo heatex 1-cdin, heatex F htot, heatex2-htin, heatex2-htot, reactor I 
-in 
1, reactor I_Iiqd, 
reactor I 
-vapr 
], 
valve I 6_aperture is unknown, 
propLinks info [ 
%propagation 
arc([heatex I 
-htin, 
flow], +, [heatex I-htot, temperature]), 
arc([heatex 1-cdot, pressure], +, [heatex I_cdin, pressure]), 
arc([heatex2 
- 
cdot, flow], +, [heatex2_cdin, flow]), 
arc([heatex2_cdin, flow], +, [heatex2_cdot, temperature]), 
arc([heatex I 
-htin, 
flow], +, [reactor I_in I, flow]), 
arc([heatex I 
-htin, 
flow], +, [reactor I_Iiqd, level]), 
arc([heatex2_cd in, flow], +, [reactor I-liqd, temperature]), 
arc([heatex 1-htin, flow], +, [heatex2_htot, temperature]), 
arc([heatex I 
-cdot, 
flowl, -, [reactor I_Iiqd, level]), 
arc([heatex2_cdin, flow], +, [heatex 1-cdot, temperature]), 
arc([heatex2 
- 
cdin, flow], +, [heatex2 
- 
cdot, flow]), 
arc([heatex2_cdin, flow], +, [heatex2_htot, temperature]), 
arc([heatex2_cdin, temperature], +, [heatex2 
- 
cdot, temperature]), 
arc([heatex I 
_htin, 
temperature], +, [heatex2 
- 
htot, temperature]), 
arc([heatex I 
-htin, 
temperature], +, [heatex I 
_htot, 
temperature]), 
arc([heatex 1-htin, temperature], +, [heatex I- cdot, temperature]), 
arc([heatex 1-htin, temperature], +, [heatex2_cdot, temperature]), 
arc([heatex2_cdin, temperaturel, +, [heatex I- cdot, temperature]), 
arc([heatex2 
- 
cdin, temperature], +, [heatex2 
- 
htot, temperature]), 
arc([heatex2_cdin, pressurel, +, [heatex2 
- 
cdot, pressure]), 
arc([heatex I- ht in, pressure], +, [reactor I 
_yapr, pressure]), arc([heatex2_cdot, pressure], +, [heatex2 
- 
cdin, pressurel), 
arc([heatex2_cdot, reverseFlow], ++, [heatex2 
- 
cdin, reverseFlow]), 
arc([heatex2 
- 
cdot, noFlow], ++, [heatex2 
- 
cdin, noFlow]), 
arc([heatex2_ýcdin, noFlow], ++, [heatex2_cdot, noFlow]), 
arc([heatexl-htin, noFlow], - -jreactor I _Iiqd, 
level]), 
arc([heatex2_cdin, noFlowl, - -, [reactor I _Iiqd, 
temperature]), 
arc([heatex I- htin, noFlow], ++, [heatex I- cdot, noFlow]), 
arc([heatex 1_cdot, noFlow], ++, [reactor I-liqd, level]), 
arc([heatex2 
- 
cdin, noFlow], - -, [heatex I- cdot, temperature]), 
arc([heatex2_cdin, concentrationl, +, [heatex2_cdot, concentration]), 
arc([heatex I- htin, concentration], +, [reactor I_Iiqd, concentration]), 
arc([heatex I 
_htin, concentrat 
ion], +, [heatex I 
-cdot, concentration]), 
%faults 
arc([fault, 'heatex2 holed heatexchangee], +, [heatex2 
- cdin, 
flowl), 
arcffault, 'heatex2 holed heatexchanger], -, [heatex2 - cdot, 
flow]), 
arc([fault, 'heatexl holed heatexchanger'], -, [heatexl-cdot, flow]), 
arcffault, 'heatexI partly blocked (heating side)'], -, [heatex I- cdot, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'heatexl fouling'], +, [heatex I-cdot, temperature]), 
arcffault, 'heatexI fouling'], -, [reactor I- liqd, temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'heatexl blockage (heating side)'], +, [heatex I- cdot, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'heatexl blockage (heated side)'], +, [heatexl_cdot, noFlow]), 
arcffault, 'heatexI blockage (heated side)'j, +, [heatexI htin, noFlow]), 
arcffault, 'heatexI blockage (heating side)'], +, [heatexT cdin, pressure]), 
arcffault, 'heatexl blockage (heating side)'], -, [heatex I _Sdot, pressure]), arc([fault, 'heatexl blockage (heated side)'], +, [heatex I -htin, pressure)), 
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arc([fault, 'heatex I blockage (heated side)'], -, [reactor I -vapr, pressure]), arc([fault, 'heatex I blockage (heating side)'], -, [reactor I liqd, temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'heatex2 partly blocked (heating side)'], -, [heatex2_cdot, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'heatex2 fouling'], +, [heatex2_cdot, temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'heatex2 fouling'], -, [heatexl-cdot, temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'heatex2 fouling'], -, [reactor I _Iiqd, 
temperature]), 
arcffault, 'heatex2 blockage (heating side)'], +, [heatex2_cdot, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'heatex2 blockage (heated side)'], +, [heatexl-cdot, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'heatex2 blockage (heated side)'], +, [heatexl-htin, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'heatex2 blockage (heating side)'], +, [heatex2_cdin, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'heatex2 blockage (heating side)'], -, [heatex2_cdot, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'heatex2 blockage (heated side)'], +, [heatex2_htin, pressure]), 
arcffault, 'heatex2 blockage (heated side)'], +, [heatex I- htin, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'heatex2 blockage (heated side)'], -, [reactor I -Yaprpressure]), arcffault, 'heatex2 blockage (heating side)'], -, [heatexl-cdot, temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'heatex2 blockage (heating side)'], -, [reactor I _I 
iqd, temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'heatex2 blockage (heated side)'], +, [heatex2_cdot, temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'reactorl leak to environment'], -, [reactor I _I 
iqd, level]), 
arc([fault, 'reactorl external fire'], +, [reactor I _I 
iqd, tem perature]), 
arc([fault, 'reactorl external fire'], +, [heatex I -cdot, 
temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'reactorl cold weathee], -, [reactor I _Iiqd, 
temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'reactorl cold weather'], -, [heatex I- cdot, temperature]), 
arc([fault, 'reactorl inletl siphon breaker blockage'], +, [heatexl-htin, reverseFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'reactorl leak to environment'], -, [heatex I- htin, pressure]), 
arcffault, ['reactor I leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [heatexl-htin, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'reactorl outletl partly blocked'], -, [heatex I- cdot, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'reactorl outletl completely blocked'], +, [heatex I- cdot, noFlow)), 
arc([fault, 'reactorl outletl completely blocked'], +, [heatexl_htin, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'valvel6 partly blocked'], -, [heatexi-cdot, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'valvel6 partly blocked'], +, [reactor I _I 
iqd, level]), 
arc([fault, 'valvel6 completely blocked'], +, [reactor I _Iiqd, 
level]), 
arc([fault, 'reactorl outletl partly blocked'], +, [reactor I _Iiqd, 
level]), 
arc([fault, 'reactorl outletl completely blocked'], +, [reactor I- liqd, level]), 
arc([fault, 'valvel6 completely blocked'], +, [heatex I-cdot, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'valvel6 completely blocked'], +, [heatexl - 
htin, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, ['valvel6 blocked by frozen fluid, freezing]], +, [heatex I -cdot, 
noFlow]), 
arc([fault, ['valve 16 blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, [heatex I- htin, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'valvel6 closed in effor'], +, [heatexl-cdot, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve 16 closed in erroe], +, [heatex I- htin, noFlow]), 
arcffault, [valve 16 blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, [reactorl_liqd, level]), 
arcffault, ['valvel6 leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [reactorl_liqd, levell), 
arc([fault, 'valve 16 leak to environment'], -, [heatex 1-cdot, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'valvel6 leak to environmenf], -, [rcactorl_liqd, level]), 
arc([fault, 'reactorl leak to environment' ], +, [heatexl 
- 
htin, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'reactorl leak to environment' ], -, [heatex I- cdot, flow]), 
arcffault, 'heatex2 partly blocked (heated side)'], -, [heatex I- htin, flow]), 
arcffault, 'heatex2 partly blocked (heated side)'], -, [reactor I _I 
iqd, I eve 11), 
arc([fault, 'heatexl partly blocked (heated side)'], -, [reactor I _I 
iqd, level]), 
arc([fault, 'heatexl blockage (heating side)'], +, [reactor I 
_I 
iqd, level]), 
arc([fault, 'heatexl blockage (heated side)'], -, [reactor I _I 
iqd, level]), 
arcffault, 'heatexI partly blocked (heated side)'], -, [heatexl-htin, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'valvel6 closed in error], +, [reactor I _I 
iqd, l eve 1]), 
arcffault, 'valve 16 thermal expansion of contents'], +, [heatex I- cdot, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'valvel6 thermal expansion of contents'], +, [heatex I _cdin, pressure]), arc([fault, 'heatex2 holed heatexchangeel, -, [heatex2_cdot, temperature]), 
%consequences resulting from faults 
arc([fault, 'heatex2 holed heatexchangee], +, [consequence, 'contamination of product']), 
arc([fault, 'heatexl holed heatexchanger], +, [consequence, 'contamination of product']), 
arc([fault, 'reactorl leak to environment'], +, [consequence, [contaminate environment', toxic]]), 
arc([fault, 'reactorl leak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['fire/explosion risle, flarnmablefl), 
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arc([fault, 'reactorl leak to environment' ], +, [consequence, [Ioss of material', expensivefl), 
arc([fault, 'reactorl external fire'], +, [consequence, 'structural weakening! ]), 
arc([fault, ['reactorl leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [consequence, 'Possible explosive mixture']), 
arc([fault, 'reactorl external fire'], +, [consequence, 'possib le rupture']), 
arc([fault, 'valve 16 leak to environmenfj, +, [consequence, ['contaminate environment', toxic]]), 
arc([fault, 'valvel6 leak to environment' ], +, [consequence, [Ioss of material', expensivefl), 
arc([fault, 'valvel6 leak to environment' ], +, [consequence, ['fire/explosion risk!, flarnmablefl), 
arc([fault, 'valve 16 thermal expansion of contents'], +, [consequence, 'flange leak']), 
%consequences resulting from deviations 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, heatexI htot]], +, [consequence, 'boiling in heatexchangee]), 
arc([deviation, [IessTemperature, heatexI 
- 
ýdotfl, +, [consequencejreezing in heatexchanger']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, heatexI 
- 
htot]], +, [consequence, polymerisation']), 
arc([deviation, [morePressure, heatexl-cdin]], +, [consequence, 'possible rupture']), 
arc([deviation, [morePressure, heatexl-htin]], +, [consequence, 'possible rupture']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, heatexl_htotll, +, [consequence, 'mechanicaI failure due to 
overtemperature']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, heatex2 htot]], +, fconsequence, 'boiling in heatexchangee]), 
arc([deviation, [IessTemperature, heatex2 - 
ýdotfl, +Jconsequencejreezing in heatexchanger]), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, heatex2 - 
htot]], +, [consequence, 'polymerisation]), 
arc([dev iation, [more Pressure, heatex2_cd in]], +, [consequence, 'poss ib Ie rupture']), 
arc([dev iation, [more Pressure, heatex2_htin] ], +, [consequence, 'poss ib le rupture']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, heatex2_htot]], +, [consequence, 'mechanicaI failure due to 
overtemperature']), 
arc([deviation, [moreLevel, reactorI - 
liqdl], +, [consequence, 'overfilling']), 
arc([deviation, [moreConcentration, reactorl_liqd]], +, [consequence, 'rubber lining corrosion in hot 
caustic']), 
arc([deviation, [moreConcentration, reactorl-liqd]], +, [consequence, 'emulsification of contents']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, reactorl_liqd]], +, [consequence, 'increased evaporation']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, reactorl_liqd]], +, [consequence, 'flammable or toxic vapour release']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, reactorl_liqd]], +, [consequence, 'crystallisation']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, reactorl_liqd]], +, [consequence, 'viscosity increase']), 
arc([deviat ion, [lessTem peraturejeactor I 
_I 
iqd] ], +, [consequence, 'v iscosity decrease']), 
arc([deviation, [IessLevel, reactorl_liqd]], +, [consequence, 'vesseI emptying']), 
arc([dev iation, [more Pressure, reactor I- vapr]], +, [consequence, 'possible rupture']), 
arc([deviation, [moreFlow, reactorl_inl]], +, [consequence, 'incomplete separation of water']) 
/* -------------------------------------------------- 
The module is composed of the following units: 
divider2 out I connected to valve II in, 
divider2 out2 connected to valve 13 in, 
valve II out connected to pumpj2a in, 
purnpj2a out connected to valve 12 in, 
valve 12 out connected to header2 in 1, 
valve 13 out connected to pumpj2b in, 
pumpj2b out connected to valve 14 in, 
valve 14 out connected to header2 in2. 
Conditions of module are: 
divider2_purpose is tobypass, 
valve II -aperture 
is open, 
valve 12_aperture is open, 
valve 13_aperture is closed, 
pumpj2b_status is spare, 
valve I 4_aperture is closed, 
header2_purpose is frombypass 
and this completes the module. 
1* 
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/* -------------------------------------------------- */ 
frame(module_2 isa module, 
inports info [ divider2_in 
outports info header2-out 
unitports info pumpj2a - 
in, pumpj2a_out, pumpj2b_in, pumpj2b-out 1, 
dividcr2_purpose is toBypass, 
valve II 
-aperture 
is unknown, 
pumpj2a_status is unknown, 
valve I 2_aperture is unknown, 
valve I 3_aperture is unknown, 
pumpj2b_status is unknown, 
valve 14_apcrture is unknown, 
header2_purpose is fromBypass, 
propLinks info [ 
%propagation 
arc([divider2 - 
in, noFlow], ++jheader2 - out, 
noFlow]), 
arc([header2_out, noFlow], ++, fdivider2_in, noFlow]), 
arc([divider2_in, noFlow], ++, fpumpj2a - 
in, noFlow]), 
arc([divider2_in, temperature], +, [pumpj2a out, temperaturel), 
arc([divider2_in, temperature], +, [header2 - 
out, temperature]), 
arc([divider2_in, pressure], +, [pumpj2a_out, pressure]), 
arc([divider2_in, pressure], +, [header2_out, pressure]), 
arc([header2 out, reverseFlow], ++jpumpj2a out, reverseFlow]), 
arc([d iv ideri' in, concentrat ion], +, [header2_out, concentration]), 
%faults 
arc([fault, 'divider2 leak to environment'], +, [divider2 - 
in, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'divider2 leak to environmenf], -, [header2_out, flowl), 
arc([fauIQ'divider2 blocked by frozen fluid', freezingll, +, [divider2_in, noFlow]), 
arcQfauItj'divider2 blocked by frozen fluid', freezingll, +, [header2_out, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, ['divider2 blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +jpumpj2a - 
in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'divider2 inlet completely blocked'], +, [divider2_in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'divider2 inlet completely blocked'], +, [header2 - out, noFlowl), arc([fault, 'divider2 inlet completely blocked'], +, [pumpj2a, _in, noFlow]), arc([fault, 'divider2 inlet partly blocked'], -, [divider2_in, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'divider2 inlet partly blocked'], -, [header2 - out, 
flow)), 
arcffault, 'pumpj2a partly blocked'], -, [divider2_in, flowl), 
arc([fault, 'pumpj2a partly blocked'], -, [header2-out, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'pumpj2a completely blocked'], +, [header2_out, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'pumpj2a completely blocked'], +, [divider2_in, noFlowl), 
arc([fault, 'pumpj2a leak to environmenf], +, [divider2 - 
in, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'pumpj2a leak to environment'], -, [header2-out, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'pumpj2a air Iock! ], -, [divider2_in, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'pumpj2a air IocWj, -jheader2-out, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'pumpj2a air lock'], -, [header2_out, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'pumpj2a air locie], +, [divider2_in, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'pumpj2a power supply fails'], +, [header2-out, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'pumpj2a power supply fails'], +, [divider2_in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'pumpj2a power supply fails'], -jheader2 out, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'pumpj2a power supply fai Is'], +, [divider! in, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'pumpj2a impellor failure'], -jdivider2_in, flow]), 
arc(ffault, 'pumpj2a impellor failure'], -jheader2-out, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'pumpj2a impellor failure'], -, [header2_out, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'pumpj2a impellor failure'], +, [divider2 - 
in, pressure]), 
arc([fauIQ'pumpj2a leak into vacuum system', vacuum] j, +jdivider2_in, pressure]), 
arc(ffault, 'pumpj2a pump fails'], +, [divider2_in, reverseFlow]), 
arcffault, 'pumpj2a pump fails'], +, [header2_out, reverseFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'header2 outlet partly blocked'], -, [header2-out, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'header2 outlet partly blocked'], -, [divider2_in, flow]), 
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arcffault, 'header2 outlet completely blocked'], +, [header2 out, noFlow]), 
arcffault, 'header2 outlet completely blocked'], +, [divided in, noFlow]), 
arcffault, 'header2 outlet completely blocked'], +, [pumpj2aý_in, noFlow]), 
arcffauIt, ['header2 blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, [header2 out, noFlow]), 
arcffaultj'header2 blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +jdivided in, noFlow]), 
arcffauIt, ['header2 blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, [pumpj2a_in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'divider2 branch I completely blocked'], +, [divider2_in, noFlow]), 
arcffault, 'divider2 branch I completely blocked'], +, [header2 
- out, noFlow]), arcffault, 'divider2 branch I completely blocked'], +, [pumpj24_in, noFIow]), 
arcffault, 'divider2 branch I partly blocked'], -jdivider2_in, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'divider2 branch I partly blocked'], -, [header2 - outflow]), arc([fault, 'valve II partly blocked'], -jdivider2_in, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve II partly blocked'], -, [header2 - out, 
flow]), 
arc([fault, 'valvel2 partly blocked'], -, [header2_out, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'valvel2 partly blocked'], -, [divider2 - 
in, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve II completely blocked'], +, [divider2_in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve II completely blocked'], +, [header2 
- 
out, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve II completely blocked'], +, [pumpj2q_in, noFlow)), 
arc([fault, 'valvel2 completely blocked'], +, [divider2_in, noFlow]), 
arcffault, 'valve12 completely blocked'], +, [header2 
- 
out, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve 12 completely blocked'], +, [pumpj2a, 
_in, noFlowl), arcffault, ['valve II blocked by frozen fluid!, freezing]], +, [divider2_in, noFlow]), 
arcffault, ['valve II blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, [header2 
- 
out, noFlow]), 
arcffault, ['valve II blocked by frozen fluid', freezing] ], +jpumpj2a_in, noFIow]), 
arcffault, ['valve 12 blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, [divider2_in, noFlow]), 
arcffault, [valve 12 blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, [header2 
- 
out, noFlowl), 
arcffauIQ'vaIveI2 blocked by frozen fluid', freezing] ], +jpumpj2a, 
_in, noFIow]), arcffaultj'valve II leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [divider2_in, pressure]), 
arcffault, ['valve 12 leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [divider2_in, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'valvel I closed in erroei, +, [divider2_in, pressure]), 
arc([ fau It, 'valve II closed in error'], -, [pumpj2a - out, pressure]), arc([fault, 'valve II closed in error'], -, [header2_out, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'valvel I closed in error'], +, [pumpj2a 
- 
in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve II closed in error`], +jheader2_put, noFIow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve II closed in error'], +, [divider2_in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'valvel2 closed in error'], +, [pumpj2a 
- out, pressure]), arc([fault, 'valve 12 closed in error'], +, [d ivider2_in, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'valvel2 closed in error'], -, [header2 - out, pressure]), arc([fault, 'valvel2 closed in error'], +, [header2_out, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'valvel2 closed in error`J, +jdivider2_in, noFIow]), 
arc([fault, 'valvel2 closed in erroe], +jpumpj2a 
- 
in, noFlow]), 
arcffau It, ['valve 13 leak into vacuum system, vacuum]], +, [divider2_in, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'header2 branch I partly blocked'], -, [header2 - 
out, flow]), 
arcffault, 'header2 branch I partly blocked'], -, [d iv ider2 - 
in, flow]), 
arcffault, 'header2 branch I completely blocked'], +, [header2_out, noFlow]), 
arcffault, 'header2 branch I completely blocked'], +, [divider2_in, noFlow]), 
arcffault, 'header2 branch I completely bIocked'], +jpumpj2a 
- 
in, noFlow]), 
arcffault, 'header2 outlet completely blocked'], +, [pumpj2a_out, pressure]), 
arcffauIt, ['header2 blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, rpumpj2a 
- 
out, pressure]), 
arcffault, 'header2 branch I completely blocked'], +, [pumpj2a_out, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'valve 12 completely blocked'], +, [pumpj2a 
- 
out, pressure]), 
arcffault, ['valve 12 blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, [pumpj2a_out, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'valvel3 open or passing'j, +jdivider2_in, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'valvel3 leak to environmenf], +, [divider2 in, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve 13 leak to environmenf], -, [header2 
ýut, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve II leak to environment'], +, [divideri in, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve II leak to environmenf], -jheader2 
; ut, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve 12 leak to environment'], +, [divideri in, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve 12 leak to environment'], -, [header2_out, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve II thermal expansion'], +, [divider2_in, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'valvel2 thermal expansion'], +, [d iv ider2_in, pressure]), 
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arc(ffault, 'header2 leak to environmenf], -, [header2-out, flowl), 
arc([fault, 'header2 leak to environment'], +, [divider2_in, flow]), 
arc([fault, ['divider2 leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [divider2_in, pressure]), 
arcffault, ['header2 leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [divider2_in, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'valvel3 thermal expansion'], +, [d iv ider2_in, pressure]), 
%consequences resulting from faults 
arc(ffault, 'dividcr2 leak to environment'], +, [consequence, 'contaminate environmenf]), 
arc([fault, 'divider2 leak to environmenf], +, [consequence, ['fire/explosion risk', flammable]]), 
arc([fault, 'divider2 leak to environmenf], +, [consequence, ['Ioss of material', expensivefl), 
arc(ffaulQ'divider2 leak into vacuum system', vacuuml], +, [consequence, 'Possible explosive mixture']), 
arc([fault, 'valve II leak to environment' ], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environment', toxic]]), 
arc([fault, 'valve II leak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['Ioss of material', expensive]]), 
arc([fault, 'valve II leak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['fire/explosion risk', flammablefl), 
arc([fault, 'valve II thermal expansion'], +, [consequence, 'flange leale]), 
arc(ffault, 'pumpj2a leak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environment, toxic]]), 
arc(ffault, 'pumpj2a leak to environment! ], +, [consequence, ['fire/explosion risk', flarnmablefl), 
arc([fault, 'pumpj2a leak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['loss of material', expensivefl), 
arc([fault, ['pumpj2a leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [consequence, 'Possible explosive mixture']), 
arc([fault, 'valvel2 leak to environmenf], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environment', toxic]]), 
arc([fault, 'valvel2 leak to environment'], +, [consequence, [Ioss of material', expensivefl), 
arc([fault, 'valvel2 leak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['fire/explosion risk', flammablefl), 
arc([fault, 'valvel2 thermal expansion'], +, [consequence, 'flange leak']), 
arc([fault, 'valve 13 leak to environment! ], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environment', toxic]]), 
arc([fault, 'valve 13 leak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['Ioss of material', expensivefl), 
arc([fault, 'valvel 3 leak to environment' ], +, [consequence, ['f ire/explosion risk', flammablefl), 
arc([fault, 'valve 13 thermal expansion'], +, [consequence, 'flange leak']), 
arc([fault, 'header2 leak to environment! ], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environment', toxic]]), 
arc([fault, 'header2 leak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['Ioss of material', expensivefl), 
arc([fault, 'header2 leak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['fire/explosion risk', flarnmablefl), 
arc(ffaultj'header2 leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [consequence, 'Possible explosive mixture']), 
arc([fault, 'valve 13 open or passing! ], +, [consequence, 'spare pump possible rupture']), 
%consequences resulting from deviations 
arc([deviation, [morePressure, divider2 
- 
in]], +, [consequence, 'possible rupture']), 
arc([deviation, [morePressure, pumpj2a_out]], +, [consequence, 'possible rupture']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, pumpj2a 
- 
out]], +, [consequence, 'overheating']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, pumpj2a, _out]], 
+, [consequence, 'gland failure']), 
arc([deviation, [reverseFlow, pumpj2a 
- 
out]], +, [consequence, 'pump driven backwards]), 
arc([deviation, [noFlow, pumpj2a_in]], +, [consequence, 'overheating']), 
arc([deviation, [noFlow, pumpj2a_in]], +, [consequence, 'gland failure]) 
/* ----------------------- - ------------------------- 
The module is composed of the following units: 
divider I out I connected to valve3 in, 
dividerl out2 connected to valve5 in, 
valve3 out connected to pumpj Ia in, 
pumpj Ia out connected to valve4 in, 
valve4 out connected to header I in 1, 
valve5 out connected to pumpj Ib in, 
pumpj Ib out connected to valve6 in, 
valve6 out connected to header I in2. 
Conditions of module are: 
divider I 
_purpose 
is tobypass, 
valve3_aperture is open, 
valve4_aperture is open, 
valve5_aperture is closed, 
pumpj I b_status is spare, 
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valve6_aperture is closed, 
headerl_purpose is frombypass 
and this completes the module. 
/* -------------------------------------------------- 
frame(module_1 isa module, 
inports info [ dividerl_in 
outports info [ headerl. 
- out unitportsinfo [pumpjla_in, pumpjla_out, pumpjlb-in, pumpjlb-oUt], 
divider I 
_purpose 
is toBypass, 
valve3_aperture is unknown, 
pumpj I a_status is unknown, 
valve4_aperture is unknown, 
valve5_aperture is unknown, 
pumpj I b_status is unknown, 
valve6_aperture is unknown, 
headerl_purpose is fromBypass, 
propLinks info [ 
%propagation 
arc([d ivider I_in, noFlowl, ++, [header I out, noFlowl), 
arc([headerl 
- out, noFlow], 
++, [divideil--in, noFlow]), 
arc([dividerl_in, noFlowl, ++, [pumpjla_in, noFlow]), 
arc([dividerl_in, temperature], +, [pumpjla 
- out, 
temperature]), 
arc([divider 1-in, temperature], +, [header I 
-Out, 
temperature]), 
arc([dividerl_in, pressurel, +, [pumpjla 
- out, pressure]), arc([d ivider I 
_in, pressure], 
+, [header I 
_put, 
pressurel), 
arc([headerl-out, reverseFlow], ++, [pumpj la_out, reverseFlow]), 
arc([divider I 
_in, 
concentration], +, [header I 
-out, 
concentration]), 
%faults 
arc([fault, 'dividerl leak to environmenf], +, [dividerl_in, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'dividerl leak to environmenf], -, [headerl - 
out, flow]), 
arc([fault, ['dividerl blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, [dividerl_in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, ['dividerl blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, [header I- out, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, ['dividerl blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, [pumpjIajn, noFIow]), 
arc([fault, 'dividerl inlet completely blocked'], +, [divider I 
_in, 
noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'dividerl inlet completely blocked'], +, [header I- out, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'dividerl inlet completely blocked'], +, [pumpj I a, 
_in, 
noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'dividerl inlet partly blocked'], -, [divider I- in, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'dividerl inlet partly blocked'], -, [headerl--Put, flow]), 
arcffault, 'pumpj la partly blocked'], -, [divider I _in, 
flow]), 
arc([fault, 'pumpj Ia partly blocked'], -, [header I- out, flow]), 
arc(ffault, 'pumpj Ia completely blocked'], +, [header I 
_out, noFlow]), arcffault, 'pumpj Ia completely blocked'], +, [divider I_in, noFlow]), 
arc(ffault, 'pumpj Ia leak to environment'], +, [divider I_in, flow]), 
arcffault, 'pumpj la leak to environment'], -, [header I- out, flow]), 
arc(ffault, 'pumpj Ia air lock'], -, [divider I _in, 
flow]), 
arc(ffault, 'pumpj Ia air lock'], -, [header I- out, flow]), 
arc(ffault, 'pumpj Ia air lock'], -, [header I _ýout, pressure]), arc(ffault, 'pumpj Ia air lock'], +, [divider l_in, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'pumpj Ia power supply fails'], +, [header I out, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'pumpj Ia power supply fails'], +, [divider I- in, noFlow]), 
arc(ffault, 'pumpj Ia power supply fails'], -, [headerl_out, pressure]), 
arc(ffault, 'pumpj Ia power supply fai Is'], +, [divider I_in, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'pumpjla impellor failure'], -, [divider I _in, 
flow]), 
arc(ffault, 'pumpj Ia impellor failure'], -, [headerl - out, 
flow]), 
arc(ffault, 'pumpj Ia impellor failure'], -, [header I _put, pressure]), arc([fault, 'pumpjla impellor failure'], +, [dividerl_in, pressurel), 
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arc(ffaultj'pumpj Ia leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [dividerl-in, pressure]), 
arc(ffault, 'pumpj Ia pump fails'], +, [dividerl_in, reverseFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'pumpj Ia pump fails'], +, [headerl-oUt, reverseFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'headerl outlet partly blocked'], -, [headerl-out, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'headerl outlet partly blocked'], -, (dividerl_in, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'headert outlet completely blocked'], +, [header I -out, noFlow]), arc([fault, 'headerl outlet completely blocked'], +, [dividerl_in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'headerl outlet completely blocked'), +jpumpj Ia- in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, ['header I blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, [headerl-out, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, ['header I blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, [divider I 
_in, noFlow]), arc([fault, ['headerl blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, [pumpj Ia- in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'dividerl branch I completely blocked'], +, [dividerl_in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'dividerl branch I completely blocked'], +, [headerl-out, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'dividerl branch I completely blocked'], +, [pumpj la - 
in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'dividerl branch I partly blocked'], -, [dividerl_in, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'dividerl branch I partly blocked'], -, [headerl-out, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve3 partly blocked'], -jdividerl_in, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve3 partly blocked'], -, [headerl-out, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve4 partly blocked'], -, [headerl-out, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve4 partly blocked'], -jdividerl_in, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve3 completely blocked'], +, [divider I_in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve3 completely blocked'], +, [headerl-out, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve3 completely blocked'], +jpumpj Ia- in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve4 completely blocked'], +, [dividerl-in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve4 completely blocked'], +, [headerl-out, noFlow]), 
arc([fau lt, 'valve4 completely blocked'], +, [pumpj Ia in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, ['valve3 blocked by frozen fluid', freezinj]], +, [divider I _in, noFlow]), arc([fault, ['valve3 blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, [header I -out, noFlow]), arc([fault, ['valve3 blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, [pumpj Ia- in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, ['valve4 blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, [dividerl_in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, ['valve4 blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, [header I -out, 
noFlow]), 
arc([fault, ['valve4 blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, [pumpj Ia- in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, ['valve3 leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [dividerl_in, pressure]), 
arc([fault, ['valve4 leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [divider I _in, pressure]), arc([fault, 'valve3 closed in error'], +, [divider I 
_in, 
pressure]), 
arc([fau lt, 'valve3 closed in erroe], -jpumpj Ia- out, pressurel), 
arc([fault, 'valve3 closed in error], -, [header I _out, 
pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'valve3 closed in error'], +, [pumpj Ia- in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve3 closed in erroe], +, [header I 
_out, 
noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve3 closed in error'], +, [dividerl_in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve4 closed in erroe], +, [pumpj I a_out, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'valve4 closed in error'], +, [divider 1-in, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'valve4 closed in erroe], -, [header I- out, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'valve4 closed in erroil], +, [headerl-out, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve4 closed in errorll, +, [dividerl_in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve4 closed in error'], +jpumpj Ia- in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, ['valve5 leak into vacuum system', vacuum] ], +, [divider I 
_in, 
pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'headerl branch I partly blocked'], -, [header I out, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'headerl branch I partly blocked'], -, [divider 17 in, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'headerl branch I completely blocked'], +, [headerl-out, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'headert branch I completely blocked'], +, [dividerl_in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'headerl branch I completely blocked'], +, [pumpj Ia- in, noFlow]), 
arc([fault, 'headerl outlet completely blocked'], +, [pumpj la_out, pressure]), 
arc(ffault, ['header I blocked by frozen fluid', freezing]], +, [pumpj Ia- out, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'headerl branch I completely blocked'], +jpumpj I a_out, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'valve4 completely blocked'], +, fpumpj Ia out, pressure]), 
arc([fault, ['valve4 blocked by frozen fluid', freezinj]], +jpumpj I a_out, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 open or passing'], +, [divider I _in, 
flowl), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 leak to environment'], +, [dividerl_in, flowl), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 leak to environment'], -, [headeri-out, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve3 leak to environment'], +, [divider I_in, flow]), 
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arc([fault, 'valve3 leak to environmenV], -, [headerl-out, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve4 leak to environment'], +, [dividerl_in, flow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve4 leak to environment'], -, [header I -out, 
flow]), 
arc([fault, 'valve3 thermal expansion'], +, [d iv ider I _in, pressurel), arc([fault, 'valve4 thermal expansion'], +, [d iv ider I _in, pressure]), arc([fault, 'headerl leak to environment' ], -, [header I -out, 
flow]), 
arc([fault, 'headerl leak to environment'], +, [dividerl_in, flow]), 
arc([fault, ['dividerl leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [divider I 
_in, pressure]), arc([fau It, ['header I leak into vacuum system', vacuumfl, +, [divider I_in, pressure]), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 thermal expansion'], +, [divider I 
_in, pressure]), 
%consequences resulting from faults 
arc([fault, 'dividerl leak to enviromnent'], +, [consequence, 'contaminate environment']), 
arc([fault, 'dividerl leak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['fire/explosion risk', flarnmablefl), 
arc([fault, 'dividert leak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['Ioss of material', expensivefl), 
arc([fault, ['dividerl leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [consequence, 'Possible explosive mixture']), 
arc([fault, 'valve3 leak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environment', toxic]]), 
arc([fault, 'valve3 leak to environmenf], +, [consequence, [Ioss of material', expensivefl), 
arc([fault, 'valve3 leak to environment' ], +, [consequence, ['flre/explosion risk', flarnmablefl), 
arc([fault, 'valve3 thermal expansion'], +, [consequence, 'flange leak! ]), 
arc(ffault, 'pumpj Ia leak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environment', toxic]]), 
arc([fault, 'pumpj Ia leak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['fire/explosion risk', flarnmablefl), 
arc([fault, 'pumpj Ia leak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['Ioss of material', expensive]]), 
arc(ffaultj'pumpj Ia leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [consequence, 'Possible explosive mixture, ]), 
arc([fault, 'valve4 leak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environment', toxic]]), 
arc([fault, 'valve4 leak to environment! ], +, [consequence, ['loss of material', expensivefl), 
arc([fault, 'valve4 leak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['fire/explosion risk', flarnmablefl), 
arc([fault, 'valve4 thermal expansion'], +, [consequence, 'flange leak']), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 leak to environmenf], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environment', toxic]]), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 leak to environment'], +, [consequence, [Ioss of material', expensivefl), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 leak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['fire/explosion risk', flairimablefl), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 thermal expansion'], +, [consequence, 'flange leak']), 
arc([fault, 'headerl leak to environment'], +, [consequence, ['contaminate environment', toxic]]), 
arc([fault, 'headert leak to environment'], +, [consequence, [Ioss of material', expensive]]), 
arc([fault, 'headerl leak to environmenf], +, [consequence, ['fire/explosion risk', flammable]]), 
arc(ffault, ['header I leak into vacuum system', vacuum]], +, [consequence, 'Possible explosive mixture']), 
arc([fault, 'valve5 open or passing'], +, [consequence, 'spare pump possible rupture']), 
%consequences resulting from deviations 
arc([deviation, [morePressure, dividerl_in]], +, [consequence, 'possible rupture']), 
arc([deviation, (morePressure, pumpj Ia- out]], +, [consequence, 'possible rupture']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, pumpj I a_out]], +, [consequence, overheating']), 
arc([deviation, [moreTemperature, pumpj Ia- out]], +, [consequence, 'gland failure']), 
arc([deviation, [reverseFlow, pumpj I a_outfl, +, [consequence, 'pump driven backwards']), 
arc([deviation, [noFlow, pUmpj Ia- in]], +, [consequence, 'overheating']), 
arc([deviation, [noFlow, pumpj I a_infl, +, [consequence, 'gland failure']) 
D. 6. HAZOP Results (Modular Approach) 
Examples from the HAZOP emulation results created by QUEEN are shown. For brevity 
the full set of results is not given. 
feedinlet no flow out valvel: completely 
blocked, feedpipe: 
completely blocked, 
feedinlet: inlet 
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I completely blocked 
feedinlet less flow 
out 
feedinlet: leak to 
environment 
- etc. - 
storagetank less flow valve2: partly 
outl blocked, storagetank: 
outletl partly 
blocked, bypsl_: 
valve4 partly 
blocked, valve3 
partly blocked, 
pumpjla partly 
blocked, pumpjla 
impellor failure, 
pumpjla air lock, 
headerl outlet partly 
blocked, headerl 
branch 1 partly 
blocked, dividerl 
inlet partly blocked, 
dividerl branch 1 
partly blocked 
valve18: partly 
blocked, completely 
blocked, 
flaresystemi: partly 
blocked, blocked, 
feedpipe: partly 
blocked, feedinlet: 
inlet partly blocked 
contaminate 
environment, 
fire/explosion 
risk, loss of 
material 
- etc. - 
storagetank more 
level liqd 
valve8: completely 
blocked, valve2: 
partly blocked, 
closed in error, 
storagetank: outleti 
partly blocked, 
outletl completely 
blocked, 
nitogeninleti: inlet 
partly blocked, inlet 
completely blocked, 
halfmileline: 
completely blocked, 
bypsi : valve4 partly 
block; d, valve4 
completely blocked, 
valve4 closed in 
error, valve3 partly 
blocked, valve3 
completely blocked, 
valve3 closed in 
overfilling 
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error, pumpjla pump 
fails, pumpjla power 
supply fails, pumpjla 
partly blocked, 
pumpjla impellor 
failure, pumpjla 
completely blocked, 
pumpjla air lock, 
headerl outlet partly 
blocked, headerl 
outlet completely 
blocked, headerl 
branch 1 partly 
blocked, headerl 
branch 1 completely 
blocked, dividerl 
inlet partly blocked, 
dividerl inlet 
completely blocked, 
dividerl branch 1 
partly blocked, 
dividerl branch 1 
completely blocked 
valve2: thermal 
expansion of 
contents, bypsi 
valveS thermal 
expansion, valve4 
thermal expansion, 
valve3 thermal 
expansion 
valve18: leak to 
environment 
nitogeninleti: leak 
to environment 
flaresystemi: leak to 
environment 
overfilling, flange 
leak 
overfilling, 
contaminate 
environment, loss 
of material, 
fire/explosion risk 
overfilling, loss 
of material 
overfilling, 
contaminate 
environment, 
fire/explosion 
risk, loss of 
material 
- etc. - 
buffertank less flow 
outi 
valveIO: partly 
blocked, byps2 
-: valve12 partly 
blocked, valvell 
partly blocked, 
pumpj2a partly 
blocked, pumpj2a 
impellor failure, 
pumpj2a air lock, 
header2 outlet partly 
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blocked, header2 
branch 1 partly 
blocked, divider2 
inlet partly blocked, 
divider2 branch 1 
partly blocked, 
buffertank: outleti 
partly blocked 
- etc. - 
buffertank more level valve9: thermal overfilling, flange 
liqd expansion of leak 
contents, byps2_: 
valve13 thermal 
expansion, valve12 
thermal expansion, 
valvell thermal 
expansion 
valve20: leak to overfilling, 
environment contaminate 
environment, loss 
of material, 
fire/explosion risk 
valve19: partly 
blocked, completely 
blocked, valvelO: 
closed in error, 
nitrogeninlet2: inlet 
partly blocked, inlet 
completely blocked, 
heatingloop3_: 
valve16 completely 
blocked, valve16 
closed in error, 
reactorl outletl 
completely blocked, 
heatex2 blockage 
(heated side), 
heatexi blockage 
(heated side), 
byps2 
-: 
valve12 
partly blocked, 
valve12 completely 
blocked, valve12 
closed in error, 
valvell partly 
blocked, valvell 
completely blocked, 
valvell closed in 
error, pumpj2a pump 
fails, pumpj2a power 
supply fails, pumpj2a 
partly blocked, 
pumpj2a impellor 
failure, pumpj2a 
completely blocked, 
pumpi2a air lock, 
header2 outlet partly 
overfilling 
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blocked, header2 
outlet completely 
blocked, header2 
branch 1 partly 
blocked, header2 
branch 1 completely 
blocked, divider2 
inlet partly blocked, 
divider2 inlet 
completely blocked, 
divider2 branch 1 
partly blocked, 
divider2 branch I 
completely blocked, 
buffertank: outlet2 
partly blocked, 
outlet2 completely 
blocked, outleti 
partly blocked, 
outletl completely 
blocked 
nitrogeninlet2: leak 
to environment 
halfmileline: thermal 
expansion 
halfmileline: liquid 
hammer 
flaresystem2: leak to 
environment 
overfilling, loss 
of material 
overfilling, 
possible rupture 
overfilling, 
pipeline supports 
broken 
overfilling, 
contaminate 
environment, 
fire/explosion 
risk, loss of 
material 
- etc. - 
bypsi_ no flow 
pumpjla_in 
valve8: completely 
blocked, storagetank: 
outletl completely 
blocked, 
halfmileline: 
completely blocked, 
feedpipe: completely 
blocked, feedinlet: 
inlet completely 
blocked, bypsi 
-: valve4 completely 
blocked, valve4 
closed in error, 
valve3 completely 
blocked, valve3 
closed in error, 
pumpjla power supply 
fails, pumpjla 
completely blocked, 
headerl outlet 
overheating, gland 
failure 
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bypsl_ more 
temperature 
pumpjla-out 
bypsl_ more pressure 
pumpjla-out 
byps2_ no flow 
pumpj2a_in 
completely blocked, 
headerl branch 1 
completely blocked, 
dividerl inlet 
completely blocked, 
dividerl branch 1 
completely blocked 
storagetank: external overheating, gland 
fire failure, structural 
weakening 
bypsl valve4 possible rupture 
completely blocked, 
headerl outlet 
completely blocked, 
headerl branch 1 
completely blocked 
valve15: completely 
blocked, 
heatingloop3 
valveiG completely 
blocked, valve16 
closed in error, 
reactorl outletl 
completely blocked, 
heatex2 blockage 
(heated side), 
heatexi blockage 
(heated side), 
byps2 
-: 
valve12 
completely blocked, 
valve12 closed in 
error, valvell 
completely blocked, 
valvell closed in 
error, pumpj2a power 
supply fails, pumpj2a 
completely blocked, 
header2 outlet 
completely blocked, 
header2 branch 1 
completely blocked, 
divider2 inlet 
completely blocked, 
divider2 branch 1 
completely blocked, 
buffertank: outleti 
completely blocked 
overheating, gland 
failure 
byps2_ more halfmileline: overheating, gland 
temperature external heat failure 
pumpj2a-out 
buffertank: external overheating, gland 
fire failure, structural 
weakening, possible 
rupture 
byps2_ more pressure byps2_: valve12 possible rupture 
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pumpj2a-out completely blocked, 
header2 oUtlet. 
completely blocked, 
header2 branch 1 
completely blocked 
- etc. - 
heatingloop3_ more 
level reactori-liqd 
heatingloop3_ less 
level reactori-liqd 
tail2: partly overfilling 
blocked, blocked 
heatingloop3_: 
valve16 partly 
blocked, reactorl 
outletl partly 
blocked, heatexi 
partly blocked 
(heating side), 
heatexi blockage 
(heating side) 
heatingloop3_: overfilling, 
heatexi holed contamination of 
heatexchanger product 
valve15: partly 
blocked, completely 
blocked, 
heatingloop3_: 
heatex2 partly 
blocked (heated 
side), heatex2 
blockage (heated 
side), heatexi partly 
blocked (heated 
side), heatexl 
blockage (heated 
side), byps2_: 
valve12 partly 
blocked, valve12 
completely blocked, 
valve12 closed in 
error, valvell partly 
blocked, valvell 
completely blocked, 
valvell closed in 
error, pumpj2a power 
supply fails, pumpj2a 
partly blocked, 
pumpj2a impellor 
failure, pumpj2a 
completely blocked, 
pumpj2a air lock, 
header2 outlet partly 
blocked, header2 
outlet completely 
blocked, header2 
branch 1 partly 
blocked, header2 
branch 1 completely 
blocked, divider2 
inlet partly blocked, 
vessel emptying 
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divider2 inlet 
completely blocked, 
divider2 branch 1 
partly blocked, 
divider2 branch 1 
completely blocked, 
buffertank: outleti 
completely blocked 
valve15: leak to 
environment, 
heatingloop3_: 
valve16 leak to 
environment 
tail2: leak to 
environment, 
heatingloop3_: 
reactorl leak to 
environment 
vessel emptying, 
contaminate 
environment, loss 
of material, 
fire/explosion risk 
vessel emptying, 
contaminate 
environment, 
fire/explosion 
risk, loss of 
material 
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